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Abstract  
 
This thesis provides a functional, and justifiable application of the theory of the efficient breach of 
contract within the commercial context. Limiting the theory’s application in this way is the primary 
original contribution. This is because the theory of efficient breach has not been explicitly applied 
solely to the commercial setting previously. This is legitimate because the underlying intention 
behind commercial contracting is profit generation. As such, maximising the wealth which flows 
from commercial contracts will be the focus of the parties involved. An additional original 
contribution is that this thesis represents the first major discussion of efficient breach which applies 
the theory to English law.  
This thesis also makes additional contributions. A definition of “commercial” in a contract law 
context is established to frame the discussion that is to follow. It is then outlined that the fundamental 
structure of English contract law will remain the same whether a dispute concerns a commercial, or 
a non-commercial contract. However, there is a difference in the approach of the court where rights 
are pursued for commercial, profit driven reasons in contrast with rights that are of a personal nature. 
Next, it is set out that in English law, promise is not the basis of contract. As such, the efficient breach 
of commercial contracts cannot be discounted based on issues of morality which are linked to 
promise breaking. Numerous other criticisms which have been directed at efficient breach are also 
discounted. 
Ultimately, a legitimate formulation of the efficient breach of commercial contracts is outlined. This 
iteration is permissive, rather than mandatory. It provides efficient optionality, meaning that where 
a party has the opportunity to breach efficiently, it will not necessarily take place. However, should 
a party choose to breach, they will be justified. This is a departure from more prescriptive approaches.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Precis 
 
This thesis will make the case for the legitimacy of efficient breach within the commercial 
contracting context meaning that in this setting, a party may breach a contract and pay damages 
where it is cost effective to do so. An instrumentalist approach which encourages contract rules which 
aim to maximise wealth will be proposed. This is legitimate on the basis that the underlying intention 
behind commercial contracting is, on all sides, profit generation. Importantly, the claim is not that an 
efficient breach should take place, only that it could should breaching parties deem it to be attractive.  
Broadly, there are two major original contributions which this thesis makes. First, that efficient 
breach is being discussed in the commercial context. This means that the ultimate claim is that the 
efficient breach of commercial contracts is legitimate. The commercial limitation is applied in order 
to focus this discussion. This will make carrying out the analysis far more manageable than would 
be the case should it extend to all contract forms. Also, it is appropriate as a result of the underlying 
profit generation intent which is exhibited by parties to commercial contracts. This makes the 
commercial setting the natural environment in which to apply the theory of efficient breach. This 
approach is original on the basis that the theory of efficient breach has not been explicitly applied to 
the commercial setting. There are some passing references made to business contracts, or market 
settings within contract law literature.1 However, no scholars have outlined a functional theory of 
efficient breach on the basis that it is legitimate in the commercial setting.  
                                                          
1 See for example John H Barton, ‘The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract’ (1972) 1 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 277, 300; See also Daniel A Farber, ‘Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory’ 
(1983) 78 Northwestern University Law Review 303, 338; Alan Schwartz and Robert E Scott, ‘Contract 
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Second, this is the first major discussion of efficient breach which applies the theory to English law. 
Most of the relevant literature has emerged from the American schools of law and economics.2 There 
are some passing references to efficient breach made within some English literature.3 However, there 
is no full, in depth analysis of this type which is available. This thesis will provide that. There will 
of course be references to American literature; however, at all times the primary focus will be the 
English law of contract.  
A number of additional contributions are also provided. A definition of “commercial” in a contract 
law context will be established in order to frame this discussion effectively. This is achieved through 
reference to the construction and interpretation of commercial contracts, as well as relevant case law. 
Other areas of the law which make a commercial distinction will also be considered. It will be 
outlined that a commercial party will generally carry out an organised business activity with the 
intention of generating a profit. Additionally, that commercial contracts feature only commercial 
parties.  
Next, it will be set out that the structure of English contract law will remain fundamentally the same 
whether a dispute concerns a commercial, or a non-commercial contract. There is, however, a 
difference in the approach of the court where rights are pursued for commercial, profit driven 
reasons.4 This is in contrast with rights that are personal in nature.5  
It will then be demonstrated that in English law, promise is not, and thus should not be considered to 
form the basis of contract. Rather, it functions in order to provide a method by which a party may 
seek an enforceable remedy following breach. Also, that in any contract it is the consequences of 
entering into it which provides the reason for doing so. The case will be made that an act 
                                                          
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ (2003) 113 Yale Law Journal 541, 546; Daniel Markovits and Alan 
Schwartz ‘The Expectation Remedy Revisited’ (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 1093, 1097. 
2 See 5.2 The Economic Analysis of Law. 
3 See for example Jonathan Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism (CUP 2013) 44; See also Neil Andrews, 
Malcolm Clark, Andrew Tettenborn and Graham Virgo, Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, 
Termination and Remedies (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 397; Gregory Klass, ‘Efficient Breach’ in 
Gregory Klass, George Letsas and Prince Saprai (eds) The Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 
2014); Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson, Remedies in Contract and Tort (2nd edn, CUP 
2005) 11; Catherine Mitchell, Contract Law and Contract Practice (Hart 2013) 154. 
4 See 3.3 The Commercial Distinction in Contract Law. 
5 See 3.4 Personal Contracts and the “Holiday” Cases. 
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consequentialist approach is legitimate here because commercial contracts exist primarily to generate 
a profit.6 This means that the efficient breach of commercial contracts cannot be discounted based 
on issues of morality which are linked to promise breaking.  
The claim will be made that in commercial contracting, efficiency may legitimately be judged based 
on wealth maximisation, which is assessed based on monetary value, as well as by utilising the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion (featuring the caveat that actual compensation must be paid). Also, that a 
simple approach where efficient breach is defined as involving breaching a contract’s terms where it 
is cost effective to do so. This involves comparing the costs of performance with the costs of breach 
and the paying compensatory damages in line with the expectation measure.  
Numerous criticisms that have been directed at efficient breach will also be discounted. This will be 
done using a thematic approach consisting of four categories including potential clashes with existing 
legal doctrines, a resistance to instrumentalist approaches to the law, issues relating to commercial 
practices and questions regarding the theory’s practical application.7  
Finally, a formulation of efficient breach which differs from the classic Holmes inspired iteration 
will be outlined.8 This is in the sense that it is limited to solely commercial contracting, rather than 
all forms of contract. Because the intention of commercial contracting is profit production, 
maximising the wealth which flows from them will be the focus of the parties involved. This will 
mean that the rational decision maker paradigm may be applied to them. Further, monetary damages 
will be shown to be legitimate in this setting because value can be assessed objectively based on 
market value. Ultimately, the approach to efficient breach which will be presented will be permissive, 
rather than mandatory. The suggestion is that where a party has the opportunity to breach efficiently, 
it does not necessarily have to take place. However, should a party choose to breach, they will be 
                                                          
6 See 4.3.1 Understanding Contract Law.  
7 See Chapter 6. 
8 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 462. Reprinted 
in (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991, 995. 
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justified in doing so. It will also be noted that the law’s approach in limiting the available remedy to 
expectation damages within commercial contract disputes, in practicality, condones the breach. 
 
1.2 The Conceptual Framework of this Thesis 
 
This thesis adopts a specific approach to advancing the case for the legitimacy of the efficient breach 
of commercial contracts. Most notable is the focus is on the English legal system. In addition, a 
number of existing concepts including efficient breach, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and wealth 
maximisation are discussed. However, on occasion, these concepts are interpreted, as well as applied 
slightly differently than is the norm.  
 
1.2.1 Focus on the English Legal System 
 
This thesis places focus on the English Legal system. English contract law is an appropriate realm 
for this discussion on the basis that the UK is a major centre for the hearing of commercial disputes. 
This is based on the expertise available within the English court system.9 Also, a large volume of 
English contract law emanates from the commercial sector. This is likely due to their higher value 
and thus, the greater willingness to litigate of the parties involved. In addition, the approach that the 
courts adopt in terms of dealing with English contract cases is appropriate based on the commercial 
distinction that will be highlighted.10 
Next, other areas of English law, which include tax law, the law of partnership, company law and 
patent law, are utilised in order to develop a functional definition of a commercial contract that is a 
natural fit with existing legal doctrine. It is acknowledged that other approaches could be drawn on 
to achieve this. For example, one could look to the US Uniform Commercial Code for inspiration. 
                                                          
9 See 2.3 The Commercial Court.  
10 See 3.3 The Commercial Distinction in Contract Law.  
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However, for the purposes of this study, which is focused solely on English Law, it is more 
appropriate to draw on existing legal doctrine within this jurisdiction to ensure consistency and 
coherence. 
 
1.2.2 Efficient Breach 
 
In its simplest terms, the theory of efficient breach sets out that breach of contract will be justifiable 
where it will result in a more economically efficient outcome. The case is often made that it stems 
from the suggestion that ‘the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you 
must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else’.11 A breach of contract will be desirable 
where the position of the breaching party is preferable, after the payment of expectation damages, to 
that which would have come about through performance. This could apply where an opportunity 
arises to increase profit, or to reduce losses. This thesis will provide a justification for the efficient 
breach of contracts agreed between solely commercial parties for the purpose profit generation. This 
will not apply to other forms of contract, agreed between different forms of contracting party. 
 
1.2.3 The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion 
 
The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion outlines that where there is scope ‘to make everybody better off than 
before, or at any rate to make some people better off without making anybody worse off … if all 
those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, the rest of the community will still 
be better off than before’.12 As such, it assumes that that monetary compensation can effectively 
repair any damage caused when one party’s position improves whilst another’s is simultaneously 
diminished.13 However, in its classic form there is no fixed requirement that compensation must 
                                                          
11 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 462. Reprinted  
in (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991, 995. 
12 N Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’ (1939) 49 The 
Economic Journal 549, 550. 
13 See John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Myles, A Dictionary of Economics (OUP 2012). 
18 
 
actually be paid.14 The view is that when compensation could be paid, total value has been increased. 
Therefore, overall efficiency is achieved. In this case, the production of wealth is separate from its 
distribution. This thesis proceeds on the basis that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion may be applied, but 
that actual payment of compensation must take place in the event of an efficient breach. This is an 
important caveat to keep in mind. 
 
1.2.4 Wealth Maximisation  
 
This thesis takes the position that it is legitimate to utilise wealth maximisation as a measure in the 
case of the efficient breach of a commercial contract. Here, “wealth” is considered to denote a 
specific, measurable approach to assessing value. This is based on monetary value and is concerned 
with ‘what people are willing to pay for something rather than on the happiness they would derive 
from having it’.15 This approach differs from alternate approaches that consider wealth as 
synonymous with other measures such as “welfare”, or “utility”. These could concern the ‘pleasures, 
satisfactions, or preferences of the actor’,16 and would require ‘the aggregation of all of the subjective 
goods of individuals and it considers as best the outcome in which the total of individual satisfactions 
is maximized’.17 The justification for approaching “wealth” in this more specific, measurable way 
where monetary value is used is the fact that the primary reason for the existence of commercial 
contracts, and the underlying intention of the parties to those contracts is the production of profit. 
Thus, placing focus on monetary value is legitimate in this context. However, it is acknowledged that 
assessing wealth in this was may not be appropriate in other settings.  
 
 
                                                          
14 N Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’ (1939) 49 The 
Economic Journal 549, 550. 
15 RA Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1983) 60. 
16 Ernest J Weinrib, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory’ (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 307, 309. 
17 ibid. 
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1.3 Methodology and Research Questions 
 
In any original research project the methodology that is to be applied is a key consideration. Choosing 
an appropriate methodological approach is essential in order to achieve the required results. That 
being said, it is important to keep in mind that no methodology is watertight. It has been noted that 
‘research methods texts, often remain quiet about the imperfect path of the research process’.18 
Further, that ‘while there are unquestionably norms and best practices for research methods, analysis, 
and interpretation’,19 it is the case that ambiguity and difficulty can, in fact, be categorised as 
elements that are essential within the research process.20 
Broadly, this thesis will apply the theory of efficient breach to the commercial contracting context. 
With that in mind, all aspects of the analysis which take place must be viewed through a commercial 
lens. This is the primary methodological approach which is to be applied and is a fundamental 
element of the justification which is being put forth. This will involve adopting an approach that can 
be defined as broadly doctrinal throughout.21 That being said, the approach will vary slightly from 
chapter to chapter in order to meet their individual needs. This is essential because no singular 
methodological approach would be suitable throughout. Other approaches will include the 
historical,22 the philosophical,23 and the economic.24 Six questions will be addressed across six 
substantive chapters.  
 
                                                          
18 Simon Halliday and Patrick D Scmidt, Conducting law and society research: Reflections on methods and 
practices (CUP 2009) 2. 
19 ibid, 5-6. 
20 ibid. 
21 See Jenny Steele, ‘Doctrinal Approaches’ in Simon Halliday, An Introduction to the Study of Law (W 
Green 2012); See also Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and 
Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2013) 13. 
22 See TT Arvind, ‘Historical Approaches’ in Simon Halliday, An Introduction to the Study of Law (W Green 
2012); See also Philip Handler, ‘Legal History’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in 
Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2013) 103. 
23 See for example Jules L Coleman, The practice of principle: In defence of a pragmatist approach to legal 
theory (OUP 2003) 156. 
24 Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Economic analysis of law, or economically informed legal research’ in Dawn 
Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2013) 170. 
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What is a commercial contract? 
In order to limit this analysis of efficient breach to commercial contracts, the essential first step is to 
clearly set out the parameters of such contracts. While this may seem straightforward, it is the case 
that no clear, functional, and widely accepted definition of a ‘commercial contract’ exists within 
contract law scholarship. It is essential to answer this question as it forms the basis of the platform 
upon which the justification of efficient breach that this thesis advances is built. The issues at hand 
include what a commercial contract looks like, as well as the types of party who will enter into them. 
A functional definition of “commercial” will be established. This will be applied to define a 
commercial party as one who carries out business activity with the primary intention of generating 
profit, as well to outline the parameters of a commercial contract, namely a contract which is agreed 
between solely commercial parties for the purpose of generating profit. Again, this definition is not 
intended to be all-encompassing and applicable in all settings. The intention is simply to identify the 
characteristics embodied by an archetypal commercial contract in order to ground the analysis of 
efficient breach that follows. 
In terms of methodological approach, a variety of areas of English law which make a commercial 
distinction will be investigated. In this respect, it will be classically doctrinal. Case law, statute, as 
well as relevant academic literature will be investigated in order to inform the definition. This will 
be achieved by identifying common themes which are indicative of a commercial party. Areas of 
interest will include tax law, the law of partnership, company law and patent law. Contracts entered 
into by government bodies will also be discussed as they may enter contracts of a commercial and 
non-commercial nature. Finally, Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social Enterprises and Community Interest 
Companies will be considered. This approach is to be adopted because there is no clear, functional 
definition of ‘commercial’ or ‘commercial contract’ within contract law. Utilising characteristics that 
are evident within other areas of English law allows a definition that can be applied to contract law 
to be reverse engineered. As a result, the definition will naturally be in line with other areas of English 
law which make a commercial distinction. This definition will be carried forward throughout the 
remainder of this thesis.  
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Why are commercial contracts treated differently to non-commercial contracts? 
Having identified the existence of a commercial distinction in contract law, as well as having defined 
it, the intention here is to assess why it exists. Contracts which fit the description noted in chapter 2 
will be analysed. The reasoning behind why commercial parties are treated differently by English 
contract law will be set out. This is important because it is not enough to simply acknowledge that 
there is a commercial distinction within contract law. In order to build a justification for efficient 
breach in the commercial contracting context, it is vital to understand why the commercial distinction 
exists. This is because the existence of this distinction is a major factor in terms of legitimising the 
similar approach that will be applied to efficient breach. By setting out that the existing distinction 
is functional, as well as legitimate, applying a similar approach to efficient breach will not be 
problematic. With this in mind, the rationale behind why commercial contacts are treated differently 
to other forms of contract within English law will be extracted based on the wording provided by the 
courts. The assertion is that in deciding contract cases, the courts will consider the type of right which 
is being pursued. They will also account for the reasons behind that pursuit. The difference concerns 
whether a right is being pursued for commercial, profit driven reasons or, for reasons of an individual 
or personal nature. This will inform judicial decision-making. However, judges are bound by 
precedent and must follow the previous decisions of higher courts, adhering to the reasoning 
provided. 
Once again, the methodological approach which will be adopted is doctrinal in nature. The focus is 
on the relevant case law, specifically the reasoning adopted by the courts in coming to their decisions. 
Literature regarding the decision making of the judiciary, as well as legal realism, will also be 
considered. This is necessary in order to assess the types of influence which may have an impact on 
the decision making of the courts. Finally, material which emanates from trust law will be contrasted 
with commercial contract law to further highlight the distinction. This approach is logical on the 
basis that the rationale for any decisions reached by the court should be contained within the 
judgment that is provided. It is necessary to understand how these decisions are reached if they, and 
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the rationale behind them, are to be utilised. Other methods could have been adopted in this respect. 
For example, an approach based on collecting qualitative data from relevant parties through the use 
of questionnaires could be suggested. However, this is both unrealistic, and unnecessary here. This 
is because the concern is solely how commercial disputes are treated by the courts within the case 
law that is discussed. Once the reasoning behind the commercial distinction is set out, as well as 
shown to be legitimate, it will then be possible to move on to discuss the more efficient breach 
specific issues at hand.  
 
Is English contract law based on promising?  
With the commercial distinction, along with the rationale behind that distinction outlined and 
justified, it is possible to move on to discuss more substantive, as well as theoretical issues. Here the 
intention is to assess whether the English system of contract law is, in fact, directly influenced by the 
act of promising. This is required in order to outline that any moral impermissibility issues which 
arise from promise breaking should not be applied to contract law. This is important because efficient 
breach is built on the assertion that breach of contract is legitimate in this setting. This is in contrast 
with the attitude of promissory theorists. In answering this question it will be concluded that it is 
incorrect to suggest that the promise principle forms the basis of contractual enforceability in English 
law. This is as a result of the domain in which contracting operates. In addition, it will be set out that 
the application of the theory of efficient breach to commercial contracts requires that the 
consequentialist approach is adopted. This is justifiable because the consequences which will flow 
from entering into a contractual agreement provide the reason for doing so. Resultantly, the assertion 
is that an efficient breach in the context of commercial contracting cannot be discounted based on 
issues of morality which arise from promise breaking. 
The approach which will be adopted here is a hybrid between doctrinal, historical and philosophical. 
The development of English contract law will be investigated in order to assess whether the promise 
principle played a part in its genesis. This includes considering material on legal history as well as 
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older case law. The role of philosophy within the law will also be considered. This is necessary in 
order to allow the moral components which relate to promising to be properly understood. In 
addition, the development of contract law elsewhere will be assessed. This is important in order to 
highlight the specific characteristics of English contract law by providing a clear contrast. This 
methodological approach is appropriate on the basis that it allows a variety of key components 
relating to the role of promising in contract law to be fully investigated. Once it has been 
demonstrated that English contract law is practically detached from promising, it will be possible to 
move on to analyse the theory of efficient breach in more detail.  
 
What is an efficient breach? 
Having set out the existence of, as well as the rationale behind the commercial distinction in English 
contract law, as well as outlining that concerns raised by promissory theorists regarding breach of 
contract are inapplicable, the next step is to deal with the specifics of an efficient breach. The focus 
here is to outline the specifics of an efficient breach, as well to outline an appropriate definition for 
efficient breach in the commercial context. This is essential because to justify the theory, it must be 
understood, as well as defined in context. It will be set out that it is most appropriate to only utilise 
economic principles only in suitable settings within contract law. Further, that commercial 
contracting is such a setting. This will mean that within the commercial contract context, efficiency 
may legitimately be judged based on wealth maximisation where monetary value is the measure, as 
well as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion featuring the caveat that compensation must be paid. Additionally, 
a simple approach to characterising an efficient breach as a breach of contractual terms on the basis 
that it is more cost effective to do so will be set out. This will take into account the cost of 
performance, compared with the cost of breach (namely the payment of compensatory damages) and 
may be adopted either to reduce losses, or to maximise total gains. 
Once again, the approach will be one of a doctrinal nature. Relevant literature will be analysed in 
order to outline the characteristics of an efficient. Primarily, this is contained within literature on the 
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economic analysis of law, though there are additional sources which will be noted. English case law 
examples of an efficient breach will also be considered before looking toward key concepts within 
economics. These include Pareto optimality, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, welfare maximisation, 
utilitarianism, economic efficiency and wealth maximisation. Other elements, such as the application 
of a cost-benefit analysis, limits imposed by bounded rationality, as well as behavioural economics, 
will also be discussed. Finally, literature relating to measures of damages will be considered. Focus 
will be on the expectation measure as this is a key element of an efficient breach. This approach is 
legitimate on the basis that efficient breach has a wealth of literature, produced over a number of 
decades based around it. By investigating this literature, it will be possible to provide an appropriate 
definition of efficient breach which can be applied to commercial contracting.  
 
Do the criticisms directed at efficient breach derail it?  
After outlining the parameters of the definition of efficient breach that is to be utilised, that definition 
will be applied in order to deal with some of the theory’s major criticisms. The focus here is to assess 
whether or not a variety of criticisms which have been directed at the theory are capable of derailing 
its application to commercial contracts. This is important as attempts to justify efficient breach in 
any form have been raised consistently. By dealing with these issues, it will be possible to outline 
why this approach is functional. It will be set out that there is the potential for, as well as evidence 
of efficient breach in English contract law. Further, that none of these criticisms successfully derail 
the theory of efficient breach with respect to commercial contracts. 
The approach here is again one which may be categorised as broadly doctrinal. It involves 
considering literature which has been critical of the theory of efficient breach. This is necessary in 
order to set out that they are inapplicable within the commercial contract setting. A variety of critical 
approaches will be discussed. They will be grouped into four categories, including clashes with 
existing legal doctrines, issues with instrumentalist approaches, concerns regarding commercial 
practices and questions regarding the theory’s practical application. Grouping them in this way is a 
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novel approach to adopt. In each individual case the criticism will explained before setting out why 
they are inapplicable in the given context. Ultimately, each of them will be shown to be ineffective 
in negating the application and functionality of the theory of efficient breach within commercial 
contracts.  
 
When and where may efficient breach function? 
With the groundwork regarding the commercial distinction and its rationale, moral issues relating to 
promise breaking outlining the parameters of an efficient breach, as well as dealing with its major 
criticisms done, it is possible to outline a functional theory of efficient breach within commercial 
contracting. The intention here is to set out the circumstances and context in which efficient breach 
may function legitimately. Ultimately this is the key question which this thesis seeks to answer in 
asserting that commercial contracting provides an appropriate setting. The conclusion that will be 
reached is that when a party is presented with the opportunity to breach efficiently, this will not 
necessarily mean that breach must take place. However, should a party opt to breach they will be 
justified in doing so, both in terms of the relevant party’s choice to breach efficiently, and also, to 
the law’s approach in limiting the available remedy to expectation damages which effectively 
condones the breach. Further, that efficient breach requires that a damage award reflects the 
expectation interest in order to provide adequate compensation.  
Once again, the approach will be broadly doctrinal as it will build on the questions which were 
answered previously. Having provided the required grounding regarding the commercial lens, it will 
be possible to outline the specifics of a legitimate efficient breach in the commercial context. This 
will be achieved by applying the theory to that setting. This will allow the rational decision maker 
paradigm, a feature within both economics, and law and economics, to be applied to the parties to a 
commercial contract. This is due to the underlying intention to generate profit which drives their 
decisions to enter into commercial contracts.  
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1.4 The Structure of this Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of seven subsequent chapters which seek to address the six questions noted above. 
This will set out the grounding upon which the claims made regarding efficient breach will sit before 
outlining how it may function within commercial contracting. Each chapter is a necessary step 
towards outlining that efficient breach is legitimate within the realm of commercial contracting.  
 
1.4.1 Chapter 2: The Commercial Distinction in English Contract Law 
 
The first step is to set out that there is a commercial distinction within English contract law. This is 
a key element as the theory of efficient breach that will be outlined relies on that very distinction. 
The original contribution which chapter 2 makes is providing a functional definition of “commercial” 
as well as “commercial contract”. However, it is not intended to be all-encompassing or applicable 
in all settings. The aim is simply to identify the characteristics embodied by an archetypal commercial 
contract in order to ground the analysis of efficient breach that follows later in this thesis. This is 
required because currently no appropriate definition is evident within contract law. This is despite 
numerous references to commercial contracts, a large quantity of commercial law literature, as well 
as frequent use of the wording. The existence of a commercial distinction in contract law will be 
demonstrated through reference to the construction and interpretation of commercial contracts, as 
well as relevant case law.  
The boundaries of what is commercial will be defined by analysing other areas of the law which 
make a similar distinction. These include tax law, the law of partnership, company law and patent 
law. This is done in order to identify common themes which could inform a contract specific 
definition. Forms of contract which are not commercial in nature will then be considered. These 
include consumer contracts and personal contracts. This is necessary in order to outline reasons why 
they are non-commercial to further inform the boundaries of the definition. Situations where the 
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boundary is less clear will then be considered briefly. These include includes contracts entered into 
by government bodies, which are able to enter into contracts of both a commercial and non-
commercial nature. Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social Enterprises and Community Interest Companies 
will also be discussed. This discussion acknowledges that this blurred line between commercial, and 
non-commercial exists in some cases. However, this is not problematic as the definition of 
commercial that is being advanced in this thesis is not intended to be an all-encompassing one which 
could be applied in all settings.  
 
1.4.2 Chapter 3: The Rationale behind the Commercial Distinction in English Contract Law 
 
The second step involves outlining why the distinction that is highlighted in chapter 2 exists. The 
original contribution which chapter 3 provides comes in setting out the rationale which lies behind 
this commercial distinction, based on the reasoning provided by the courts. The discussion will 
establish why the commercial distinction exists based on that reasoning. There could be other reasons 
which exist; however, this chapter will focus specifically on the court’s reasoning. The distinction is 
of a functional, rather than a linguistic nature on the basis that commercial contracts are repeatedly 
referenced but are not defined. The fact that commercial contracts are treated differently to non-
commercial contracts highlights that the distinction functions despite the lack of an express 
definition. As well as focusing on the court’s decisions, literature on judicial decision making, as 
well as the work of the Legal Realists, will also be discussed. However, it is important to note that 
that judges are bound by precedent and must follow the rulings of previous courts, adhering to the 
reasoning provided. This is a key feature of the English common law system.  
By investigating the relevant decisions, the reasoning for this distinction can be outlined on the face 
of the wording that is provided. The suggestion is that the contract law vehicle remains the same 
whether a contract is commercial or non-commercial. However, the type of right which is pursued 
can lead the court to look beyond established legal doctrine. This allows the courts to shape the law 
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based on the reasoning which informs the pursuit of a contractual right. The difference is that where 
a right is being pursued for commercial, profit driven reasons, the court’s decisions may be informed 
by commercial intent, customs and practices and commercial reasonableness. This can be contrasted 
with personal rights which are pursued in order to facilitate pleasure or enjoyment. It will also be set 
out that this trend can be seen in equity. Proprietary estoppel and the application of fiduciary duties 
will be discussed in order to illustrate this.  
The conclusion is that courts will consider the rights which are being pursued, as well as the reasons 
behind that pursuit, in order to decide contract cases. The wording used by the courts in commercial 
and non-commercial cases allows the reasons why commercial contracts are treated as distinct to be 
extracted.  
 
1.4.3 Chapter 4: An Argument against Promise as the Basis of English Contract Law: Allaying 
Concerns Regarding Efficient Breach in the Commercial Contracting Context 
 
The third step is to begin to build on the commercial distinction, as well as the rationale for that 
distinction that is covered in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4’s original contribution is setting out that 
promise does not form the basis of English contract law. The potential moral issues surrounding an 
efficient breach of contract will be dealt with here. The case will be made for the legitimacy of an 
act consequentialist attitude towards breach of contract in the commercial context. This requires that 
the consequences of performance are compared with the consequences of breach in order to decide 
on the appropriate course of action. It will be set out that promises and contracts are fundamentally 
different concepts. They serve different purposes based on the domain in which they operate.  
Investigating the historical development of English contract law reveals a genesis which does not 
involve promise, but one which grew from tortious roots through trespass, debt, covenant and 
assumpsit. To provide additional context, the development of contract law elsewhere (including 
Roman law, the development of medieval European contract law and canon law) will be considered. 
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It is clear that English contract law developed in a different way to that of continental Europe where 
the approach is more in line with holding promise to be a foundational principle. It will also be set 
out that claims that the laws of Europe were imported into English law in the 19th century are unlikely 
to be correct due to the process of English legal education which took place at that time. The contrast 
between contract and equity in respect of the formalities which, whilst they are a pre-requisite in 
contract, are not in equity, will then be noted. Finally, the approach to providing remedies for breach 
of trust will also be considered. This will demonstrate that in English law, contract and promise are 
distinct entities.  
The claim is that English contract law is consequentialist in a positive sense. However, the normative 
question of whether this should be the case must also be dealt with. Promissory theories of 
contracting align with a broadly deontological approach. However, there is a flaw within 
deontological ideology in that it is at best difficult, and at worst impossible to judge whether or not 
the consequences of an action are positive or negative without taking account of the consequences. 
Also, that clams which relate to the wrongs involved in breaking promises are based predominantly 
on their virtuous nature. While these virtues may seem intuitive, it seems odd that they should form 
the basis of contractual liability without providing the reasoning why.  
 
1.4.4 Chapter 5: The Economic Analysis of Law and the Theory of Efficient Breach 
 
The fourth step is to outline the parameters of the theory of efficient breach that will be applied. 
These are based on the groundwork regarding the commercial distinction and issues relating to 
promissory theories of contract that have preceded it. As such, chapter 5 will set up the original 
analysis of efficient breach which is to follow. It serves primarily as a literature review which grounds 
the claims regarding the legitimacy of the efficient breach of commercial contracts. The economic 
analysis of law will be introduced before moving on to analyse the idea of efficiency. This includes 
a discussion of Pareto Optimality, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, welfare maximisation and 
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utilitarianism, economic efficiency and finally wealth maximisation. Efficiency’s role within a 
decision making process which includes the carrying out of a cost-benefit analysis, the limits imposed 
by bounded rationality, as well as the flaws with the homo-economicus model noted within 
behavioural economics, is then set out.  
The claim is that wealth maximisation, where monetary value is the measure, and the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, featuring the caveat that compensation must be paid, may legitimately inform decisions 
relating to the breach of commercial contracts. This is due to the profit producing intent which 
underpins them. There will also be a note on the issues which stem from a pursuit of efficiency 
flagging up that the legal process may have a value which goes beyond it. Despite this, it will be set 
out that efficiency can be of use in appropriate settings, and that commercial contracting is such a 
setting. The theory of efficient breach will then be introduced. In the simplest terms, this involves 
breaching a contract’s terms where it is cost effective to do so. This takes into account the cost of 
performance and the cost of paying compensatory damages following breach. Such an approach may 
be used to both maximise gains or to reduce losses. Finally, the process by which damages for breach 
of contract are measured will be discussed. This will focus on the expectation measure which seeks 
to place a claimant into the equivalent position to that which they would have been in had 
performance taken place in so far as is possible. It will be set out that a simple approach to defining 
an efficient breach will be adopted. This involves the breach of a commercial contract’s terms where 
it is more cost effective to do so. This will take into account the total cost of performance vs breach 
and the payment of compensatory damages and may be done either to reduce loss, or to maximise 
gain.  
 
1.4.5 Chapter 6: Criticisms of the Theory of Efficient Breach 
 
Chapter 6 will analyse a number of the criticisms which have been directed at the theory of efficient 
breach. A novel, thematic approach, which features four categories of criticism will be adopted. The 
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first category concerns potential clashes with existing legal doctrines including issues relating to 
awards of damages, a perceived likeness with a variety of torts, potential infringement on property 
rights and the role of a duty of good faith in commercial contracting. A contrast with trust law in 
terms of execution and remedies will also be discussed. The second category concerns issues relating 
to the application of instrumentalist approaches to the law. This includes the suggested moral 
impermissibility of breach of contract as well as the potential that moral practices could be corroded. 
Third, are issues regarding clashes with existing commercial practice. These include commercial 
reality and the impact of relational contracting and the suggestion that efficient breach would 
negatively impact the commercial system. The fourth category concerns potential clashes relating to 
the practical application of the theory of efficient breach. This includes a discussion of whether 
efficient breach is possible, the flaws that are evident in some of the current literature on efficient 
breach, bounded rationality, transaction costs and pre-risk predictions. Once these criticisms of 
efficient breach have been shown to be ineffective, it will then be possible to move on to make the 
case for the application of the theory within the commercial context in chapter 7.  
 
1.4.6 Chapter 7: Making the Case for Efficient Breach in a Commercial Context 
 
Chapter 7 will set out an original formulation of efficient breach which differs from the classic 
Holmes inspired iteration that ‘the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that 
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else’.25 This formulation differs in the 
sense that it is limited to solely commercial contracting, rather than all forms of contract. As a result, 
the claim is that efficient breach is theoretically sound when it is considered within this context. This 
allows the rational decision maker paradigm to be applied to parties to a commercial contract. It will 
be set out that monetary damages are legitimate within this setting. This is based on factors which 
include the fact that these transactions will generally take place in a market where replacements may 
                                                          
25 Holmes (n 6) 995. 
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be acquired. This will mean that value can be assessed objectively based on market value. They will 
also tend to involve money or an equivalent. In addition, the existence of a market for a replacement 
will mean that damages will be preferred to specific performance. Furthermore, any intangible losses 
which are inherently difficult to quantify will not be considered. This is standard practice within 
commercial contracting, simplifying the calculation process. An additional element is that a 
permissive, rather than a mandatory approach will be presented. It provides what can be described 
as efficient optionality. This will mean that when a party has the opportunity to breach efficiently, it 
is not a prerequisite that it must take place. The claim is simply that where a party chooses to breach, 
they will be justified in doing so. This justification applies to the relevant party’s choice to breach 
efficiently, and also, to the law’s approach in limiting the available remedy to expectation damages 
which effectively condones the breach. Further, that in a commercial context, an instrumentalist 
approach to efficient breach is legitimate due to the underlying profit generation intent displayed by 
commercial parties. It follows that the wealth maximisation approach can be applied here. It will be 
outlined that this approach will allow parties the flexibility to adapt to unforeseen contingencies, but 
will not require that a breach must take place in pursuit of efficiency. Other factors, including 
protecting existing relationships or a reputation within a particular industry, could play a role. This 
could mean that the decision to perform or to attempt to renegotiate the agreement could be made. 
Two existing defences of efficient breach will also be discussed. They include the defence based on 
unforeseen contingencies raised by Shavell,26 as well as the Dual Performance Hypothesis presented 
by Markovits and Schwartz.27 This will be considered in order to highlight that this approach is 
original in comparison. This is based on the commercial distinction which is applied. Finally, it will 
be set out that this approach to efficient breach is justifiable both epistemically, and normatively. The 
epistemic element concerns the non-prescriptive nature of the approach, whilst the normative element 
                                                          
26 See Steven Shavell, ‘Is Breach of Contract Immoral?’ (2006) 56 Emory Law Journal 439; See also Steven 
Shavell, ‘Why Breach of Contract may not be Immoral given the Incompleteness of Contracts’ (2009) 107 
Michigan Law Review 1569. 
27 See Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz ‘The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation 
Interest’ (2011) 97 Virginia Law Review 1939; See also Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz ‘The 
Expectation Remedy Revisited’ (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 1093. 
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concerns issues relating to maximising utility and individual autonomy. Again, this is an original 
approach to take to the theory of efficient breach. 
 
1.4.7 Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Chapter 8 will recap the conclusions that will be reached in setting out that efficient breach within 
the commercial contracting context is legitimate. First, it will reiterate the claim that a commercial 
party will be involved in an organised business activity with the intention to create profit. This will 
generally be carried out as part of a party’s trade, profession or vocation. This is often in business 
forms such as sole traders, partnerships or companies. Further, that a commercial contract will feature 
only commercial parties and will exist for the purposes of generating a profit.  
Second, it will be clear that the fundamental structure of English contract law remains the same 
should a dispute be in relation to a commercial or non-commercial contract. They will, however, be 
interpreted differently by the courts. This is based on the reasoning behind a party’s pursuit of a 
particular right. Where the intention is commercially minded, the court may take factors such as 
commercial reasonableness, as well as industry customs and practices, into account. Where the 
intention is non-commercial and a right is being pursued for personal reasons such as pleasure or 
enjoyment, the court will account for that. This could include considering personal preferences ahead 
of what would be commercially reasonable.  
Third, claims that the promise principle forms the basis of English contract law will be shown to be 
incorrect. This is based on its historical development, as well as the specific domain it operates 
within. It is also clear that the consequences which flow from a contractual agreement provide the 
reasons for entering into it. What this means is that within commercial contracting, an approach 
which is based on consequentialism is legitimate. This means that the theory of efficient breach 
cannot be discounted based on moral issues which arise from promise breaking.  
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Fourth, that a simplistic approach to defining an efficient breach should be adopted. This 
characterises it as breaching the terms of a contract where it is more cost effective to do so and 
involves accounting for the total cost of performance compared with the costs of breach and the 
payment of compensatory damages. Importantly, this approach can be utilised to both reduce loss, 
or to maximise total gain. In addition, that in the context of commercial contracting, it is legitimate 
to utilise wealth maximisation, where monetary value is the measure, as well as the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, featuring the caveat that compensation must be paid. 
Fifth, it will be set out that a number of criticisms which have been directed at the theory of efficient 
breach relating to potential clashes with existing legal doctrines, a resistance to instrumentalist 
approaches to the law, issues relating to commercial practices, and questions regarding the theory’s 
practical application, do not derail its legitimacy with respect to commercial contracts.  
Finally, it will be clear that efficient breach may function legitimately within the sphere of 
commercial contracting. This is on the basis that the primary intention behind those contracts is profit 
production. This means that maximising the wealth which flows from them is the legitimate focus of 
the parties involved. This allows the rational decision maker paradigm to be applied to parties to a 
commercial contract. It will be set out that the use of monetary damages which reflect the expectation 
interest is legitimate here. It is of note that, in this case, damage awards can be objectively assessed 
based on market value as transactions will generally take place in a market where replacements may 
be acquired. This will also mean that damages will be preferred to specific performance and that any 
intangible losses which are difficult to quantify will not be considered. The approach that will be 
presented will be permissive, rather than mandatory, meaning that when a party has the opportunity 
to breach efficiently, it is not a prerequisite that it must take place. However, it will be justified should 
it be preferred. This can be described as efficient optionality. It will be set out that an instrumentalist 
approach to efficient breach may be applied here. Again, this is due to the underlying profit 
generation intent displayed by commercial parties. This means that an approach based on wealth 
maximisation can be utilised. This formulation of efficient breach allows parties the flexibility to 
adapt to unforeseen contingencies. However, it does not require that a breach must take place. The 
35 
 
decision to perform or to attempt to renegotiate the agreement could be made should it suit an 
individual party’s preferences. However, should they choose to breach in pursuit of efficiency, it will 
be justifiable. It will be made clear that this approach to efficient breach is epistemically, and 
normatively justifiable. The epistemic element concerns the non-prescriptive nature of the approach. 
The normative element concerns issues relating to maximising utility and individual autonomy.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Commercial Distinction in English Contract Law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The first step in the process of justifying the theory of efficient breach in the context of commercial 
contracts is to outline the characteristics that this particular subset of contracts feature. By setting out 
what it means to be “commercial”, it will be possible to apply that definition in order to identify 
commercial contracts. This is important because currently no appropriate definition exists within 
contract law, despite numerous references to commercial contracts, a large volume of commercial 
law literature, as well as frequent use of the wording. However, this definition is not intended to be 
all-encompassing and thus, is not applicable in all settings. The focus is to identify the characteristics 
embodied by an archetypal commercial contract in order to ground the analysis of efficient breach 
that is to follow. 
To distinguish commercial contracts, the meaning of “commercial” in a contract law context must 
be established. Currently, no satisfactory definition is provided. This is despite consistent references 
to commercial contracts, a large quantity of commercial law literature, and frequent use of the 
wording within legal literature generally. Attempts to define the characteristics of what is 
“commercial” are few, and those that do exist are unsatisfactory.1 This results from a lack of 
specificity in terms of the parties who are categorised as “commercial”, and the agreements which 
they enter into. Further, terms associated with the commercial sphere are used interchangeably. The 
result is the problem of circularity. Substitution of words such as “business”, “trade”, and 
                                                          
1 HW Disney, The Elements of Commercial Law (Macdonald 1931) 1: ‘Commercial law is an expression 
incapable of strict definition, but is used to comprehend all that portion of the law of England which is more 
especially concerned with commerce, trade and business’; HC Gutteridge ‘Contract and Commercial Law’ 
(1935) 51 LQR 91: ‘Commercial law can be defined as the special rules which apply to contracts for the sale 
of goods and to such contracts as are ancillary thereto’; Roy Goode and Ewan McKendrick, Goode on 
Commercial Law (4th edn, Penguin 2010) 8: ‘Commercial Law is that branch of law which is concerned with 
rights and duties arising from the supply of goods and services in the way of trade’; Catherine Mitchell, 
Contract Law and Contract Practice (Hart 2013) 22: ‘Commercial agreements are taken to be those where 
participants do not act as consumers, but in the course of business’; Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, 
Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern & Hunter on International Arbitration (6th edn, OUP 2015) 
Section 1.38 notes the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with 
amendments as adopted in 2006 Article 1(1):‘“Commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so as to 
cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships 
of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for 
the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; 
factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; 
insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business 
cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road’. 
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“commerce” occurs frequently. The issue is that the same questions which exist around defining 
“commercial” could be asked of the terms which are perceived to be synonymous with it. This is 
problematic as a lack of clarity in terms of categorising what constitutes the “commercial” sector is 
evident. As such, circularity will be avoided in developing a modern definition of “commercial” in a 
contract law context. 
It will be demonstrated that a commercial distinction is made within contract law. This will be 
achieved by referring to the construction and interpretation of commercial contracts as well as to 
relevant case law. It will then be necessary to define the characteristics of what “commercial” means. 
Various approaches could be utilised in this respect. One could look to historical accounts which 
chart the development of merchant law and suggest that a commercial party would be a member of 
the “merchant class”. It could also be suggested that commercial matters are those which are heard 
by the commercial court. However, it seems more appropriate to look toward current practices within 
the commercial sector. This is because what is sought is a definition which functions in a modern 
context.  
Various areas of English law which make a commercial distinction will be investigated. These 
include tax law, the law of partnership, company law and patent law. The common themes which are 
shared by these areas of law which will then inform a contract specific definition will be assessed. 
Forms of contract not considered to be of a commercial nature will then be analysed. These include 
consumer contracts, as well as a note on personal contracts. This is done to outline the reasons why 
such contracts are not commercial in nature, which is based in part on the parties involved. The focus 
is placed on these areas of English law because the intention is to develop a definition of 
“commercial” which is a natural fit within the English legal system. It is acknowledged that other 
approaches could be drawn from. For example, one could look to the US Uniform Commercial Code. 
However, for the purposes of this study, which is focused solely on English Law, it is more 
appropriate to draw on existing legal doctrine within this jurisdiction. 
The next area that will be discussed includes examples of situations where the boundary between 
commercial and non-commercial is less clear. This includes contracts entered into by government 
bodies, which are able to enter into contracts of both a commercial and non-commercial nature. 
Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social Enterprises and Community Interest Companies will also be 
discussed. These can be seen to occupy a grey area between purely profit-oriented bodies, and those 
which act not for profit, often with a social purpose, charities for example. This discussion is carried 
out simply to acknowledge that this blurred line exists in some cases. This is not problematic as the 
definition of commercial that is being advanced in this thesis is not intended to be an all-
encompassing one which could be applied in all settings.  
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It will be concluded that a commercial contract requires that the parties act with an overarching 
business activity in mind. This applies both in a general sense, as well as with respect to the contract 
in question. This activity will be carried out with the intention of generating a profit. Again, this 
distinction also applies to the contract in question. A combination of these requirements will signal 
a commercial intent lies behind the contract in question. Establishing this definition is key as it will 
be applied in order to identify commercial contracts throughout this thesis. 
 
2.2 The Commercial Distinction in Contract Law 
 
Here the intention is to outline that a commercial distinction exists within contract law in a general 
sense. Once this has been established, it will be possible to move on to analyse that distinction in 
more depth. Commercial contracts are frequently referred to within contract law literature but remain 
undefined. It is suggested that ‘the most important of this type of division is between commercial 
and non-commercial contracts’.2 Also, that ‘commercial contracts can be described as those which 
are made between two or more parties who are in business for the purposes of trade’.3 This is perhaps 
the closest thing to a working definition which exists within contract law literature. It suggests that 
the major distinguishing factor between commercial and non-commercial contracts is the overriding 
intentions of the parties involved. 
On commercial contract law generally, Morgan notes the need to facilitate ‘a suitable legal 
framework for trade’,4 to ‘provide workable rules for business-to-business transactions’,5 as well as 
to ‘serve the needs of business’.6 However, it is unclear why this type of contracting party would be 
commercial in nature. References to commercial contracts are made in Benjamin’s Sale of Goods on 
subjects including mistake,7 a seller’s right to retender,8 as well as rejection.9 McGregor on Damages 
notes “commercial contracts” in reference to mental distress,10 the lease of land,11 contracts of 
employment,12 and the measure of damages in contract and tort.13 Commercial contracts have also 
                                                          
2 Hugh G Beale, Chitty on Contracts (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1-101.  
3 ibid. 
4 Jonathan Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism (CUP 2013) xiii. 
5 ibid, 89. 
6 ibid, 91. 
7 Michael Bridge, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 3-016. 
8 ibid, 12-032. 
9 ibid, 12-065. 
10 The Hon Mr Justice James Edelman, Dr Jason Varuhas, Simon Colton (eds), McGregor on Damages (20th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 5-023. 
11 ibid, 9-050. 
12 ibid, 9-060. 
13 ibid, 24-008. 
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been considered with reference to classification of terms.14 They are also noted within literature on 
law and economics.15 This is not an exhaustive list of references to commercial contracts. It would 
be impossible to catalogue here every reference to commercial contracts that does not adequately 
define them.16  
What will follow is a discussion of various strands of contract law literature. This includes the 
construction and interpretation of commercial contracts as well as some of the relevant case law. 
This will further highlight that a distinction between commercial and non-commercial contracts 
exists within modern contract law. This contribution is significant because the fact that commercial 
contracts are treated as distinct requires an effective method of identifying them. 
 
2.2.1 The Construction and Interpretation of Commercial Contracts 
 
Carter suggests that ‘primacy is given to commercial purpose – objectively determined – rather than 
specific rules’.17 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov18 is cited as support, outlining that the 
intention of the parties are interpreted based not only on the words used within the agreement, but 
also with the commercial background in mind. Also, parties ‘are assumed to have entered into 
agreements to achieve some rational commercial purpose and an understanding of this purpose will 
influence the way in which one interprets their language’.19 Additionally, that ‘in relation to desired 
result, construction is “commercial” in the sense that the conclusions reached seek to mirror the 
conclusions which the reasonable commercial person would reach in relation to the contract at 
issue’.20 Assessing what amounts to “commercial sense” is said to include taking account of ‘the 
words used … the document in which they are set, the nature of the transaction, and the legal factual 
matrix’.21 References to what is commercially reasonable or commercially sensible within contract 
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15 See for example RA Posner, ‘The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation’ [2005] 83 Texas Law 
Review 1581, 1611; See also P Burrows and C G Vejanovski, The Economic Approach to Law (Butterworths 
1981) 48. 
16 See G Cordero-Moss, Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law 
(CUP 2011); See also S Vogenauer and J Kleinheisterkamp, Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2nd edn (OUP 2015); P Burrows and CG Vejanovski, The 
Economic Approach to Law (Butterworths 1981) 48. 
17 JW Carter, The Construction of Commercial Contracts (Hart 2012) 16. 
18 [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] 4 All ER 951. 
19 ibid [5] (Lord Hoffmann). 
20 Carter (n 17) 16. 
21 Sir Robert Goff, ‘Commercial Contracts and the Commercial Court’ [1984] LMCLQ 382, 388. 
41 
 
case law are numerous.22 These cases also refer to the likely interpretation of an agreement by a 
reasonable commercial person. 
Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB23 highlights that ‘if detailed semantic and 
syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts 
business commonsense, it must be made to yield to business commonsense’.24 If it can be concluded 
based on the available background information that an error has been made regarding language, 
judges are not forced to attribute an intention to a party that was clearly unintended.25 It seems that 
‘in the case of commercial contracts, the restriction on the use of background has been quietly 
dropped’.26 They ‘are construed in the light of all the background which could reasonably have been 
expected to have been available to the parties in order to ascertain what would objectively have been 
understood to be their intention’.27 Mitchell notes that such an approach to the interpretation of 
commercial contracts ‘recognizes that commercial contracting takes place against a normatively rich 
background … which provides potentially relevant evidence of the parties’ intentions and gives 
another layer of meaning to their agreement’.28 Additionally, Posner suggests that when doubt exists 
regarding the intentions of the parties, ‘the best, the most cost-efficient, way to resolve their dispute 
is not to take testimony and conduct a trial; it is to use commercial or economic common sense to 
figure out how, in all likelihood, the parties would have provided for the contingency’.29  
It appears then that when analysing those contracts that are considered to be of a commercial nature, 
one must be aware of the way they will be interpreted. This will likely include taking account of the 
context in which the agreement was made as well as what is considered to be commercially 
reasonable. It is clear that commercial contracts are in this sense considered to sit in a category of 
their own. However, the issue of effectively defining the characteristics of what constitutes a 
commercial contract remains. 
 
 
                                                          
22 See for example Rainy Sky SA and others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; [2011] 1 WLR 2900 [14] 
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2.2.2 Case Law References to Commercial Contracts  
 
That contracts categorised as being commercial in nature are treated as distinct from others is 
supported by case law evidence. In Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth30 Lord Mustill 
noted that where a ‘contract is designed to fulfil a purely commercial purpose, the loss will very often 
consist only of the monetary detriment brought about by the breach of contract’.31 Note that the focus 
here is the quantifiable consequences of the breach, rather than the legal consequences. However, it 
was set out that ‘these remedies are not exhaustive, for the law must cater for those occasions where 
the value of the promise to the promisee exceeds the financial enhancement of his position which 
full performance will secure’.32 This approach of considering a wider range of losses in non-
commercial cases highlights the difference between a purely commercial contract, and one which is 
intended to secure other types of interest. Note also The Rozel33 which directed that ‘in a commercial 
context a plaintiff will not recover damages on a “cost of cure” basis if that cost is disproportionate 
to the financial consequences of the deficiency’.34 This demonstrates a distinction from non-
commercial contracts in that the key consideration is whether a remedy is appropriate in a 
commercial sense. As we will see later, other approaches to quantification may be adopted where it 
is deemed commercially appropriate. In this case the appropriate method was to quantify the 
reduction in commercial value.35 In Southampton Container Terminals Ltd v Hansa Schiffahrts 
GmbH (The Maersk Colombo)36 the appropriate valuation was deemed to be resale value. In Sealace 
Shipping Co Ltd v Oceanvoice Ltd (The Alecos M)37 scrap value was utilised in this respect. 
 
2.2.2.1 Good Faith in Commercial Contracting  
 
Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited38 highlighted the distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial contracts with respect to good faith in contractual dealing. 
The concern was whether duties which can apply in ‘contracts of employment and contracts between 
partners or others whose relationship is characterised as a fiduciary one’39 could extend to 
commercial contracts. It was noted that it was doubtful whether ‘English law has reached the stage 
                                                          
30 [1996] AC 344; [1995] 3 WLR 118. 
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32 ibid. 
33 [1994] CLC 168. 
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… where it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a duty implied by law, even as a 
default rule, into all commercial contracts’.40  However, there was said to ‘be no difficulty, following 
the established methodology of English law for the implication of terms in fact, in implying such a 
duty in any ordinary commercial contract based on the presumed intention of the parties’.41 The key 
point is that the distinction between commercial and non-commercial contracts was directly 
acknowledged by the court. 
 
2.2.2.2 Time for Delivery  
 
The Naxos42 concerned time for delivery and its importance in commercial contracts. Lord Ackner 
referenced a previous decision of a lower court which had outlined that ‘time of delivery is of the 
greatest importance in commercial contracts and contracts in the sugar trade are no exception’.43 
Thunderbird Industries Llc v Simoco Digital UK Limited44 also highlighted that ‘in relation to 
stipulated delivery times contained in commercial contracts, time is presumed to be of the essence’.45 
Interestingly in United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council46 it was noted that ‘some 
stipulations in commercial contracts as to the time when something must be done by one of the parties 
or some event must occur, time is of the essence; in others it is not’.47 Bunge Corporation New York 
v Tradax Export SA Panama48 was also cited as support for this principle. Note though that the 
wording in this case refers to mercantile contracts. Again, direct references to commercial contracts 
as a separate category of contract are evident. 
 
2.2.2.3 Restraint of Trade 
 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd49 outlined that a distinction will exist 
between contracts which regulate normal commercial relations and those that are in restraint of 
trade.50 As such, this will does not apply to ‘commercial contracts for the regulation and promotion 
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of trade during the existence of the contract, provided that any prevention of work outside the contract 
… is directed towards the absorption of the parties’ services and not their sterilisation’.51 The ruling 
in Esso was cited in Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay,52 as well as in One Money Mail 
Limited v Ria Financial Services.53 This demonstrates that in certain commercial settings clauses 
which would usually be in restraint of trade will be allowed on the basis that they are commercially 
reasonable. 
 
2.2.2.4 Mental Distress 
 
Claims for damages for mental distress will not be successful in commercial contract cases. This was 
demonstrated in Hayes v James & Charles Dodd.54 Also, Johnson v Unisys Ltd55 outlines that in the 
context of a commercial contract ‘non-pecuniary loss such as mental suffering consequent on breach 
is not within the contemplation of the parties and is accordingly too remote’.56 This is different to the 
approach that is taken in personal contracts and is perhaps the clearest example of the difference 
which exists in respect of commercial and non-commercial contracts. 
 
2.2.2.5 Equitable Relief against Forfeiture 
 
Sport Internationaal Bussum BV and Others v Inter-Footwear Ltd57 set out that in a claim for 
equitable relief against forfeiture ‘the jurisdiction never was, and never has been up to now, extended 
to ordinary commercial contracts unconnected with interests in land’.58 This ruling made direct 
reference to commercial contracts as a separate category and also, the fact that the claim was ‘not 
based on any pressing consideration of legal policy but simply on an appeal to sympathy for what is 
considered to be a hardship arising from strict adherence to a bargain which is concluded with its 
eyes open’.59 This is of note as it highlights the reasoning adopted by Lord Oliver who took account 
of the commercial norm of entering into an agreement freely, with open eyes and by doing so, 
accepting the risks involved. 
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2.2.2.6 State Immunity 
 
A State will be immune from the jurisdiction of UK courts except in certain circumstances.60 In the 
case of a commercial transaction entered into by a State this immunity will not apply.61 Greenwood 
notes that ‘it follows that when such a State is sued for breach of a commercial contract, it should 
not be able to rely on its sovereign character by arguing that the breach was a political act’.62 This is 
also the case under the Vienna Convention which concerns similar immunity for an individual 
diplomatic agent.63 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria64 confirmed that 
English courts would be required to acknowledge this approach in respect of commercial 
transactions. Also The United States of America v Nolan65 outlined expressly that immunity from 
potential liability will not be available in the case of an act which is commercial in nature.66  
 
2.2.2.7 Late Payment of Commercial Debts 
 
The late payment of commercial debts should be regulated differently based on the negative effect 
such activity could have on the liquidity and financial management of undertakings.67 Statutory 
interest will be payable on any such debts.68 Note that the Late Payment of Commercial Debts 
Regulations 2002/1674 amends the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998. In 
Sempra Metals Limited v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Inland Revenue69 Lord Mance noted that 
that:  
[T]he Arbitration Act 1996 conferred a discretionary power on arbitration tribunals to award, 
unless the parties had otherwise agreed, simple or compound interest on sums awarded in 
the arbitration and the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 provided, in 
certain circumstances, a right to simple interest on certain commercial debts.70  
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2.2.2.8 Conclusion  
 
There are far more examples than those noted above which distinguish between commercial and non-
commercial contracts. The intention was to highlight the existence of the commercial distinction in 
contract law. While it is clear that a distinction is made, the characteristics of commercial contracts 
remain undefined. It is therefore necessary to develop a functional definition of what is meant by 
commercial in a contract law sense. It is clear that the need for a party to act in pursuit of profit will 
be of importance, as was noted explicitly in Ruxley and Johnson v Unisys Ltd.71 It is also evident that 
the commercial nature of an agreement will inform the way which the courts will reach their 
decisions. A recurring theme is the use of a standard of reasonableness, which is in turn informed by 
commercial norms. Examples of this are particularly clear in relation to quantification of loss,72 time 
for delivery,73 and restraint of trade.74 Another obvious distinction relates to claims for non-pecuniary 
losses such as mental distress.75 Now that the existence of the commercial distinction in contract law 
has been established, it will be possible to move on to discuss the content of that distinction, as well 
as to set about providing a legitimate definition of both “commercial”, and “commercial contract”. 
 
2.3 The Commercial Court 
 
With the existence of a commercial distinction in contract law confirmed, it is now possible to move 
on to deal with the obvious issue which exists regarding their definition. It could be suggested that 
commercial disputes will be those dealt with by the Commercial Court.76 The Commercial Court is 
governed by the Civil Procedure Rules. These outline that a ‘“commercial claim” means any claim 
arising out of the transaction of trade and commerce’.77 These may include a business document or 
contract, the export or import of goods, insurance and re-insurance and the purchase and sale of 
commodities.78 The mercantile court will hear cases which relate to ‘a commercial or business matter 
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in a broad sense’.79 Claims in the mercantile court do not require that they are heard in London’s 
Commercial Court. They are typically of a lower value than claims in the commercial court.80 
When a party wishes to bring a claim before the Commercial Court it must make an application 
before a claim form is provided to a Commercial Court judge.81 This must be supported by 
evidence.82 Should the relevant judge consider ‘that the proceedings should not be brought in the 
commercial list, he may adjourn the application to be heard by a master or by a judge who is not a 
Commercial Court judge’.83 Those which proceed in the Commercial Court are placed on a specialist 
list known as the commercial list, over which a judge of the Commercial Court will preside.84 A 
Commercial Court Judge has the capacity to order a claim to be transferred from the commercial list 
to another specialist list.85 For example, a case can be transferred to one of the mercantile courts or 
the London mercantile court should it be deemed necessary.86 A case could be transferred to the 
commercial list, though it is directed that this can take place for limited purposes only.87 These 
purposes are not expanded upon. Any decision to allow a transfer will be made by a Commercial 
Court judge.88 It therefore appears that a commercial judge assigned the responsibility of making 
these decisions holds the power to decide whether a dispute is of a commercial nature. Guidance on 
how judges make such decisions is not provided. This gives the court and (and the particular judge) 
great freedom to decide on the suitability of claims as they see fit. Retaining this freedom and control 
could very well be something that the Commercial Court and its judges are keen to do.  
In order to provide some idea of how these judges exercise their discretion the relevant case law has 
been analysed. The key case in respect of a transfer to or from the commercial court is Southern Rock 
Insurance Co Ltd v Brightside Group Ltd and Another.89 This concerned a proposed transfer from 
the Chancery Division in Bristol to London’s Commercial Court. In this case the application for 
transfer was refused because the expertise of judges in the Commercial Court was not considered to 
be essential. It was set out that the suitability of the commercial court is based on ‘whether there are 
issues involved which would particularly benefit from the experience and expertise of judges in this 
court as compared with that of judges in the Chancery Division’.90 Further, that ‘other matters, such 
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as relative expedition and cost insofar as those are material; but the primary focus … must be on the 
subject matter of the case’.91 Breyer Group v Department of Energy and Climate Change92 applied 
the reasoning in Southern Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Brightside Group Ltd and Another.93 It is noted 
that part 58 of the civil procedure rules define a commercial claim as ‘any claim arising out of the 
transaction of trade and commerce’.94 Further that the claim was ‘not a dispute between traders or 
businesses’.95 Rather it was ‘a dispute between a number of businesses and the Government’,96 
making it a public law claim. In dismissing the application to transfer the case it was set out that 
whilst there was a ‘Commercial Court flavour’97 to the case, there was doubt that the issues at hand 
would ‘benefit from the experience and expertise of judges in this court’.98 Further, that if there was 
a difference, it would not be significant.99 The application was dismissed as the court was ‘wholly 
unpersuaded that the Commercial Court would be a significantly more suitable court for the trial of 
this public law claim’.100 Finally, in Pantheon v Chandler Hargreaves101 both the commercial court 
and the chancery division were said to be appropriate. The view was that speed and efficiency were 
the relevant factors in deciding whether to allow the transfer. It was outlined that ‘a judge of the 
commercial court will have … the relevant expertise to deal more efficiently with the matters which 
are raised and the issues which are raised in this action’.102 These cases illustrate that sole discretion 
is afforded to the presiding judge in interpreting the guidance provided in the civil procedure rules.103  
There is evidence of claims which would appear to be of a commercial nature being heard elsewhere. 
For example, claims concerning construction disputes are commonly heard in the county court or the 
Technology and Construction Court.104 Also, intellectual property cases are heard in the Intellectual 
Property Enterprise Court or, should the value of damages claimed be above £500,000, the Chancery 
Division.105 It should also be noted that the Commercial Bar Association whose members are 
specialist commercial lawyers representing their clients within the Commercial Court do not attempt 
to define a commercial party or commercial claim.106  
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What is offered regarding the Commercial Court is not particularly useful in providing a functional 
definition of what is commercial. What could amount to a commercial claim is broad and open ended. 
It appears that the approach is based on the assumption that a Commercial Court judge will know 
what one looks like and act accordingly. This suggests that in terms of identifying such a claim is not 
based on any specific guidelines which have been set out. The characteristics of a party that may 
bring a claim are not outlined. As such, it is clear that asserting that a commercial claim (that would 
be brought by a commercial party) is one which is heard in the Commercial Court does not effectively 
characterise them. With this in mind, it is now necessary to analyse other areas which may shed light 
on the commercial distinction in contract law. 
 
2.4 Commercial History 
 
The next area of interest with regard to the need to shed light on the commercial distinction in contract 
law is the history of commercial law in England which has developed over a number of centuries. 
The key issue that is to be addressed is whether or not there are any principles which can be utilised 
and applied in order to define the characteristics of what it means to be “commercial”.  Legal 
historians have asserted that commercial law is informed by the customs and practices of the 
merchant community, predominantly the merchant community of continental Europe. This became 
known as the “Law Merchant” or “Lex Mercatoria”107 and developed in Europe as ‘the diversity of 
international commerce diminished the self-regulating capacity of a merchant regime’.108 Its 
intention was to provide merchants with a uniform legal system to resolve disputes based upon 
mercantile interests.109 Note that ‘to be a merchant was to possess a special status’.110 This 
increasingly international system ‘was more than just a result of the commercial revolution. It was a 
prerequisite for the rapid development of trade’.111 During the reign of Edward I it was seen as body 
of law which differed from the common law whereby ‘within certain limits it was for the merchants 
themselves to declare this law’.112 The suggestion is that this system ‘took a more liberal and modern 
view of contractual obligations than that which was taken by the common law’.113 The division 
between the highly technical English common law and the Law Merchant proved problematic. The 
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solution was allowing merchants to rely upon their own trade customs as exceptions to the common 
law.   
There is also evidence of merchant customs being incorporated into the common law. As early as the 
Tudor times ‘merchants began to transfer their allegiance to the King’s Bench, and the King’s Bench 
encouraged them by upsetting judgments of municipal courts on technical grounds’.114 The issues 
raised in commercial disputes were often sophisticated in nature. As such ‘the use of special juries 
enabled them to be determined by experts who knew the relevant usages without the need to turn 
them into law’.115 This approach is likely to have resulted from Lord Mansfield’s ‘response to 
pressure from the city for the formulation of clear rules of mercantile law’.116 Before reaching 
decisions Mansfield began consulting with city merchants, though this technique was not completely 
radical. Hale CJ is said to have consulted with the merchant community during the 1660s and 
1670s.117 In addition, there is evidence of what is termed the “custom of merchants” being taken into 
account by the courts in the 17th and 18th centuries.118 Lord Mansfield worked to develop ‘co-
operation with city juries into a continuous programme for settling questions of commercial law in 
the King’s Bench upon motions after trial’.119 He has been credited with laying ‘the foundation of 
the modern commercial system’.120 He was active in attempting to formalise a uniform commercial 
law in Europe, encouraging ‘the citation of writings current on the continent, the works of natural 
lawyers such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Heineccius and Vattel, and the standard international text books 
on commercial law’.121 It is suggested that this type of approach was essential for international trade 
as in the absence of ‘clear and understandable laws, alien merchants would not have been willing to 
carry on trade at near the level that arose during the eleventh, twelfth and subsequent centuries’.122 
Pillans and Rose v Van Mierop and Hopkins123 concerned letters of credit. Here Lord Mansfield 
stated that it was ‘almost implied, that there must be some consideration’.124 Ibbetson has noted that 
‘this could be generalized into a rule that, so far as merchants were concerned, enforceable contracts 
could be made without consideration’.125 Another example of the dilution of the need for 
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consideration came in the form of the bill of exchange which were used ‘primarily in transnational 
commerce but increasingly found in more domestic inland contexts in the eighteenth century’.126 
Utilising this merchant custom allowed ‘that acceptors should be liable on bills’127 without needing 
to demonstrate the existence of any consideration. Lord Irvine, citing Woodward v Rowe128 suggested 
that by the end of the seventeenth century ‘bills of exchange had become such a central feature of 
commercial transactions that they were finally recognised by the common law’.129  
In summary, there been a historical distinction made between parties considered commercial in 
nature (the merchant classes) and those who are not. What this demonstrates is that the norms and 
practices of merchants were incorporated into contract law where it was deemed appropriate.  This 
allowed that agreements between the merchant classes could be governed based on their own system 
of rules and shared understandings. This highlights that the merchant classes were in this respect 
treated differently to the wider public. While it does appear that the merchant classes have in the past 
possessed seemingly commercial characteristics, utilising such a distinction in the present day would 
be flawed. This is because what constitutes a commercial party now goes beyond being categorised 
as a member of the merchant class. This terminology has become outdated. Commercial parties could 
well operate in industries beyond simply trade, as was the case in the historical accounts noted 
above.130 Examples could include parties to contracts concerning construction or intellectual 
property. Therefore it is necessary to use an alternate approach to craft a modern definition which 
will incorporate this expansion in terms of the characteristics of the parties which it covers. This will 
be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.  
 
2.5 Areas of the Law which make a Commercial Distinction  
 
With the existence of the commercial distinction in contract law identified, commercial contracts 
must now be defined. To craft a modern, contract law specific definition of “commercial”, elements 
from other areas of the law which distinguish commercial from non-commercial have been 
investigated. Elements of English law including tax law, the law of partnership and company law 
offer useful guidance in terms of identifying any common themes which could also exist within 
contract law. This methodology offers a way to develop a definition of “commercial” providing 
guidance required to reverse engineer a definition for a term which, despite widespread use, is not 
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clearly outlined. Again, the focus is on English law because the intention is to develop a definition 
of “commercial” which is a natural fit within the English legal system. 
 
2.5.1 Tax Law 
 
The first area of interest is the commercial distinction in tax law. Tax liability applies to the majority 
of the population.131 In UK tax law a distinction is made when assessing the liability of parties acting 
in a business capacity. The concern here is not the politics, policies or economic rationale behind tax 
law. Only the elements of tax which apply to profits made in the course of business will be 
considered.  
There are a variety of interrelated terms which are used to identify tax subjects. These include 
‘“person”, “entity”, “body of persons” and “company”’.132 Liberal use of “entity” within tax 
legislation is particularly unclear. It is used ‘in numerous places, but without definition. These uses 
suggest that an individual is not an “entity”, but that a company or corporation is’.133 This lack of 
clarity could be problematic in developing a definition for what is commercial in a tax law sense. 
With this in mind the different types of business form will be outlined before moving on to analyse 
the problematic terms “trade”, “profession” and “vocation”. Finally the key issue of profit will be 
discussed. 
 
2.5.1.1 Business Structures 
 
The first issue for discussion with respect to the commercial distinction in tax law are the business 
structures utilised in the UK and how tax law applies to them.134 The simplest form are sole traders 
who:  
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[A]re not regulated by any special legal provisions regarding legal form and the business has 
no separate legal personality … the business and personal assets of a sole trader do not need 
to be kept separate (although accounts are required for tax purposes for profits at a de 
minimis level).135  
A sole trader takes on personal liability for any debts accrued through their business activity. Their 
personal and business assets are mixed in the eyes of the law. 
Next is the concept of a partnership which can be ‘governed by purely oral or written agreements 
and can arise quite informally’.136 The law specific to partnerships will be returned to. For now it 
will be considered briefly regarding how tax law applies to partnerships. Generally ‘partners remain 
liable to the full extent of their personal assets and these may well be mixed with their business 
assets’.137 In a limited partnership, the liability of a partner extends only to the value of their initial 
investment, not to personal assets. The Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) is a hybrid form offering 
partners limited liability. LLPs ‘are called “partnerships”, but are given corporate personality 
…Therefore, limited liability partnerships seem to fall outside the definition of “partnerships” in the 
Partnership Act 1890’.138 It is outlined that ‘references to a firm or partnership include a limited 
liability partnership in relation to which subsection (1) applies’.139  
Last is the company. Note that company law will be discussed in greater depth later. A limited 
company must be registered under the Companies Act 2006 and must fulfil various requirements set 
out therein.  Once incorporated, a company will have its own legal personality separate from its 
shareholders. A key feature of this is limited liability in respect of the debts undertaken by 
shareholders. Under the Income Tax Act 2007, company means ‘any body corporate or 
unincorporated association, but does not include a partnership, a local authority or a local authority 
association’.140 This wording is mirrored in the Corporation Tax Act 2010.141 With these business 
structures identified, it will now be possible to move on to discuss the impact which tax liability has 
on them. 
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2.5.1.2 “Trade”, “Profession” or “Vocation” 
 
One may assert that when businesses fall into categories noted above, they are distinguishable from 
the general public when assessing tax liability because it will be applied to the profits they generate. 
The deciding factor is the activity they carry out and whether it is focused on profit generation. The 
Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (ITTOIA) outlines that ‘income tax is charged on 
the profits of a trade, profession or vocation’.142 Also the provisions of Chapter 2 of the ITTOIA 
‘apply to professions and vocations as they apply to trades’.143 The Corporation Tax Act 2009 states 
that ‘the charge to corporation tax on income applies to the profits of a trade’.144 Focus is therefore 
on the terms “trade”, “profession” and “vocation”, suggesting that if a course of dealing is done in 
that capacity, any profits will be taxable. 
 
The Income Tax Act 2007 defines “trade” as ‘any venture in the nature of trade’.145 This is unclear, 
as is highlighted in Ransom v Higgs.146 Lord Reid noted that ‘the Income Tax Acts have never defined 
trade or trading farther than to provide that trade includes every trade, manufacture, adventure or 
concern in the nature of trade’.147 Furthermore:  
 
‘[T]rade’ has or has had a variety of meanings or shades of meaning … it is sometimes used 
to denote any mercantile operation but it is commonly used to denote operations of a 
commercial character by which the trader provides to customers for reward some kind of 
goods or services.148  
 
Additionally Lord Wilberforce suggested that trade ‘cannot be precisely defined, but certain 
characteristics can be identified which trade normally has’.149 It will normally involve ‘the exchange 
of goods, or of services, for reward … there must be something which the trade offers to provide by 
way of business’.150  
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Whilst a distinction is made between a profession, a vocation and a trade, no definition for 
‘profession’ or ‘vocation’ is provided by statute. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Maxse151 
suggests that a profession will involve:  
 
[A]n occupation requiring either purely intellectual skill, or of manual skill controlled, as in 
painting and sculpture, or surgery, by the intellectual skill of the operator, as distinguished 
from an occupation which is substantially the production or sale or arrangements for the 
production or sale of commodities’.152  
 
The terms “profession” and “vocation” were used interchangeably in Higgs v Olivier.153 The 
contention related to whether profits were generated as a result of the taxpayer’s profession or 
vocation as an actor.154 It seems that distinguishing between “profession”, “vocation” and “trade” is 
unnecessary for tax purposes. Satisfying any one will lead to tax liability on any profit that is 
produced. With this in mind it is clear that profit production is the key factor.  
 
2.5.1.3 Profit Production 
 
Intention to create profit is useful in indicating the presence of a trade, profession or vocation. In 
Torbell Investments Ltd and others v Williams155 certain ‘transactions were undertaken … with a 
genuine view to making a profit and were therefore … trading transactions’.156  A transaction 
featuring a genuine intent to generate profit will qualify as a trade. In Griffiths v J P Harrison 
(Watford) Ltd157 the form which profit took was assessed. Viscount Simonds outlined that ‘a dealer 
may seek his profit … otherwise than by an enhanced price on a re-sale, as by a declaration of 
dividend, a repayment on a reduction of capital or on a liquidation of the company whose shares he 
has bought’.158 Further, it was ‘immaterial, so long as the transaction is not a sham … what may be 
the fiscal result or the ulterior fiscal object of the transaction’.159 Therefore if a course of dealing is 
carried out without fraudulent intention, the generation of a profit may take a form apart from 
enhancing the value of goods through re-sale. In Lupton v FA & AB Ltd160 a taxpayer acted with the 
intention of securing a tax advantage, rather than generating a profit. It was held that because the 
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transaction in question did not amount to dealing in stocks and shares, it could not be considered to 
form part of the trading activity of one who purports to be a dealer in stocks and shares. This suggests 
that legitimate business intent, or attempt to generate a legitimate profit is the deciding factor in 
assessing whether a transaction is of a trade nature. The importance of a pursuit of profit through 
trading activity is demonstrated further where a business attempts to claim tax relief following a 
trading loss. This is demonstrated by sections 66 and 74 of the Income Tax Act 2007. Both place 
restrictions on tax relief being made available for trading losses unless said trade is of a commercial 
nature. Whilst the term “commercial” is once more undefined, there is clear evidence of its link to a 
need for a legitimate pursuit of profit within Tax Law. 
 
2.5.1.4 Conclusion  
 
Investigating the nature by which tax is applied to the profits of business activity in the UK provides 
a useful model which will aid in developing a functional definition of “commercial” which can be 
applied to contract law. While tax liability is universal in one form or another, a distinction is made 
when it is applied to profits. There are recurring themes in Tax Law regarding the characteristics of 
parties of a potentially “commercial” nature. First, if one of the categories of business form, namely 
sole traders, partnerships (including LLPs) and companies is utilised, it will be distinct from members 
of the public for tax purposes. Second, any trading activity should be carried out with the intention 
of producing a profit. This also suggests that the specific activity is in itself a key distinguishing 
factor in this regard. 
Tax liability will be applied to the profits accrued through a trade, profession or vocation. This profit 
production motive is the key factor in terms of assessing and applying any tax liability and sets these 
business forms apart from members of the public for example. Combinations of these themes are 
characteristics indicative of a party of a commercial nature, engaging in an activity with a commercial 
intent for the purposes of assessing tax liability. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that these are 
characteristics which could apply to a commercial party in a contract law sense. The next step is to 
assess whether this is consistent across other areas of the law.  
 
 
 
 
57 
 
2.5.2 The Law of Partnership 
 
The next area of interest with regard to a commercial distinction is the law of partnership. Partnership 
was noted briefly earlier but will now be analysed more fully.161 This will be useful as partnerships 
exist with the intention of carrying out a business activity to produce a profit, a characteristic which 
suggests that they are of a “commercial” nature. In English law there are three categories of 
partnership. First, the general partnership governed by The Partnership Act 1890. Second is the 
limited partnership created by the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 but which are subject to the 
provisions in the Partnership Act 1890. Third is the limited liability partnership governed by the 
Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000.  
A partnership is defined in Section 1 of the Partnership Act 1890. One must display three important 
characteristics. There must exist ‘(1) a business (2) which is carried on by two or more persons in 
common (3) with “a view of profit”’.162 Rolls v Miller163 outlines that the word ‘business’ can mean 
‘almost anything which is an occupation, as distinguished from a pleasure’.164 In Town Investments 
Ltd v Department of the Environment165 Lord Diplock suggested that ‘the word “business” is an 
etymological chameleon; it suits its meaning to the context in which it is found’.166 As such, 
‘business’ will be likely to apply to ‘every trade, occupation, or profession’.167 The suggestion is that 
the term occupation ‘must be construed eiusdem generis and coupled with the words “with a view to 
a profit” in s 1(1) of the Act, so that some sort of commercial activity is essential’.168 This reference 
to commercial activity is a clear acknowledgment of the relevance of partnership law in terms of any 
attempt to develop a modern definition of what is commercial. 
 
2.5.2.1 Profit Production 
 
Based on the prior discussion regarding tax a law, it appears that profit production is a key issue 
regarding the commercial distinction. It is the case that a partnership should operate with the intention 
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of producing profit.169 That this profit may ‘be shared by the parties to the agreement, is the grand 
characteristic of every partnership, and is the leading feature of nearly every definition of the term’.170 
It is suggested that ‘the intention to make a profit (even if a profit is not actually realised) lies at the 
very heart of the partnership relation’.171 There may be scenarios where pursuit of profit is not the 
primary focus of a partnership. In such cases one must question if there is any genuine view to 
generating a profit. For example, where a partnership exists featuring ‘some other predominant 
motive, e.g. tax avoidance, but there is also a real, albeit ancillary, profit element, it may be 
permissible to infer that the business is being carried on “with a view of profit”’.172 Therefore, where 
it can be demonstrated that: 
[T]he sole reason for the creation of a partnership was to give a particular partner the ‘benefit’ 
of, say, a tax loss, when there was no contemplation in the parties’ minds that a profit … 
would be derived from carrying on the relevant business, the partnership could not in any 
real sense be said to have been formed ‘with a view of profit’.173   
In addition, any activity should be carried out with a business intention in mind. This may sound 
obvious, however Lord Millet in Khan and Another v Miah and Others174 outlined that trading need 
not have commenced but that ‘persons who agree to carry on a business activity as a joint venture do 
not become partners until they actually embark on the activity in question’.175 The issue was ‘whether 
the parties had done enough to be found to have commenced the joint enterprise in which they had 
agreed to engage’,176 rather than whether they had commenced trading. This decision is noted in Ilott 
v Williams.177 Here it was ruled that ‘it was not necessary to find actual trading. What was required 
was a carrying on of business’.178 Furthermore, that ‘preparatory work … forms part of the carrying 
on of business and the fact that there is no actual trading does not mean that the business cannot be 
carried on “with a view of profit”’. 179  
On the partner’s right to share in profits, it is suggested that ‘even where there is a genuine view of 
profit, a partnership will only exist if the profits are intended to be realised for the common benefit 
of the participants’.180 Not sharing profits does not bar an individual from being a partner. This is 
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demonstrated in M Young Legal Associates Ltd v Zahid.181 Here Lord Justice Wilson stated that “in 
order to be partners, it was necessary for persons to carry on a business in common with a view to 
profit and not that they should also share it”.182 Hodson v Hodson183 demonstrated that ‘where a 
partner in a business waived her right to receive her share in the profits for period of time it was ruled 
that her position as a partner was unaffected’.184 The importance of entitlement to a share was 
highlighted in Ilott v Williams.185 Here the claimant ‘following receipt of a notice of removal … was 
no longer entitled to a share of the profits under the terms of the Side Letter in respect of the then 
current, or any subsequent, financial year’.186 Therefore, they were no longer considered a partner. 
 
2.5.2.2 Conclusion  
 
The law of partnership has provided useful guidance on terms of developing a definition for what is 
“commercial”. Partnerships require the carrying on of business activity which is said to involve a 
trade, occupation or profession, including any preparatory activity. This should be carried out with a 
view to producing a profit, coupled with a partner’s right to share in that profit. The right to receive 
is distinct from the actual receipt of a proportion of any profit produced. As such, ‘there must always 
be a view of profit … but, as was made abundantly clear by the Court of Appeal in M Young Legal 
Associates v Zahid and in Hodson v Hodson, a sharing of profits between the partners is not a 
necessary ingredient’.187 The combination of an organised business activity, as well as the pursuit of 
profit are characteristics that are indicative of what a commercial party does. Again, it also appears 
that the profit production intent behind the activity in question is a key distinguishing factor. This 
suggests that the transaction, as well as its overriding purpose is an important consideration.  
 
2.5.3 Company Law 
 
The next area if interest regarding the relevance of profit production to a commercial distinction is 
company law. The company form was noted during the discussion on Tax Law. It will now be 
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considered in more detail.188 This will provide a useful model as a company will generally exist with 
the intention of carrying out a business activity to produce a profit. These are characteristics which 
suggest a commercial nature. That a company displays characteristics which are indicative of a 
commercial party could be considered to be quite obvious. That is assuming that all relevant 
requirements set out in the Companies Act 2006 are complied with. There is a caveat in that not all 
bodies which are companies and governed by the 2006 Act will necessarily be commercial in nature. 
Not for profit organisations and charities are examples of this. A charity is defined within the 
Charities Act189 while the Finance Act 2010 defines a “charitable company” as a charity that is a 
body of persons.190 They must operate for charitable purposes, the meaning of which is contained in 
the Charities Act 2011.191 A charity cannot operate with the predominant intention of producing a 
profit. There are exemptions made regarding trading profits produced by a corporate charity.192 The 
profits of charitable trades will be exempt from corporation tax if ‘the trade is exercised in the course 
of carrying out a primary purpose of the charitable company’193 or ‘the work in connection with the 
trade is mainly carried out by beneficiaries of the charitable company’.194 
 
2.5.3.1 Separate Legal Personality 
 
It is reasonable to assert that if a business entity is afforded a separate legal personality, and is not a 
charity, it is likely to be of a commercial nature.195 This is because these entities exist to engage in 
organised business practice with the intention of producing a profit. Once incorporated, a company 
will have its own legal personality separate from that of its shareholders providing them with limited 
liability. There are advantages to separate legal personality which include facilitating perpetual 
succession, the right to own property, the ability to sue and be sued and most notably limited liability. 
Easterbrook and Fischel assert that ‘limited liability is a distinguishing feature of corporate law – 
perhaps the distinguishing feature’.196 Through protecting shareholders, business enterprise is 
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facilitated by reducing the risks to potential investors. This allows the company to pursue profit with 
that investment as a resource.  
 
2.5.3.2 Conclusion  
 
If a body operates as a company, governed by the Companies Act 2006, it is likely to be commercial 
in nature assuming that it is operating with the primary intention of producing a profit (unlike a 
charity or a not for profit organisation). The separate legal personality afforded to a company which 
features the limited liability of its members is further evidence of this. The evidence of an organised 
business activity combined with pursuit of profit are characteristics that can be said to be indicative 
of a commercial party. Like in tax law as well as the law of partnership, it is reasonable to assert that 
these are characteristics which are likely to apply in terms of defining a “commercial” party in a 
contract law context. 
 
2.5.4 Patent Law 
 
The final area in which the relevance of profit production regarding a commercial distinction is to be 
assessed is patent law. This distinction comes in the form of an exception to patent protection. It 
exists to balance the needs of society (through encouraging innovation) with protecting the interests 
of inventors. The UK Patent system was introduced as early as 1623 by the Statute of Monopolies to 
reward parties for the creation of useful inventions.197 This is because when a reward cannot be 
provided by the market, the view was that the State should intervene by providing a temporary 
monopoly.198 The system is ‘strongly marked by commercial sensitivity at all levels, both in its 
legislative infrastructure and in its judicial application’.199 It provides limited property rights in that 
the originator can exclude others from their intellectual property. However, this is not in totality as 
would be the case with physical property.200 
The Patents Act 1977 outlines that: 
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(3) A patent shall not be granted for an invention the commercial exploitation of which would 
be contrary to public policy or morality.201 
Also that: 
An act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an 
invention shall not do so if— 
(a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not commercial 
 
(b) here the invention is a process, he uses the process or he offers it for use in the United 
Kingdom when he knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the circumstances, that 
its use there without the consent of the proprietor would be an infringement of the patent.202 
Patent protection has industrial and commercial implications.203 This is particularly important within 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries where it could a number of years ‘before a patentee can 
get any remuneration in respect of his invention’.204  It has been suggested that it could be ‘as much 
as ten years before a pharmaceutical patent can bring any return’.205  
UK patent laws allow actions which would normally infringe upon patent protections when they are 
done privately, for non-commercial or experimental purposes.206 In the event that an experimental 
trial is of a mixed nature (part research and part commercial) the English courts favour a narrow 
approach, considering such use to be infringing.207 This is demonstrated by Monsanto v Stauffer208 
where the limitation under the Patents Act ‘would exclude tests or trials having as their purpose 
achieving or extending the commercial acceptance of some commercial embodiment of the patented 
invention’.209 Auchincloss v Agricultural & Veterinary Supplies Ltd210 followed the ruling in 
Monsanto.  The sample in question was used in order ‘to obtain official approval; not to discover 
something unknown or to test a hypothesis’.211 As a result it ‘was not done for experimental purposes 
and therefore section 60(5)(b) does not apply’.212 
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The continental approach has not been consistent with that of UK courts. A more relaxed approach 
to assessing what amounts to commercial use is preferred despite the similarity in the wording of the 
relevant legislation. The Community Patent Convention states that: 
‘The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to: 
(a) acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes; 
(b) acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention’.213 
Additionally, the German Patents Act provides an exemption for acts which are carried out privately 
for a non-commercial purpose, as well as for acts which are carried out for experimental purposes.214 
Klinische Versuche II215 demonstrates this relaxed approach as ‘the court was aware of the economic 
reality that clinical research involving pharmaceuticals would … be based on commercial 
considerations because of the high costs of such R&D’.216 As such, it was: 
[I]mpossible to stipulate that research activities which are concerned with the research and 
further development of technology would be impermissible if they are at the same time 
undertaken with the additional, or even overwhelming, motivation of using the results of the 
tests to prepare for commercial exploitation.217  
The interests of the public were also noted in terms of continuing development of technology which 
patent law strives for.218 
 
2.5.4.1 Conclusion  
 
The existence of a distinction in terms of commercial exploitation exception in patent law is intended 
to balance the needs of society through encouraging innovation with the need to protect the interests 
of inventors. Despite obvious differences in application, featuring a harder line approach taken by 
UK courts compared to those on the continent, the overriding intention behind the commercial 
exemption remains the same. Removing the potential for exempt research and development to be 
exploited for profit by others until the expiry of its patent intends to protect the interests of inventors. 
By giving acts that are done for non-commercial purposes an exemption from normal patent 
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protections, the law facilitates research and development of existing technologies. It can therefore be 
inferred that an intention to exploit their creation for profit is a determining factor in terms of what 
is commercial activity within patent law. Again, this discussion further illustrates that the intention 
to produce profit is a key determining factor when seeking to apply a commercial distinction 
regarding a particular activity. With this, alongside the conclusions reached regarding tax law, the 
law of partnership, and company law in mind, it is clear that a profit production intention is key when 
identifying a commercial activity in these areas. It therefore seems intuitive that the same could be 
said for contract law.  
 
2.6 Contracts which are not commercial in nature 
 
Having outlined that profit production is a key feature within the commercial distinction in various 
areas of the law, the next step is to set out the type of contract which by definition cannot be 
commercial in nature. This is done in order to add breadth to the discussion regarding the 
characteristics of a commercial contract by outlining the types of contract which are excluded from 
that group. It is not realistic to discuss each type of contract which is not of a commercial nature here. 
This would be both time consuming and unnecessary for the purposes of this discussion. Only a 
select number of contract forms will be discussed. These include an analysis of consumer contracts 
as well as a brief note on “personal” contracts. 
 
2.6.1 Consumer Contracts  
 
It was outlined in Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV219 that the Consumer Rights Act ‘has 
no bearing on commercial contracts’.220 Consumer transactions contrast with ‘the archetypal arm’s-
length contract on which both contract law and neoclassical economics focus’.221 They ‘are not the 
product of negotiations between two parties … these contracts are unilaterally drafted by sellers and 
mass-marketed to consumers, together with the products and services that these sellers offer’.222 
Whilst it is true that not all consumer contracts are standard form in nature and that some are 
concluded following negotiations between the parties, it still appears that there is an unequal 
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bargaining relationship between those parties.223 As a result of this imbalance and a perceived 
vulnerability, consumers are afforded statutory protections. They are in this respect treated as distinct 
from other types of contracting party. A selection of these statutory protections including the relevant 
EU Council Directive, the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 will now be discussed. 
 
2.6.1.1 The EU Position 
 
Under the EU Council Directive 2005/29/EC which concerns unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market, a “consumer” is said to mean ‘any natural person who, 
in commercial practices … is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or 
profession’.224 Consumer protection is prominent within this directive, specifically the importance of 
not allowing the economic behaviour of consumers to be distorted.225  
 
2.6.1.2 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 
 
Consumer protection was a major influence behind the Consumer Rights Act 2015.226 It outlines that 
“consumer” will mean ‘an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that 
individual's trade, business, craft or profession’227 covering contracts and notices noted in Section 61 
of the act. This amends the definition of “consumer”,228 “consumer contract”,229 and “consumer 
notice”230 used in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) as well as replacing the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCC) in its entirety. A consumer is therefore assumed 
to be distinct from a commercial party. A consumer contract refers to a ‘contract between a trader 
and a consumer’.231 Overy v Paypal (Europe) Limited232 outlined that: 
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[A] contract would be treated as having been concluded by a person for a purpose which 
could be regarded as being outside his trade or profession only if any business purpose was 
insignificant or negligible and the contract satisfied an individual’s own needs in terms of 
private consumption.233 
 Judge Hegarty QC cited Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl234 and Gruber v Bay Wa AG235 as support here. 
It is accepted that consumers rarely read small print within contracts. The suggestion is that practices 
such as ‘labelling a hyper-link as “terms and condition”’ is sufficient to ensure that most consumers 
do not read the document’.236 With such issues in mind, recommendations were made to reform the 
UTCC as it was suggested that it required ‘significant legal expertise to navigate, and even then the 
outcome is unpredictable’.237 The need for certainty appeared universal as ‘all consumer groups 
agreed with the need for reform, as did the majority of businesses and business groups, public bodies, 
judges and lawyers’.238  It was agreed that ‘all small print terms should be assessable for fairness’.239 
This recommendation was made referencing Gut Springenheide GmbH and Another v 
Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt—AMT für Lebensmittelüberwachung240 that the “Average 
Consumer Test” should be applied.241 Additionally that ‘if the meaning of a term is in doubt a court 
will follow the interpretation most favourable to the consumer’.242 This highlights the importance of 
protecting the consumer. 
There were economic influences informing the Consumer Rights Act which included ensuring that 
the competitiveness of the market was not undermined.243 Also, relying on the insights of behavioural 
economists, it was noted that consumers may ignore remote or contingent charges, even if they are 
prominent.244 This is at odds with classic economic theory which assumes that consumers when 
presented with appropriate information will make rational decisions. It was accepted that consumers 
are rational only to a point and that while their behavioural biases are to all intents and purposes 
irrational, it was noted that they are predictable. 245 
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2.6.1.3 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) was primarily intended to provide consumer protection 
in contractual dealing. The consumer element of UCTA has since been repealed by the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 noted above.246 UCTA was said to represent ‘a great advance in consumer protection 
but it recognises economic realities’.247 UCTA concerns small print contract clauses referring to 
future liabilities for negligence or breach of contract for example.248 Such terms are often said to 
operate against the public interest.249 These clauses were said to have been introduced in a way that 
‘the party affected by them remaining ignorant of their presence or import until it is too late”.250 An 
affected party would “be unable to appreciate what he may lose by accepting it … he may not have 
sufficient bargaining strength to refuse to accept it’.251 Guarding against such clauses demonstrates 
the public interest concerns in terms of consumer protection behind UCTA. 
It is noteworthy that UCTA offers protection to parties who are not deemed to be dealing as 
consumers. These are parties who deal on another party’s written standard terms of business and/or 
as customers while the other party ‘deals in the course of business’.252 The extent to which protection 
under UCTA should be afforded to businesses has been a point of contention. The conclusion being 
that such parties ‘should not have the same protection as private purchasers as they are often in a 
better position to protect themselves and may often deal on special trade terms’.253 
 
2.6.1.4 The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 
 
The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 outlines that a Consumer 
Insurance Contract is one agreed between ‘an individual who enters into the contract wholly or 
mainly for purposes unrelated to the individual's trade, business or profession’254 and a party ‘who 
carries on the business of insurance and who becomes a party to the contract by way of that 
business’.255  A consumer can be categorised as a party who does not act, nor purports to act in a 
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business or professional capacity. Their actions will not form a part, or have any link to their 
individual trade, business, or profession. A consumer contract requires that a consumer enters into it 
with a party acting in a professional or business capacity. These parties feature characteristics which 
are indicative of a commercial party in that they offer goods or services with the intention of 
generating a profit. A prime example is consumer insurance contracts. Additionally, any goods that 
are supplied as per the contract should be of a type which would normally have a private or personal 
use. Much like the characteristics of a consumer contracts offered within the Consumer Rights Act, 
there certain inferences that can be made. These include that a consumer contract (in this case an 
insurance contract) cannot be a commercial contract due to the nature of the parties involved. This 
again suggests that a commercial contract will be agreed between parties who are acting in a business 
capacity.256 There is also clear of evidence within the legislation noted above that to offer effective 
protection to the consumer is paramount.257 This further demonstrates the distinction made between 
a party dealing as a consumer and others. As was noted earlier, the purpose of discussing what 
constitutes a consumer is that if the relevant requirements are met, the party in question cannot be 
considered to be of a commercial nature.  
 
2.6.1.5 Conclusion  
 
There are conclusions which can be drawn regarding consumer contracts. First, that a consumer is 
treated as distinct from other contracting parties. Evidence includes the definitions of “consumer” 
offered in EU Council Directive 2005/29/EC, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. These definitions refer to an individual acting 
outside his/her trade, craft or profession. That these parties will be acting in this way suggests that 
motive behind their actions will not be the production of profit. Also of note is the perception that a 
consumer requires statutory protection when they enter into any contractual dealing. These 
protections are only afforded to consumers and are not relevant to commercial contracts.258 As such, 
a consumer acting in that capacity cannot be a “commercial” party. Second, that a consumer contract 
will be entered into by a consumer and a party who is acting in a business or trade sense with the 
primary intention of generating a profit. It can therefore be inferred that a commercial contract would 
be likely to be agreed between multiple commercial parties.  
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2.6.2 Personal Contracts 
 
Contracts that are categorised as personal in nature offer further examples of non-commercial 
contracts. Two clear examples of such contracts being treated distinct from a commercial contract 
include contracts of employment and certain types of contract for the sale of goods. These types of 
contract will now be discussed.  
 
2.6.2.1 Contracts of Employment 
 
A contract of employment will be for ‘service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if 
it is express) whether oral or in writing’.259 Its relevance is that an employee will mean ‘an individual 
who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract 
of employment’.260 Johnson v Unisys Ltd261 set out that ‘contracts of employment are no longer 
regarded as purely commercial contracts entered into between free and equal agents’.262 This referred 
to ‘ordinary commercial contracts entered into by both parties with a view of profit’.263 This reference 
is in itself illustrative with respect to the nature of the parties to a commercial contract.  
Much like in consumer contracts, the contrast in bargaining position of the contracting parties is 
important. In employment contracts, one of the parties (the employee) is in fact not necessarily free 
and equal. There exists an imbalance in terms of bargaining position, unlike in the classic commercial 
contract. It is also noteworthy that employment contracts are entered into by the employee, not with 
the intention of generating a profit, but to earn a wage. This wage will be subject to standard income 
tax, unlike profits which as we have seen, are taxed differently. 
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2.6.2.2 Contracts for the Sale of Goods 
 
Contracts for the sale of goods are governed by standard contract law rules.264 It will include any 
contract where a seller ‘transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money 
consideration’.265 They can be formed in writing, verbally, through a combination of the two as well 
as being by the conduct of the parties.266 Payzu Ltd v Saunders267 demonstrated that there exists a 
difference between commercial contracts, and a contract for the sale of goods specifically in respect 
of offers following a default. This is the only issue that is being raised in this regard. This is because 
it is accepted that contracts for the sale of goods could exist between commercial parties.  
It was noted that ‘in certain cases of personal service it may be unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to 
consider an offer from the other party who has grossly injured him; but in commercial contracts it is 
generally reasonable to accept an offer from the party in default’.268 Such an offer intends to salvage 
commercial value from a transaction. In this respect, the individual interests of a non-commercial 
party to a contract for the sale of goods lead to it being treated differently to a contract of a 
commercial nature, such as one which concerns the sale of goods between two commercial parties. 
 
2.6.2.3 Conclusion  
 
Contracts of employment and certain contracts for the sale of goods offer two clear examples of 
contracts being treated as commercially distinct. This is based on the need to protect employees in 
employment contracts, as well as to consider the individual interests of parties to service contracts 
regarding offers following default. The important point is that non-commercial parties are afforded 
additional protection, or consideration than would be the case for commercial parties. 
 
2.7 The Boundary Cases 
 
Having considered the commercial distinction in other areas of the law, as well as contracts that not 
commercial in nature, the next area that will be discussed briefly are some examples of situations 
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where the boundary between commercial and non-commercial is less clear. This is done to 
acknowledge that this blurred line exists in some cases. However, it is again important to highlight 
that the definition of commercial being advanced in this thesis is not intended to be an all-
encompassing one that could be applied in all settings. Its intention is simply to frame the discussion 
of efficient breach that is to follow by outlining the characteristics of an archetypal commercial 
contract.  
 
2.7.1 Government Power to enter into Contracts 
 
Governments have the ability to enter into contracts of a commercial, as well as a non-commercial 
nature. It appears that any suggestion that private law concerns only private interests, while public 
law concerns the interests of the State are invalid. This is because the State may enter into legal 
relations within private law.269 Limitations are placed on the government’s contracting capability 
through the doctrine of ultra vires in order to safeguard against abuses of power. This is due to ‘the 
tendency of governments to engage in commercial activities and to use contracts as a means of 
achieving public objectives’.270 Under the State Immunity Act 1978, a State will be immune from a 
UK court’s jurisdiction except in certain circumstances.271 One of these exceptions concerns 
commercial transactions.272 There was a growing belief in the UK that where a State was to engage 
in ordinary commercial activity, that State should be in the same legal position as any other party. 
The State Immunity Act was a reaction to this.273 The European Convention on State Immunity 1972 
outlines that similar requirements be placed on governments when entering into commercial 
dealings.274 The current state of play is that in the event that a State breaches a commercial contract 
and is subsequently sued, it ‘should not be able to rely on its sovereign character by arguing that the 
breach was a political act’.275 
What amounts to a commercial transaction under the State Immunity Act includes contracts for the 
supply of goods or services, a loan or other provision of finance in respect of that type of transaction 
as well as any other transaction of a commercial, industrial, professional or similar nature which the 
State enters outside its sovereign authority.276 However, it is important to note that a government 
body, while operating in what could be described as a broadly commercial manner will not 
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necessarily fulfil the criteria which this thesis’ definition of a commercial party requires. This is 
because a government body will focus more on factors such as facilitating public services rather than 
producing a profit.  
 
2.7.2 Charities 
 
Charities were discussed briefly earlier.277 This was on the basis that incorporated charities will in 
part be governed by the Companies Act 2006. To recap, a charity is defined within the Charities 
Act,278 and must operate for charitable purposes.279 It is generally the case that a charity cannot 
operate with the profit production focus, though some exceptions to this rule exist in the context of 
corporate charities.280 These exceptions concern the tax liabilities that can be applied to profits that 
these charities produce.281 These profits could result from fundraising activities intended to further 
the ability of these organisations to carry on their charitable purpose. 
 
2.7.3 Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social Enterprises and Community Interest Companies 
 
Unlike charities, Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social Enterprises and Community Interest Companies 
(CICs) can be seen to sit in the niche between classically commercial entities, and charities. This is 
on the basis that there are no restrictions placed upon these bodies actively seeking to produce a profit 
as a primary objective. However, limits are placed on the use of any profit.  
Mutuals will take one of two forms; Co-operative Societies and Community Benefit Societies. They 
are ‘owned by, and run for, the benefit of its members, who are actively and directly involved in the 
business’,282 are required to carry on their business without the primary objective of producing profits 
in order to pay interest, dividends or bonuses.283 Co-operatives, which are defined as ‘an autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs 
and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise’,284 must use the 
                                                          
277 2.5.3 Company Law. 
278 Charities Act 2011, s 1. 
279 ibid, s 2. 
280 Corporation Tax Act 2010, s 478-480.  
281 ibid, s 479. 
282 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, A Guide to Mutual Ownership Models, November 2011, 
2. <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31678/11-1401-guide-
mutual-ownership-models.pdf> accessed 24 September 2018. 
283 Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014, s 2(3). 
284 As defined by the International Co-operative Alliance. <http://ica.coop/en> accessed 24 September 2018. 
73 
 
majority of their profits in order to support their social objectives.285 A social enterprise is defined as 
an ‘operator in the social economy whose main objective is to have a social impact rather than make 
a profit for their owners or shareholders … and uses its profits primarily to achieve social 
objectives’.286 It appears that ‘the main feature of social enterprises is that they run a commercial 
activity for a social purpose and are less focused on how they use their profits’.287 Again focus is 
placed on the use of any profit, rather than its production. A CIC functions to ‘provide a benefit to 
the community they serve. They are not strictly ‘not for profit’, and CICs can, and do, deliver returns 
to investors … the purpose of CIC is primarily one of community benefit rather than private profit’.288 
They are governed by the Companies Act 2006, Community Interest Company Regulations 2005 
and the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004. They must benefit 
a section of the community.289 They must use 65% of their profits to serve the community or for 
reinvestment into the company itself.290  
The limitations or requirements that apply to any profits that Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social 
Enterprises and Community Interest Companies generate, as well as the overarching purpose behind 
their existence creates a lack of clarity regarding whether they are commercial in nature. As such, if 
the intention were to provide an all-encompassing definition of what it means to act in a commercial 
manner, these bodies would need to be analysed in far more depth. However, this is not a necessity 
here. As such, it is sufficient to note that a blurred line with respect to commercial and non-
commercial activity exists in some cases.  
 
2.7.4 Conclusion 
 
While there is potential for this definition of commercial to have a wider application, this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. The purpose of this definition is simply to frame the discussion of efficient 
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breach that will follow in subsequent chapters. It seeks only to outline the characteristics of an 
archetypal commercial contract. With that in mind, it is unnecessary to analyse potential boundary 
cases in great depth. However, should an attempt be made to provide an all-encompassing definition 
of what it means to be commercial, these, as well as other types of boundary cases would need to be 
analysed in detail. 
 
2.8 Overall Conclusion 
 
The intention of this chapter was to develop a modern definition of what is commercial in a contract 
law sense. This definition is not all-encompassing and is not intended to be applicable in all settings. 
The intention was simply to identify the characteristics embodied by an archetypal commercial 
contract in order to ground the analysis of efficient breach that is to follow. 
It was first demonstrated that a commercial distinction exists within contract law despite being 
unsatisfactorily defined. This was done through reference to relevant case law.291 It was then 
necessary to characterise what commercial is perceived to mean. First, the Commercial Court was 
investigated; however, any offerings were overly broad in scope. Legal history, namely the 
development of what has been termed commercial law was the next area of interest. Whilst it was 
evident that a commercial party has historically been treated as distinct from the general public, the 
characteristics of such a party (a member of the merchant class) were outdated. This is due to the 
wider range of parties which are considered to be of a commercial nature today. With this in mind, a 
modern, functional definition was required. 
To develop a modern, functional definition of “commercial”, themes which other areas of the law 
demonstrate in making a commercial distinction were identified. This allowed them to be applied to 
contract law. The first area of interest was tax law. Whilst tax liability is in many respects universal, 
a distinction is made when it is applied to profits. Tax law suggests that there are particular 
characteristics shared by parties which are of a commercial nature. These include that a business 
form (sole traders, partnerships and companies) is utilised. Next, any trading activity, profession or 
vocation should be carried out with the intention of producing a profit. That this activity should be 
carried out with the intention of producing a profit also suggests that the specific activity is in itself 
a key distinguishing factor in this regard. Tax liability will be applied to that profit. A combination 
of these characteristics is indicative of a party of a commercial nature.  
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The Law of Partnership offered another useful model. Partnerships require the carrying on of 
business activity involving a trade, occupation or profession, including any preparatory activity. 
Also, this activity should be carried out with a view to producing a profit, coupled with a partner’s 
right to share in that profit. Again, it appears that the profit production intent behind the activity in 
question is a key distinguishing factor suggesting that the transaction itself, as well as its overriding 
purpose is an important consideration. The combination of an organised activity and the pursuit of 
profit through a particular activity are characteristics that can, like in tax law, be said to be indicative 
of a commercial party.  
Company Law was another source of guidance. It is asserted that if a body operates as a company, 
governed by the Companies Act 2006, and assuming it is operating with the primary intention of 
producing a profit (unlike a charity or not for profit organisation) it will be likely to be commercial 
in nature. Again, it appears that evidence of an organised business activity taking place, combined 
with the pursuit of profit are characteristics which are indicative of a commercial party. This is 
consistent with the conclusions drawn from tax law as well as the law of partnership.  
The commercial exception in patent law was also discussed. This exception exists to balance the 
needs of society in the form of innovation, with the profit driven interest of inventors. It appears that 
the right to exploit an invention for profit is a major factor is assessing what will constitute 
commercial activity. Again, this discussion further illustrated that the intention to produce profit 
through a particular activity is a key determining factor when seeking to apply a commercial 
distinction. 
Having identified the importance of the profit production intention, the next step was to discount the 
types of contract which could not be considered to be commercial in nature. Consumer contracts 
were investigated with this in mind. A consumer is distinct from other contracting parties based on 
the definitions offered in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure 
and Representations) Act 2012. A consumer requires statutory protection when entering into a 
contractual dealing. An individual acting in a consumer capacity cannot be considered to be a 
commercial party. A consumer contract (of which a Consumer Insurance Contract is an example) 
will exist between a consumer and a party acting in a business or trade sense. The other forms of 
contract which were discounted were those considered to be of a personal nature. These included 
contracts of employment and non-commercial contracts for the sale of goods. This related to the way 
which parties that were seemingly non-commercial in nature were treated. With this in mind, it seems 
appropriate to assert that a commercial contract will take place between only commercial parties. 
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This assertion is supported by the decision in Johnson v Unisys Ltd292 where it was noted that 
ordinarily, commercial contracts exist between parties seeking to generate a profit.293 
Next, a potential middle ground between commercial, and non-commercial was discussed. This 
included considering contracts entered into by government bodies, the role of charities, as well as 
Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social Enterprises and Community Interest Companies. This was done in 
order to highlight that on occasion, the boundary between commercial, and non-commercial  activity 
can be unclear. If it were the case that an all-encompassing definition of what it means to be 
commercial was being advanced, these, as well as other types of boundary cases would need to be 
analysed in detail. However, the purpose of this definition is to frame the discussion of efficient 
breach that follows. As such, the intention was simply to outline the characteristics of an archetypal 
commercial contract. With that in mind, it is unnecessary to analyse potential boundary cases in 
depth.  
In terms of overall conclusions, it appears that a commercial contract requires that the parties act 
with an overarching business activity in mind. This applies both in a general sense, as well as with 
respect to the activity (in this case a contract) in question. This will be done with the intention of 
generating a profit and will customarily take place as part of a party’s trade, profession or vocation, 
often through business forms such as sole traders, partnerships or companies. In addition, the 
assertion is that a commercial contract will feature only commercial parties. This is the definition 
that will be carried forward and applied throughout this thesis as it seeks to justify the legitimacy of 
the efficient breach of commercial contracts.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Rationale behind the Commercial Distinction in English Contract Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The intention of this chapter is to develop on the conclusions reached in chapter 2 regarding the 
existence of a commercial distinction in English contract law. Discussion will go beyond whether a 
commercial contract is treated differently. It will seek to establish the reasons why this is the case. 
This chapter will investigate the reasoning provided by the courts for this commercial distinction in 
contract law in order to outline why cases are decided the way they are. There may well be other 
reasons which are in operation; however, this chapter will focus specifically on the reasoning which 
is provided by the courts. The original contribution which this chapter will provide is setting out the 
rationale behind the commercial distinction in contract law, based on the reasoning provided by the 
courts. The distinction appears to be of a functional, rather than a linguistic nature in the sense that 
while commercial contracts are repeatedly referenced, they are not adequately defined. This was 
highlighted in chapter 2. The fact that commercial contracts are treated differently to non-commercial 
contracts demonstrates that the distinction functions despite the absence of an express definition. 
Because commercial contracts are treated as distinct by the court, there could be a perception that 
judges are effectively acting as legislators. With this in mind, literature on judicial decision-making, 
as well as the work of the Legal Realists will be considered. The Legal Realists suggested that the 
decision-making of judges is informed by more than the law itself and that they could consider issues 
such as context, prevalent social norms, as well as their personal moral philosophies. The commercial 
contract distinction could therefore suggest that the claims of the Legal Realists may carry some 
weight. However, it is important to be aware that judges are bound by precedent. They must follow 
the rulings of previous courts and adhere to the reasoning contained therein. This is a key feature of 
the English common law system. The point that is to be developed moving forward is that there is an 
accepted commercial distinction which is applied within contract law. This is evident within the case 
law. Because of this distinction, judges, while being bound by previous decisions will rightly 
continue to uphold this context based distinction regarding the outcomes of commercial disputes. It 
is the rulings of the English courts in relevant commercial and non-commercial cases that will form 
the key component of this chapter. By assessing the decisions of the English courts, the reasoning 
for this distinction can be set out based on the wording provided. 
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The suggestion is that while contract law as a vehicle remains fundamentally the same whether a 
contract is commercial or otherwise, the type of right that is being pursued can lead the court to look 
beyond established legal doctrine. This is done to allow them to shape the law based on the reasoning 
that informs the pursuit of a contractual right. The difference lies where a right is being pursued for 
commercial, profit driven reasons. In these cases, the court’s decisions may be informed by factors 
such as commercial intent, customs and practices as well as commercial reasonableness.1 With this 
in mind, it is set out that:  
[M]odern principles of construction require the court to have regard to the commercial 
background, the context of the contract and the circumstances of the parties, and to consider 
whether, against that background and in that context, to give the words a particular or 
restricted meaning would lead to an apparently unreasonable and unfair result.2  
Further, in Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd v L Schuler AG3 Lord Reid noted that ‘the more 
unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it, and if they do 
intend it the more necessary it is that they shall make that intention abundantly clear’.4 Finally, Lord 
Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society Ltd5 set out 
five principles which relate to contractual interpretation.6 In Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd7  a standard 
of reasonableness was utilised in order to adopt an objective standard for assessing the quality of 
goods (in this case timber). In Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer Plc8 which concerned 
a longstanding relationship with no written agreement in place, it was ruled that because there were 
‘no objective criteria by which the court could assess what would be reasonable either as to quantity 
or price’,9 a contract between the two parties could not be implied. Contrast this with a personal right 
which will be pursued in order to create pleasure or enjoyment.10 This trend can also be seen in equity 
where, like in contract, the court will look to utilise equitable mechanisms based on the reasoning 
behind a claim being brought. This reasoning is based on whether the claim is of a commercial or 
                                                          
1 See JW Carter, The Construction of Commercial Contracts (Hart 2012) 16; See also Sir Robert Goff, 
‘Commercial Contracts and the Commercial Court’ [1984] LMCLQ 382, 388; Hugh G Beale (ed) Chitty on 
Contracts (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1-051 and 2-150; Edwin Peel, The Law on Contract (14th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 207-208. 
2 Cargill International SA and Another v Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation [1998] 1 WLR 
461, 468 (Potter LJ). 
3 [1974] AC 235. 
4 ibid, 251 (Lord Reid). 
5 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
6 ibid, 912–913 (Lord Hoffmann). 
7 (1932) 147 LT 503. 
8 [2001] EWCA Civ 274; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737. 
9 ibid, 795 per (Morritt VC). 
10 See for example Diesen v Samson (1971) SLT 49; Jarvis v Swans Tours [1973] QB 233; Jackson v 
Horizon Holidays [1975] 1 WLR 1468 (CA) 1472; Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421; Farley v Skinner 
[2001] UKHL 49; [2002] 2 AC 732. 
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non-commercial nature. Proprietary estoppel and the application of fiduciary duties will also be 
analysed to demonstrate this.  
It will be concluded that in deciding contract cases, the courts will consider the type of right which 
is being pursued, as well as the reasons behind that pursuit. The difference lies where a right is being 
pursued for commercial, profit driven reasons or alternatively, for reasons of an individual or 
personal nature. This will inform judicial decision-making. However, judges are bound by precedent. 
They must follow the previous decisions of higher courts, adhering to the reasoning provided for 
those decisions. As such, it is important to base any inferences regarding the commercial distinction 
in contract law on the reasoning provided in the judgments. This reasoning will be extracted from 
the relevant rulings. It is the wording that is used in both commercial and non-commercial cases 
which has allowed the reasoning behind treating commercial contracts as distinct to be inferred. 
Ultimately, it is profit maximisation which will inspire an efficient breach of contract. As such, this 
will be the base from which the analysis which follows will proceed. It is important to make clear 
that no claims which are made with this in mind are intended to extend to contracts within the non-
commercial context which may or may not be similarly inspired.  
 
3.2 Judicial Decision-Making and Legal Realism 
 
The first point of interest is the way which judges reach their decisions. This is because if commercial 
contracts are being treated as distinct by the courts, it is important to consider the role of the judiciary 
as well as their approach to decision-making. This is done because an understanding of this approach 
will ground the analysis of the relevant case law that is to follow. The classic model of judicial 
decision-making has been described as a product of rational choice theory where ‘the judge is a 
rational actor who reasons logically from facts, previous decisions, statutes, and constitutions to 
reach a decision’.11 Any decision will flow naturally from a body of law and would therefore be 
consistent irrespective of the judge who makes it. However, there has been doubt cast over this 
model. For example, Landes and Posner suggest that ‘legal precedents are more accurately described 
as inputs into the production of judge-made rules of law than as the rules themselves’.12 If this were 
the case, precedent would only constitute a contributing element to the law, rather than being the law 
in itself.  
 
                                                          
11 John N Drobak and Douglass C North, ‘Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The Importance of 
Constraints on Non-Rational Deliberations’ (2008) 26 Washington Journal of Law and Policy 131. 
12 WM Landes and RA Posner, ‘Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1976) 19 The 
Journal of Law and Economics 249, 250. 
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3.2.1 Influences on Judicial Decision-Making 
 
There is a suggestion that the belief systems of judges will have an unavoidable influence upon how 
they reach decisions. For example, Holmes set out that ‘the very considerations which judges most 
rarely mention, and always with apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices 
of life’.13 The belief systems of judges are effectively hidden and will influence their decisions in ‘an 
unconscious and unexplainable way’.14 Further, that the potential for this to take place is facilitated 
by the indeterminate nature of the judicial decision-making process.15 Issues may arise because 
despite being able to identify that the beliefs of individual judges play a part, those beliefs cannot be 
explained with precision or detail.16 Further, that “institutional devices” act as a shield of sorts, 
insulating judges from inside or outside influences and allows them the facility to ‘decide disputes 
based on their “sincere” ideological preferences and values’.17 The claim is that it is human nature to 
be influenced by unconscious beliefs and preferences, and that judges are no different in this respect. 
With this in mind, it would be impossible to know with absolute certainty the thought process of an 
individual judge. However, it is noted that ‘in order to conduct a serious discussion of the judicial 
practice, we must understand the mental processes that drive it, and appreciate their strengths, their 
flaws, and their limitations’.18  
Judges may also be influenced by their environment. In a study based on criminal trial courts in the 
US state of Iowa, Gibson suggested that ‘there is a moderately strong “role-playing” linkage between 
judges' sentencing decisions and environmental attributes’.19 Also, three key variables which impact 
on the link between sentencing and environment are noted. These include ‘increased contact with the 
constituency, fear of electoral sanction, and the role orientation of the judge’.20 Gibson concludes 
that ‘sentencing decisions, because of their salience to mass publics and the high degree of discretion 
allowed by law, may be the most susceptible to influence the local community’.21 
Kozinski suggests that judges possess a considerable level of discretion regarding the decision-
making process. This includes ‘making findings of fact, interpreting language in the Constitution, 
statutes and regulations; determining whether officials of the executive branch have abused their 
                                                          
13 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown, and Company 1881) 31; See also Drobak and 
North (n 11) 139. 
14 Drobak and North (n 11)138. 
15 ibid, 139. 
16 ibid, 140. 
17 Pablo T Spiller and Rafael Gely, ‘Strategic Judicial Decision-making’ in Gregory A Caldeira, R Daniel 
Kelemen and Keith E Whittington (eds) The Oxford  Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 39. Cites 
Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (CUP 2002) 82. 
18 Dan Simon, ‘A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making’ (1998) 30 Rutgers Law Journal 1, 142. 
19 James L Gibson, ‘Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A Representational Model of 
Judicial Decision Making’ (1980) 14 Law and Society Review 343, 367. 
20 ibid, 368. 
21 ibid, 368-369. 
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discretion; and, fashioning remedies for violations of the law, including fairly sweeping powers to 
grant injunctive relief’.22 However, it is stressed that this discretion is subject to constraints and that 
judges are not able to simply act as they see fit. Three factors are highlighted (though it is 
acknowledged that there are more) including the judge’s own self-respect, the influence of a judge’s 
colleagues and the political system.23  
D’Amato has been critical of the suggestion that the law is the product of the actions of judges, rather 
than a body of rules or principles.24 He had previously set out that the idea that there is no law until 
it is set out as part of judicial decision is in conflict with the ordinary meaning of law. This ordinary 
meaning is as a mechanism whereby the behaviour of society can be shaped, modified, channelled 
or controlled.25 In line with HLA Hart, it is set out that law has an internal aspect in that it guides 
members of society in making conscious decisions about whether to comply with rules.26  
 
3.2.2 Legal Realism 
 
This approach was developed by the American Legal Realists and was at its most popular in the early 
20th century.27 Its source is the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes.28 It has been set out that ‘American 
legal realism is not a systematic philosophy of law but a way of looking at legal rules and legal 
processes’.29 Karl Llewellyn noted a distrust of legal rules in terms of describing why courts decide 
cases in the way that they do.30 Further, Jerome Frank suggested that because a judge is human, and 
because a human will normally arrive at a decision without working through a formal process of 
reasoning, it will be the case that ‘judicial judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, 
                                                          
22 Alex Kozinski, ‘What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making’ (1993) 26 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 993, 994. 
23 ibid. 
24 See Anthony D’Amato, ‘Legal Realism Explains Nothing’ (2009) 1 Jurisprudence Review 1; See also RA 
Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press 1993) 21. 
25 See Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Limits of Legal Realism’ (1978) 87 The Yale Law Journal 468, 478;  
26 ibid; See also HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 88. 
27 The list of American Legal Realists includes: Karl Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism About Realism-Responding 
to Dean Pound’ (1931)  44 Harvard Law Review 1222; Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: 
Deciding Appeals (Little, Brown and Company 1960); Karl Llewellyn, ‘Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decisions and the Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed’ (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 
395; Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: The Classic Lectures on the Law and Law School (OUP 2008); 
Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers 2009); Underhill Moore and Theodore S 
Hope Jr ‘An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking’ (1929) 38 Yale Law Journal 703; 
Herman Oliphant, ‘A Return to Stare Decisis’ (1928) 14 American Bar Association Journal 71; Leon Green 
and Max Radin, ‘Statutory Interpretation’ (1930) 43 Harvard Law Review 863. 
28 See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457; Holmes (n 13). 
29 Harry W Jones, ‘Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism’ (1961) 61 Columbia Law Review 
799. 
30 Llewellyn (n 27) 1237. 
82 
 
are worked out backward from conclusions tentatively formulated’.31 A realist approach is not one 
that sets out the way in which the law should be approached, but one that suggests that there is 
potential for judges to interpret it with a broader scope of issues in mind. These could include context 
and non-legal norms, as well as the beliefs and preferences of individual judges. The approach can 
be summarised as one where reasons that are not legal, such as fairness, or commercial practices, can 
be utilised to explain the decision of the courts.32 
On the realist movement generally, Hart set out that ‘the courts regard legal rules not as predictions, 
but as standards to be followed in decision, determinate enough, in spite of their open texture, to 
limit, though not to exclude, their discretion’.33 This suggests that where the law is in fact 
indeterminate, it is the role of the judiciary to use their discretion to reach an appropriate decision 
which is in line with the existing law. While this approach acknowledges some characteristics of the 
realist approach, it stops short of accepting that judges have unlimited discretion in terms of their 
decision-making powers. In contrast, Dworkin’s view was that ‘it remains the judge’s duty, even in 
hard cases, to discover what the rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively’.34 
This has been characterised to mean that ‘the duty of the judge is always to discover the law that 
already exists in every case’.35 While this could be interpreted to mean that a judge must simply 
locate the relevant law, others perceive it to leave open the door for a level of legitimate interpretation 
to take place. This has been characterised to mean that judges should ‘search for the (relevant portion 
of) the soundest theory of the settled law’.36 This requires them to ‘search for the most cogent 
principles and theories which can be thought of as embodied in the relevant authoritative materials 
and … decide according to such principles and theories’.37 In this way, rather than creating new law, 
judges would be facilitating its evolution. 
It is suggested that a ‘realist theory of adjudication is based on a belief that judges care about 
outcomes, but that legal doctrine also exerts an influence on legal decisions because judges feel the 
need to justify their conclusions in acceptable legal terms’.38 This leads to the assertion that while 
judges are bound by the law, the law does not itself fully explain their decision-making.39 The judges 
own concerns about their standing and reputation are considered to be of importance here. For 
example, with the individual preferences of the judiciary in mind, Miceli and Cosgel suggest that this 
                                                          
31 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers 2009) 109. 
32 Brian Leiter ‘Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered’ (2001) 111 Ethics 278, 285. 
33 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 147. 
34 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 81. 
35 Leiter (n 32) 116. 
36Andrew Altman, ‘Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin’ (1986) 15 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 205, 232. 
37 ibid. 
38 Matthew C Stephenson ‘Legal Realism for Economists’ (2009) 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 191, 
208. 
39 Grant Gilmore, ‘Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure’ (1961) 70 Yale Law journal 1037, 1038. 
83 
 
‘can both restrain judicial discretion (the Landes and Posner argument), but also inspire it if future 
judges are expected to be persuaded by a decision and follow it, thereby enhancing the authoring 
judge’s reputation’.40 They argue that in considering following precedent, judges will look to balance 
private utility (a personal view on how a case should be decided) and reputational utility (the 
expectation of how a decision would be received by observers such as other judges or lawyers for 
example).41 Harnay and Marciano note that judicial behaviour cannot be understood based solely on 
individual beliefs or preferences. They set out that that attention should also be afforded to 
interdependence between judges as well as professional conformity.42  
Focus was placed on commercial dealings by the Realists. They suggested that, in these cases, judges 
would enforce the norms of the prevailing commercial culture, or look to reach a decision which 
would be socio-economically appropriate.43 Herman Oliphant set out that judges should ‘respond to 
the stimulus of the facts in the concrete cases before them rather than to the stimulus of over general 
and outworn abstractions in opinions and treatises’.44 This would allow legal doctrines to be restated 
‘in ways that were more fact-specific, and thus more descriptive of the relevant grounds of 
decision’.45 In this case, judges would ‘look to the “normal” practices in the existing business culture 
in deciding what the right outcome is (that is, the judges treat normal economic practice as the 
normative benchmark for decision)’.46 The suggestion of the Realists was that rather than attempting 
to impose economic and social philosophy, judges are in fact simply sensitive to non-legal norms. 
These may include the customs and practice of commercial parties such as merchants and banks.47 
This type of approach is one which appears to be in line with the way in which commercial contracts 
are treated differently by the courts. If the judgments provided acknowledge that such norms have 
influenced the reasoning behind them, their impact will be clear. 
As a final note, the Realist approach should not be conceived as judges simply acting as unchecked 
legislators. The case has, however, been made that it would be impossible to know the internal 
decision-making processes of individual judges. This could mean that they may well be influenced 
by non-legal factors in reaching decisions. Despite this, it has been set out that a judge who attempts 
to act as a legislator of sorts will, in fact, be ‘stealthily undermining public confidence in the rule of 
                                                          
40 Thomas J Miceli and Metin M Cosgel, ‘Reputation and Judicial Decision Making’ (1994) 23 The Journal 
of Behavior and Organization 31, 33. 
41 ibid, 49. 
42 Sophie Harnay and Alain Marciano, ‘Judicial Conformity Versus Dissidence: An Economic Analysis of 
Judicial Precedent’ (2004) 23 International Review of Law and Economics 405, 406. 
43 Brian Leiter, ‘Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence’ (1997) 76 Texas Law Review 267, 281. 
44 Herman Oliphant, ‘A Return to Stare Decisis’ (1928) 14 American Bar Association Journal 71, 75. 
45 Brian Leiter, ‘Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine’ (2015) 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1975, 1978. 
46 Brian Leiter ‘Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?’ (2010) 16 Legal Theory 111, 112. 
47 ibid, 119. Cites Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little, Brown and 
Company 1960) 122 and Underhill Moore and Theodore S Hope Jr ‘An Institutional Approach to the Law of 
Commercial Banking’ (1929) 38 Yale Law Journal 703. 
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law’.48 This is because law has an existence which extends beyond the courtroom. Judges must 
respect this ‘by trying, with each decision, to give further specificity and concreteness to the noble 
conception’.49 With this in mind, it has been suggested that a success of the realists was in facilitating 
flexibility. More specifically, this allowed adjustments to be made to the law in order to resolve social 
conflict.50  
 
3.2.3 Conclusion  
 
It is evident that there is the potential that non-legal norms could factor into judicial decision-making 
in commercial cases. However, it is important to keep in mind that in a common law legal system, 
the importance of precedent cannot be discounted. This is on the basis that judges are bound by 
precedent and thus must follow the rulings of previous courts. They are also required to adhere to the 
reasoning which is within these rulings. The point of interest is that there is an accepted commercial 
distinction which is applied within contract law. This distinction is evident within the relevant case 
law. Based on this, judges, bound by previous decisions, will continue to uphold this context based 
distinction regarding commercial disputes. 
The remainder of this chapter will build on this conclusion and focus on the relevant case law. This 
is because despite the questions surrounding judicial decision-making which have been flagged up, 
the judges in UK courts are bound by precedent. As such, judges must follow the rulings of previous 
higher courts and adhere to the reasoning which has been provided. This is a key feature of the 
English common law system. While there is scope for discretion to play a part in judicial decision-
making, this is tempered by a need to act within the boundaries set out by previous decisions and 
their reasoning. By assessing the decisions of the English courts, the reasoning for this distinction on 
the face of the wording provided can be set out. 
 
3.3 The Commercial Distinction in Contract Law  
 
Having confirmed that commercial contracts are distinct, as well as the fact that judges, bound by 
precedent, and thus, the existing commercial distinction in contract law, it is now appropriate to 
establish the rationale (as it is set out by the courts) behind that distinction. This is important because 
awareness that the courts will treat a commercial contract differently without understanding why, 
                                                          
48 D’Amato (n 24) 19. 
49 ibid, 20. 
50 Gilmore (n 39) 1048. 
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will not provide any level of certainty or predictability. It appears that the courts are willing to look 
beyond established legal doctrine to shape the law.51 The same vehicle, namely contract law, is 
utilised to pursue certain rights in both commercial and non-commercial contract cases. The 
difference is the type of right being pursued, and the reasons behind pursuing it. A divide exists 
where the contract in question is entered into purely for profit, as is the case in commercial 
contracting. This is in contrast with agreements intended to facilitate personal enjoyment. There is a 
tendency to treat commercial cases differently based on the parties’ focus on financial gain. With 
this in mind it has been noted that when we are dealing with commercial contract disputes ‘we can 
probably assume that any interests of the plaintiff which may be infringed by a breach will be, in one 
sense or another, financial’.52 To flag up some of the examples of commercial contracts being 
distinguished, some of the case law noted in chapter 2 will be revisited briefly. The intention is to 
analyse why in each case the distinction is made, rather than simply highlighting that it is. The cases 
which will be discussed concern market value, commercial reasonableness and context, time for 
delivery and restraint of trade. 
 
3.3.1 Damages Based on Market Value 
The first point of interest is the way in which damages will be assessed within commercial cases. 
This will provide a grounding for not only the remainder of this chapter, but also, this thesis as a 
whole. This is because, as will become clear, the calculation, and payment of damages is a key 
consideration within this thesis as its primary focus is outlining the legitimacy of the efficient breach 
of commercial contracts. In commercial cases, the court will make an award to reflect what has been 
lost. This will be based on the relevant market value of a good or service.53 In The Rozel54 it was 
ruled that where the cost of a remedy outweighs it actual impact, it would not make commercial sense 
to effect that remedy. Damages were valued based upon any reduction in commercial value.55 It was 
set out that ‘if the cost of remedying the defect is disproportionate to the impact of the defect on 
operating costs, it will not make commercial sense to effect the repair’.56 In short, any costs which 
may be recovered must represent a reasonable expenditure. This will be assessed based on the 
                                                          
51 See for example Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 389; [2010] 3 All ER 701; Ruxley Electronics 
and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344; Channel Island Ferries Ltd v Cenargo Navigation Ltd (The 
Rozel)  [1994] CLC 168. These cases, as well as further examples will be discussed later. 
52 Hugh Beale, ‘Exceptional Measures of Damages in Contract’ in Peter Birks (ed), Wrongs and Remedies in 
the Twenty-First Century (Reprint edn, Clarendon 2006) 220. 
53 See Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson, Remedies in Contract and Tort (2nd edn, CUP 
2005) 82; See also Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (3rd edn, OUP 2004) 188-
191. 
54 [1994] CLC 168. 
55 ibid, 175 (Phillips J). 
56 ibid. 
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commercial implications which the breach of contract in question has had.57 In The Maersk 
Colombo,58 which concerned damage to a quayside crane, the court sought to compensate for the 
claimant’s true loss. It was ruled that it was unreasonable in the circumstances to value damages at 
the level of a replacement. This was on the basis that this would amount to a value which was in 
excess of the actual loss suffered. The claimant had never contemplated replacing the crane in 
question. As such, any award for the replacement value rather than the resale value would be 
unreasonable. Finally, in The Alecos M59 a ship was sold on the understanding that it would come 
with a spare propeller. On delivery, the propeller was missing. It was set out that the claimant was 
entitled to the commercial value of the missing propeller. Further, because there was, in fact, no 
available market for the sale of spare propellers, it was ruled that ‘commercial value of this spare 
propeller on this ship was no more than its scrap value’.60  
 
3.3.2 Commercial Reasonableness 
 
The next point to note is that commercial contracts are assumed to be underpinned by a rational 
commercial purpose and are often said to follow business common sense.61 This will inform the way 
that they will be interpreted by the courts. In cases concerning commercial contracts, the background 
and the context in which contract was agreed will often be used.62 This plays into the contextual 
approach which is applied and illustrates the types of factor which influence the commercial 
distinction in contract law. For example, Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB63 
highlights that ‘if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is 
going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield to business 
commonsense’.64 In Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd,65 Lord Steyn set 
                                                          
57 ibid. 
58 Southampton Container Terminals Ltd v Hansa Schiffahrts GmbH (The Maersk Colombo) [2001] EWCA 
Civ 717. 
59 Sealace Shipping Co Ltd v Oceanvoice Ltd (The Alecos M) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 120. 
60 ibid, 120 (Neill LJ). 
61 See Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] Business Law Review 1719 [5]: 
Lord Hoffmann set out that ‘Businessmen in particular are assumed to have entered into agreements to 
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62 Sir Robert Goff, ‘Commercial Contracts and the Commercial Court’ [1984] LMCLQ 382, 388; See also 
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out that when ‘determining the meaning of the language of a commercial contract … the law therefore 
generally favours a commercially sensible construction’.66 The reasoning was ‘that a commercial 
construction is more likely to give effect to the intention of the parties. Words are therefore 
interpreted in the way in which a reasonable commercial person would construe them’.67 Based on 
this, Mitchell notes that a literal meaning may not be relied on where ‘a reasonable person would 
understand that the contract communicated something different to its strict literal meaning’.68 In 
Society of Lloyd’s v Robinson,69 Lord Steyn further set out that ‘loyalty to the text of a commercial 
contract, instrument, or document read in its contextual setting is the paramount principle of 
interpretation’.70 However, he went on to note that in ‘interpreting the meaning of the language of a 
commercial document the court ought generally to favour a commercially sensible construction’.71 
This was because commercial construction was thought ‘likely to give effect to the intention of the 
parties’.72 This should reflect the interpretation of a reasonable commercial person.73 Finally, in 
Rainy Sky SA and others v Kookmin Bank,74 Lord Clarke noted that ‘the ultimate aim of interpreting 
a provision in a contract, especially a commercial contract, is to determine what the parties meant by 
the language used, which involves ascertaining what a reasonable person would have understood the 
parties to have meant’.75 Also, that ‘the relevant reasonable person is one who has all the background 
knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they 
were at the time of the contract’.76 Again, it is suggested that ‘if a term is capable of bearing two 
meanings, a commercially sensible result is to be preferred over a commercially “absurd” one’.77 
Also, that ‘if “commercial reasonableness” cannot be understood as encapsulating a single or 
universal standard or particular reasoning technique, then this must be because contract context plays 
a large role in these determinations about commercial reasonableness’.78 The key takeaway point is 
that what is reasonable, in a specifically commercial sense, will feature in the court’s approach to 
deciding them. 
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3.3.3 Time for Delivery  
 
Moving on from the discussion of commercial reasonableness, the next point of interest is a more 
specific example which relates to the commercial distinction in contract law. The Naxos79 concerned 
time for delivery and its importance in commercial contracts. Lord Ackner set out that ‘time of 
delivery is of the greatest importance in commercial contracts and contracts in the sugar trade are no 
exception’.80 The need to avoid ‘a wholly unreasonable and commercially quite undesirable 
situation’81 as well as ‘to provide certainty which is such an indispensable ingredient of mercantile 
contracts’82 was noted. In Thunderbird Industries Llc v Simoco Digital UK Limited,83 it was ruled 
that ‘in relation to stipulated delivery times contained in commercial contracts, time is presumed to 
be of the essence’.84 Further, it was noted that neither party contested ‘that it would be right to 
attribute or include no term as to delivery in a contract of this kind. The commercial context in which 
the contract was negotiated makes that a perverse construction’.85 Interestingly, in United Scientific 
Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council86 Lord Diplock noted that ‘some stipulations in commercial 
contracts as to the time when something must be done by one of the parties or some event must occur, 
time is of the essence; in others it is not’.87 However, in Bunge Corporation New York v Tradax 
Export SA Panama,88 the House of Lords confirmed that stipulations as to time in mercantile 
contracts would generally be regarded as provisions making time of the essence. These particular 
requirements with regard to time for delivery illustrate the fact that in commercial contracts, 
requirements may differ to those which may feature in non-commercial contracts. Again, this is based 
on the context in which they exist. 
 
3.3.4 Restraint of Trade 
 
Following on from time for delivery, and additional specific example of the commercial distinction 
within contract law will now be analysed. This comes in the form of restraint of trade. Esso Petroleum 
Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd89 outlined that a distinction will exist between contracts 
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which regulate normal commercial relations and those which are in restraint of trade.90 It was noted 
that:  
[T]he doctrine does not apply to ordinary commercial contracts for the regulation and 
promotion of trade during the existence of the contract, provided that any prevention of work 
outside the contract, viewed as a whole, is directed towards the absorption of the parties' 
services and not their sterilisation.91  
Further, that:  
[S]omewhere there must be a line between those contracts which are in restraint of trade and 
whose reasonableness can, therefore, be considered by the courts and those contracts which 
merely regulate the normal commercial relations between the parties and are, therefore, free 
from doctrine.92  
Finally, Lord Wilberforce outlined that reasonableness was a key consideration in relation to restraint 
of trade cases and that this would be ‘interpreted in relation to commercial practice and common 
sense’.93  
This brief discussion of restraint of trade provides additional evidence of the existence of the 
commercial distinction in contract law. Additionally, this takes into account the importance of 
commercial reasonableness noted earlier. 
 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
 
Based on the decisions noted above, it can be inferred that in purely commercial disputes, the courts 
will be influenced by the fact that the parties involved are primarily seeking a financial gain. This 
will affect the way which damages are calculated. Any award for damages will be based on the 
commercial value which is reasonable in the circumstances. For example, this could be based on the 
cost of a replacement, the reduction in value,94 the resale value,95 or scrap value.96 A major 
contributing factor to the decision-making process of judges in commercial cases is commercial 
reasonableness. This will be applied both to the calculation of damages, as well as to the 
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interpretation of the contract’s terms.97 A prime example of this are cases which concern time for 
delivery,98 and contracts which are potentially in restraint of trade where the courts took a more 
contextual approach, showing sensitivity to commercial reasonableness, as well as commercial 
norms and practices.99 
 
3.4 Personal Contracts and the “Holiday” Cases 
 
Having set out the existence of the commercial distinction in chapter 2, as well as outlining some of 
its characteristics in the first part of this chapter, the next step is to move on to discuss one of the 
clear differences between commercial, and non-commercial contracts. This concerns the varying 
approach to the provision of compensation for non-pecuniary losses. This is relevant to the major 
claim which this thesis makes in the sense that the payment of damages for the efficient breach of 
commercial contracts will be shown to be simplified due to the fact that (often intangible) non-
pecuniary losses are not compensated.  
Johnson v Unisys Ltd set out that in the context of a commercial contract, ‘non-pecuniary loss … is 
not within the contemplation of the parties and is accordingly too remote’.100 This differs from the 
approach that is adopted regarding personal contracts. These ‘have as their object the provision of 
enjoyment, comfort, peace of mind or other non-pecuniary personal or family benefits’.101 As such, 
‘the avoidance of just such non-pecuniary injury can be said to be a principal object of the 
contract’.102 A personal contract may have sentimental or emotional inspiration, though this is not 
always the case. In a commercial setting, such an intent would appear to be illogical and (or) costly 
and, as such, would not be considered commercially rational by a court. This will influence how they 
will treat a dispute in the sense that damages will be assessed based on commercial value. Non-
pecuniary losses will not be considered.103 With this in mind, personal contracts, and more 
specifically the way in which they are distinct from commercial contracts, will now be discussed. 
This is not to suggest that any contract which is non-commercial in nature will be a personal contract, 
only that the case law in this area is of use in illustrating the way in which the courts will assess 
awards for damages following a breach.  
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Generally, damage awards for distress, disappointment, or loss of amenity stemming from a breach 
of contract are limited. They will not be available unless the aim of the contract was to prevent 
distress, create enjoyment or provide a particular amenity.104 Any claim for damages for such losses 
would be outside the primary profit generation function of commercial contracting. The position 
regarding the relaxation of this limitation on damages is demonstrated by the case law. Examples are 
the “holiday” cases where a breach of contract in terms of providing a holiday of a standard which 
was advertised resulted in a damage award for distress or disappointment.105 These contracts are not 
considered commercial because they do not meet the criteria set out in chapter 2. They are not entered 
into by purely commercial parties, carrying out organised business activity with the specific intention 
of generating a profit. In Milner v Carnival Plc,106 the relevant considerations for assessing a damage 
award were set out. These include compensation for pecuniary loss,107 compensation for 
consequential pecuniary loss,108 compensation for physical inconvenience and discomfort,109 and 
compensation for mental distress.110 In Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd,111 ‘the plaintiff was entitled to be 
compensated for his disappointment and distress at the loss of the entertainment and facilities for 
enjoyment which he had been promised’.112 Further, it was outlined that when a ‘contracting party 
breaks his contract, damages can be given for the disappointment, the distress, the upset and 
frustration caused by the breach’.113 Note also that the ruling in Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd114 is 
referenced by Lord Denning in Jackson v Horizon Holidays.115   
Watts v Morrow116 set out that when: 
[T]he very object of a contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom 
from molestation, damages will be awarded if the fruit of the contract is not provided or if 
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the contrary result is procured instead. If the law did not cater for this exceptional category 
of case it would be defective.117  
In addition, Farley v Skinner118 notes Watts v Morrow119 in setting out that contracts that are intended 
to provide pleasure and enjoyment are ‘not the product of Victorian contract theory but the result of 
evolutionary developments in case law from the 1970s’.120 Jarvis v Swans Tours is also noted here.121 
Finally, Diesen v Samson122 concerned a contract for wedding photography. Here it was ruled that 
because the contract was not of a commercial nature, compensation could be awarded for damage to 
‘personal, social and family interests’.123 The claimant’s ability to enjoy viewing wedding 
photographs had ‘been permanently denied her by the defender’s breach of contract’.124 As such, a 
damage award was made. It is noted that in order to avoid a floodgates issue ‘it might be necessary 
to find a filter to cut out trifling claims’.125 The suggestion is that ‘it would be enough to allow claims 
in principle but to keep the awards very low except in serious cases’.126 Further, it is urged that any 
‘damages for disappointment and vexation etc be awarded in any case in which such a loss on a 
serious scale was a natural and probable consequence of the breach and could not be avoided by the 
plaintiff taking reasonable steps’.127  
The key takeaway point is that an award for damages in the case of a personal contract may take into 
account loss of amenity. This could include disappointment, distress and loss of enjoyment. This is 
not the case in commercial contract disputes where damages are assessed based on commercial 
value.128 This demonstrates a clear separation between the reasoning adopted by judges in 
commercial contract cases and those which are non-commercial. While the remedy which is utilised 
is the same, the way in which the award is calculated differs. In the case of non-commercial contracts 
it may take account of losses beyond market value. This is further evidence of the way in which the 
court treat the pursuit of rights of a personal nature differently to those which are profit driven. This 
plays into the overarching theme of this thesis as it is this type of approach that would be applied in 
terms of compensating losses arising from the efficient breach of a commercial contract.  
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3.5 The approach in Ruxley v Forsyth 
 
Following on from the discussion regarding the types of loss which will be compensated in personal 
contract type cases, the next point of interest is a particular case which has relevance in an illustrative 
sense. Ruxley Electronics & Constructions Ltd v Forsyth129 concerned a contract for the construction 
of a swimming pool to certain specifications. These specifications were the required depth of the 
pool, in order to allow that an individual could dive into the water safely. The pool was found to be 
safe for diving, despite being built to a smaller depth than was specified. The claimant contended 
that this would not be the case should he wish to install a diving board. This was not his original 
intention. The claimant looked to claim damages to allow for the pool to be rebuilt to those original 
specifications.130 The relevance which this case has in terms of assessing why the commercial 
distinction exists becomes evident on examination of its facts. The norm in cases concerning building 
work is to assess an award of damages based on the cost of cure. However, this does not apply when 
the cost would be unreasonable.131 Here the commercial value of a swimming pool was unaffected 
by being built to different specifications than were requested. This was added to the fact that the cost 
of reinstatement (demolishing and rebuilding the pool) was deemed to be unreasonable.  
This decision has been noted consistently in subsequent case law. In AXA Insurance UK Plc v 
Cunningham Lindsey United Kingdom,132 the importance of a standard of reasonableness in assessing 
an award of damages was noted.133 This approach, specifically the judgment of Lord Jauncey was 
followed in The Baltic Surveyor,134 The Maersk Colombo,135 and London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority v Halcrow Gilbert Associates Ltd.136 The approach, based on actual loss, rather 
than the cost of repairs and was noted in Chetwynd v Tunmore.137 This case concerned a claim for 
damages to carry out restoration work on a collection of ponds. Here it was set out that ‘it would be 
out of all proportion to award £224,000 for the immediate revetment works when, over a period of 
three to five years, the banks would be restored in any event if the Ponds were full’.138 It was deemed 
appropriate to make an award to reflect ‘the current loss of value in the Fishery rather than the 
revetment costs’.139 
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3.5.1 The Standard of Reasonableness 
 
The commercial standard of reasonableness was noted earlier. Here, the area of interest concerns the 
application of a standard of reasonableness in dealing with a claim for reinstatement. It has been 
suggested that the main significance of the Ruxley decision is confirming that despite damages for 
the cost of cure being the norm in cases concerning building contracts, an award for this value is not 
recoverable if their valuation is unreasonable.140 Further, that the standard is an objective test where 
there is ‘no suggestion that the plaintiff himself should be the arbiter’.141 However, the suggestion is 
that the reasonable person utilised in this test ‘would be one who, like the plaintiff, had bargained for 
the defendant’s promises and who also had the plaintiff’s tastes and needs’.142 The risk of potential 
double compensation is also highlighted in that a scenario could arise where ‘the plaintiff might well 
end up with both the benefits of an effectively sufficient performance and a sum by way of damages 
which no reasonable person would spend on cure’.143 It is suggested that any questions o whether the 
court should concern itself with the use of an award of damages could be allayed ‘if the objective 
reasonableness test were to be enlarged to include the question whether, and to what extent, a 
reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff, having his tastes and needs, would spend the 
damages award in effecting the cure’.144 It follows that assessing a reasonable measure of damages 
would be based on the cost of carrying out repairs and the benefit which would be derived from it.145  
The case concerned a non-commercial contract. However, this type of approach is more common in 
damage claims stemming from commercial contracts.146 It is the way that the court utilised this 
standard which is of note. An award for reinstatement was not enforced due to its cost being 
unreasonable. The reasons for this included first, that the commercial value of the pool was 
unaffected.147 Second, that imposing these costs on the construction firm would be unreasonable as 
‘the cost of reinstatement would be wholly disproportionate to the non-monetary loss suffered’.148 
Finally, the true intent of Mr Forsyth was considered. It has been suggested that while ‘the courts 
may award damages measured by a cost of cure that is higher than the difference in value but will 
not do so where the claimant has not cured and does not intend to cure’.149 While it is accepted that 
the court would not usually be concerned by the plaintiff’s use of any damages, it was set out that ‘it 
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does not follow that intention is not relevant to reasonableness, at least in those cases where the 
plaintiff does not intend to reinstate’.150 It is noted that in cases where rebuilding was genuinely 
intended, recovery of damages for reinstatement would be more likely.151 Further, that the decision 
suggests that a ‘sensible approach to the question of cost of correction damages: they will be awarded 
only if the plaintiff has a genuine interest in the performance being as stipulated and if correction of 
the defect is reasonable. If correction is not reasonable a sum for loss of amenity may be given’.152 
The fact that the court applied reasoning which would be more commonly seen within commercial 
contracting demonstrates that the discretion of judges plays a key part in their decision-making. Note 
also that the normal approach in commercial cases would be to adopt the diminution in value 
approach.153 However, this approach was said to be inappropriate and damages were awarded for 
loss of amenity. 
The award was made to reflect the personal value of what the claimant had lost.154 This demonstrated 
that ‘the enjoyment of an amenity has a quantifiable value quite separate from the cost of performance 
and from the economic losses caused by a breach’.155 Also, that ‘where a difference in value 
amounting to less than the cost of cure has been awarded, the loss of amenity will be permanent and 
general damages ought therefore to be no less than they would have been in a case like Ruxley where 
there was no difference in value at all’.156 Note also The Baltic Surveyor which set out that this is 
‘perhaps the best example of the courts awarding a head of damages called ‘loss of amenity’ outside 
personal injury’.157 The ruling in Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd158 is also relevant. Here it was set out 
that ‘in claims for breach of contract, the plaintiff cannot recover damages for his injured feelings’.159 
However, this rule can be subject to certain exceptions, one of which is when the overriding intention 
of the contract is to provide pleasure.160 What we can see is the willingness of the court to exercise 
their discretion and balance commercial reality and commercial reasonableness with personal 
interests. This is clear based on the damage award for loss of amenity where commercial value was 
unaffected, in preference for reinstatement which was said to be unreasonable based on cost.161  
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3.5.2 Loss of Amenity and the Consumer Surplus 
 
The next point of interest is the fact that Ruxley featured compensation for loss of amenity. Awards 
for loss of amenity are problematic because as Friedmann noted, the court was ‘required to appraise 
an element that has no market price in order to provide an adequate remedy’.162 Further, that this 
development is based on the requirement ‘that the plaintiff's performance interest should be 
respected’.163 Lord Mustill set out that ‘the law must cater for those occasions where the value of the 
promise to the promisee exceeds the financial enhancement of his position which full performance 
will secure’.164 The suggestion is that in doing this he effectively admitted that: 
[I]f the claimant bargains for something which has a particular value for him, even though it 
may have no real value to another person, then the law can include that in its assessment of 
damages, although it cannot be valued on a scientific basis given that it is an intangible loss 
which has to be translated into economic terms for the purposes of an award of damages.165  
This is known as the consumer surplus. As Bowen notes, consumer surplus is an economic concept, 
but one which has an impact on damages for non-pecuniary claims following a breach of contract.166 
It concerns ‘those occasions where the value of the promise to the promisee exceeds the financial 
enhancement of his position which full performance will secure’.167 It is ‘the amount greater than the 
relative market price that a consumer is willing to pay for a good or service in order to secure certain 
conditions specific to the consumer’.168 This is assessed based on ‘the personal, subjective gain which 
the claimant expected to receive from full performance-an advantage not measured by any increase 
in the market value of his property’.169 There is potential for uncertainty regarding the consumer 
surplus. It is, in a legal sense, not completely analogous with the consumer surplus in an economic 
sense. This is because in economics it concerns the difference between the amount which consumers 
are willing to pay for a resource, and what they actually pay for it.  
In Ruxley there was ‘a “consumer surplus” beyond the cost to him of building the pool to the specified 
depth: it was a subjective, even idiosyncratic benefit to him to have that depth in his pool-an 
advantage not measured by any increase in the market value of his property’.170 The suggestion is 
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that an award for this subjective value which goes beyond market price in some case is made possible 
based on the ruling.171 Lord Mustill adopted this approach which has a ‘broader impact in that it 
would appear to be applicable in any case in which a consumer puts a higher value on performance 
than the market value’.172 However, there was acknowledgement that it is difficult to precisely 
quantify the consumer surplus ‘because it represents a personal, subjective and non-monetary 
gain’.173 Despite this, where a consumer surplus can be said to exist, it should be compensated.174 It 
is suggested that ‘their Lordships were eager to see the victim of the breach of contract with some 
degree of recovery once they had decided, rightly, that for pecuniary loss he was entitled, with 
reinstatement unreasonable and value undiminished, to only nominal damages’.175 Further, the same 
reasoning was adopted in Freeman v Niroomand.176 It was set out that in the case of a building 
contract:  
[D]amages are not limited to the diminution in value of the property or the cost of 
reinstatement, but may be awarded in an intermediate figure to reflect the loss of amenity or 
convenience suffered by the householder, or simply the personal and intangible loss which 
arises from the fact that he has not obtained what he wanted and what he expressly contracted 
for, the so-called ‘consumer surplus’.177 
The issue which consistently arises is accurately calculating the consumer surplus. There has been 
an attempt to set out a methodology for the accurate quantification of the consumer surplus using a 
cost-benefit analysis.178 A full analysis of whether this type of approach would be justifiable is not 
required here. It is sufficient to outline that the consumer surplus, despite its difficulties in terms of 
quantification, is something that should be compensated where it is required. Ruxley is said to 
demonstrate that ‘the enjoyment of an amenity has a quantifiable value quite separate from the cost 
of performance and from the economic losses caused by a breach’.179 Further, that even where cost 
of cure damages are awarded, ‘there could still be loss of amenity until such time as the cure could 
reasonably be completed’.180 It has been set out that the decision simply demonstrates that loss of 
amenity can be compensated. It should not be taken to indicate an approach to valuing damages for 
loss of amenity.181 Bowen makes the claim that Lord Mustill extends the reach of the consumer 
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surplus to commercial cases.182 However, it has been made clear throughout that this was not a 
commercial case. This is based on the definition of commercial contracts which is being utilised as 
it featured one only commercial party. It is true it highlights that commercial cases are treated 
differently, however, suggesting that it was itself a commercial case is wide of the mark. 
 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
 
Ruxley Electronics & Constructions Ltd v Forsyth183 demonstrates two key elements with regard to 
the commercial distinction in contract law. The first is that a standard of reasonableness will be 
viewed differently in a non-commercial case. The classic method of assessing damages in 
construction cases based on diminution in commercial value will not be the default approach. 
However, it is important to note that the full cost of reinstatement will not be awarded where it would 
be unreasonable to do so.184 The second is that in non-commercial cases, damages for non-pecuniary 
losses such as loss of amenity may be awarded.185 Further, that the value of the consumer surplus 
may well factor into this calculation.186 The relevance of these conclusions with respect to the 
overarching intention of this thesis are that they confirm the fact that the assessment of awards of 
damages will vary between commercial, and non-commercial disputes. Because the focus is to make 
the case for the efficient breach of commercial contracts, this is an important consideration as it is 
the commercial approach that will be applied. Issues such as compensating for loss of amenity, or 
for the consumer surplus will not feature. 
 
3.6 A similar approach in Equity 
 
At this point it has been set out that disputes that concern commercial contracts will be treated 
differently to those of a non-commercial nature. This is in respect of the types of loss that will be 
compensated and appears to be based on the type of interest that is being protected, or enforced. The 
next issue for discussion concerns highlighting a contrast with the approach that is adopted with 
respect to the commercial distinction.  
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English law also makes a distinction between the commercial and the non-commercial in equity. This 
is demonstrated clearly within the relevant case law. In Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge,187 Lord 
Nicholls outlined that different considerations will be applied ‘where the relationship between the 
debtor and guarantor is commercial’.188 This was because parties who are engaged in business 
practice ‘can be regarded as capable of looking after themselves and understanding the risks 
involved’.189 In this case, risk stemmed from the act of acting as a guarantor. The ruling in Stack v 
Dowden190 made it clear that context is at all times paramount. This shows that a case in a domestic 
context will be treated differently from one in a commercial setting. Baroness Hale highlighted that 
‘an outcome which might seem just in a purely commercial transaction may appear highly unjust in 
a transaction between husband and wife or cohabitant and cohabitant’.191 The cases of Pettitt v 
Pettitt192 and Gissing v Gissing193 were also noted here. It was outlined that both ‘contain vivid 
illustrations of how difficult it is to apply simple assumptions to the complicated, inter-dependent 
and often-changing arrangements made between married couples’.194 Further, that ‘in law, “context 
is everything” and the domestic context is very different from the commercial world. Each case will 
turn on its own facts. Many more factors than financial contributions may be relevant to divining the 
parties’ true intentions’.195 The key point is that the relationship which may exist in a domestic 
context is both multi-faceted and changeable.  
The assumption that commercial parties act predominantly in pursuit of profit and engage with one 
another in pursuit of this clearly cannot be applied in a domestic context (a marital relationship for 
example). It appears that the court is interested in the relationship between the parties to a dispute, 
rather than the subject matter in question. While we will see that any line between commerce and 
equity may on occasion be blurred in the sense that equitable principles may at times have a role to 
play, it must be said that a line does exist. This relates to the triggers which will lead to equity’s 
intervention. While equity can be seen as universally applicable, this is only the case when the 
relevant requirements are triggered. Further, it seems that in certain cases, such as commercial 
relationships, it is more difficult to bring about equity’s intervention. The reasoning behind the 
commercial distinction in equity can, like in contract, be inferred based on the case law. 
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3.6.1 Proprietary Estoppel  
 
The cases which will now be discussed initially concern whether it was appropriate to apply 
proprietary estoppel. In Thorner v Major196 Lord Walker set out the key elements which must exist 
for a successful claim in proprietary estoppel. These include ‘a representation or assurance made to 
the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his 
(reasonable) reliance’.197 Proprietary estoppel will be ‘applicable where one party knowingly 
encourages another to act, or acquiesces in the other’s actions, to her detriment in the belief that she 
has, or will have some property right in against the first party’.198 Estoppel’s flexible nature which 
offers the potential for unpredictability has been said to be inappropriate in a commercial context.199 
This is because the essential features of the commercial sphere, namely certainty and predictability 
could be undermined. It has been described as ‘a back-up device, a helping hand within the law where 
more formal principles cause injustice’.200 Further, Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd201 set 
out that the courts should be wary of allowing uncertainty to enter into the realm of commercial 
agreements.202  
Lord Neuberger has set out that: 
[T]he message from the House of Lords is that it is simply not for the courts to go galumphing 
in, wielding some Denningesque sword of justice, to rescue a miscalculating, improvident 
or optimistic property developer from the commercially unattractive, or even ruthless, 
actions of a property owner, which are lawful at common law.203  
Further, where a party is aware that they have ‘no legally enforceable right, is easier to accept in the 
context of a commercial and arm’s length relationship than in a domestic or familial context’.204 This 
is because, in a commercial setting, a decision to proceed without a contract in place ‘normally arises 
from the parties, with easy access to legal advice, considering themselves better off, or at least 
choosing to take a risk, rather than being bound’.205 He suggests that in order to establish a claim in 
proprietary estoppel, a claimant is required to demonstrate that ‘he acted in the belief that he has 
something which can be characterised as a legal right – at least in a commercial arm’s length 
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context’.206 Further, that the current state of affairs where ‘proprietary estoppel will not often assist 
a claimant in a commercial context … is probably all to the good’.207 This is because certainty and 
clarity are of particular importance in the commercial context. As such, judges should not seek to 
utilise equitable mechanisms which could introduce uncertainty where it is not legitimate to do so.208 
It is also worth noting Motivate Publishing FZ LLC v Hello Ltd209 which set out that:  
[A]ny business in that situation knows it is at risk unless the licence is actually renewed. It 
was no doubt a sensible business decision for Motivate to enter into contracts for the 
forthcoming year, but until the renewal had actually been agreed, it was or should have been 
a decision based on weighing up the risks.210  
Further, that the claimant’s actions had been founded on an assumption relating to this. The defendant 
was ruled to not be the cause of this assumption.211 This highlights that commercial parties are 
assumed to act in line with business common sense. Here a commercial risk was taken, and further, 
this risk was based on an assumption which was not induced by the defendant. This comes down to 
bad business practice on the part of the claimant. 
There is a view that ‘this does not mean … that the underlying requirements of the claim differ in 
the commercial context’.212 The reason appears to be that in the event that a divide be explicitly 
referred to, ‘it would be necessary to determine the necessarily unstable line between commercial 
and other cases’.213 This offers further evidence of the blurred line which exists between equity and 
commerce. Further, we can see a general unwillingness to define what is commercial in equity, much 
like in contract. It is suggested that there exists the potential that a claim for estoppel made in a 
commercial context could be successful where a party is assured that a contract is not required by ‘a 
man of his word’.214  
Generally, a commercial transaction made without a contract is unlikely to be successful in a claim 
for proprietary estoppel. This is because a contract provides a vehicle for risk moderation in 
commercial transactions. It functions as insurance against the risk of breach. As Lord Walker set out 
in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd,215 a commercial risk was taken with eyes wide open, 
and the result was unfortunate.216 This risk could have been allayed had a contractual agreement 
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existed. There must exist ‘exceptional circumstances before a commercial player’s decision to act on 
the basis of a non-contractual promise can be regarded as reasonable and hence not unduly risky’.217 
With this in mind, there is suggestion that the decision was made based on the absence of a formality 
assurance rather than its commercial nature.218 Whether this is the case seems irrelevant as it is noted 
that ‘in commercial contexts, the “formality assurance” is more difficult to establish and so 
unconscionability is less likely to exist’.219  In Thorner v Major, the decision in Cobbe v Yeoman’s 
Row Management Ltd was noted to highlight the contrast between the approach of equity to 
commercial and non-commercial cases. It was outlined that ‘the relationship between the parties in 
that case was entirely arm’s length and commercial, and the person raising the estoppel was a highly 
experienced businessman’.220 While there was potential to enter into a contractual agreement in 
future, the parties had made a conscious decision not to. Both knew that they were not legally 
bound.221 The fact that this was expressly acknowledged suggests that the determining factor was the 
commercial nature of the dispute. The issue of formality assurance seems tangential. In contrast, the 
ruling in Thorner v Major was in favour of proprietary estoppel due to the domestic context in which 
it was being considered. The importance of weighing up the requirement of certainty of outcomes in 
commercial dealings, and the need to uphold the fundamental aims of equity was the key 
consideration. The question is why is this distinction made? In terms of the application of proprietary 
estoppel, one can infer that the court’s reasoning came down to the type of interest which is being 
pursued or protected. In brief, Thorner v Major concerned a right of a personal nature, while Cobbe 
v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd concerned an attempt to facilitate commercial gain.  
It has been suggested that the approach in Motivate Publishing FZ LLC v Hello Ltd222 ‘makes clear 
that a court will be slow to interfere with commercial relationships and invoke the promise principle, 
even where such a relationship is long-standing’.223 The ruling in Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks 
& Spencer Plc224 is cited as additional support. Here, Lord Mance set out that ‘the law should not be 
ready to seek to fetter business relationships with its own view of what might represent appropriate 
business conduct, when parties have not chosen, or have not been willing or able, to do so in any 
identifiable legal terms themselves’.225 Further, regarding a potential requirement for a belief of the 
existence legal right in order to raise an estoppel in commercial cases, it is suggested that the court’s 
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approach in Motivate Publishing FZ LLC v Hello Ltd ‘shows that a higher threshold can nevertheless 
be imposed in the commercial context through the approach taken in Thorner without the need to 
introduce such a “mistaken belief” requirement’.226 If this is the case then the task at hand would be 
to analyse the relationship between the parties. This would mean that the underlying principles which 
apply to raising proprietary estoppel will remain the same but that the commercial context will be a 
relevant consideration.227  
There has been some suggestion in Australia that these differences should be considered in assessing 
the reasonableness of any assumption which is made. Also, that this is a matter of context. Doueihi 
v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd228 demonstrates that the reasonableness of any 
reliance will depend on the relationship which exists between the parties. Of course, that a 
relationship is of a commercial nature would contribute to this.229 Also, in EK Nominees v 
Woolworths230 it was ruled that EK Nominees were able to expect to be informed of any new proposal 
relating to a lease. It was held that Woolworths had acted unconscionably in denying EK Nominees’ 
assumption that the two parties would enter into an agreement for a lease. The result was that EK 
Nominees was entitled to damages for wasted expenditure. Also, that a representation from 
Woolworths relating to entering an agreement in future gave rise to an estoppel. This provided EK 
Nominees with compensation for any expenditure in reliance.231 
The doubt over whether a dispute in a commercial context acts as an absolute bar to raising an 
estoppel is not problematic for the purposes of this discussion. Simply outlining that the commercial 
nature of a dispute is a consideration, sufficiently demonstrates that on some level they are considered 
as distinct disputes in a domestic or family context. The fact that a dispute arising in a commercial 
context will make it far less likely that the courts will allow proprietary estoppel to be raised, 
illustrates that distinction. 
 
3.6.2 Fiduciary Duties 
 
To provide an additional equitable example, the role of fiduciary duties will now be considered.  A 
fiduciary has been characterised as an individual ‘who owes fiduciary duties, and a fiduciary 
relationship is a relationship between two or more persons in which one, the fiduciary, owes fiduciary 
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duties to the other (or others)’.232 The primary role of a fiduciary is to act for the interests of another, 
rather than their own or equally, the interests of a third party.233 The paradigm example of a fiduciary 
relationship is that which exists between a trustee and a beneficiary.234 A fiduciary must act in good 
faith and with loyalty.235 It was set out in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew236 that:  
(i) A fiduciary must act in good faith; (ii) he must not make an unauthorised profit out of his 
trust; (iii) he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; 
(iv) he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed 
consent of his principal.237 
In Sinclair Investments Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance,238 fiduciary obligations, specifically the issue 
of loyalty was discussed. Lord Millett’s appraisal in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew that 
‘a fiduciary who acts for two principals with potentially conflicting interests without the informed 
consent of both is in breach of the obligation of undivided loyalty’239 was noted here.   
There is some potential for fiduciary obligations to have a role in certain commercial relationships. 
This will depend on the surrounding circumstances of the relationship and whether the expectation 
that one party will act as a fiduciary ‘is not inappropriate, then fiduciary duties can and will arise 
notwithstanding that it is a commercial relationship’.240 Such a relationship would be one whereby a 
party could legitimately expect another to ‘act in that other’s interests or … in their joint interests, to 
the exclusion of his own several interest’.241 This is likely to be the case in relationships such as 
trusts, agency, partnerships and joint ventures.242 These would ‘require a pre-existing relationship 
with a voluntary undertaking by the fiduciary’.243 As Conaglen notes, ‘company directors act in a 
commercial context yet owe fiduciary duties to the company, and lawyers and agents frequently act 
in commercial contexts while owing fiduciary duties to their principals’.244 With this in mind, it is 
set out that the ‘view that fiduciary duties arise when it is legitimate to expect that they will do so 
provides a means of reconciling these apparently inconsistent perspectives of the appropriateness of 
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fiduciary duties in commercial settings’.245 It will be rare for a fiduciary relationship to regulate the 
contracts entered into by individuals for the overriding reason of a dealing that does not itself form 
a fiduciary relationship. This is because fiduciary principles ‘impose obligations of a different 
character from ordinary contractual obligations, and they do so with reference to the nature of the 
relationship between the parties’.246 While many commercial relationships involve a reliance on one 
party by another, it is important to keep in mind that ‘high expectations do not necessarily lead to 
equitable remedies’.247  
A fiduciary must not exploit the relationship for individual gain (by making a secret profit for 
example). This is said to be what distinguishes a fiduciary relationship from a commercial one.248 It 
has been made clear that it is important ‘not to impose fiduciary obligations on parties to a purely 
commercial relationship who deal with each other at arms’ length and can be expected to look after 
their own interests’.249 Commercial contracting seems at odds with this principle because the 
overriding intention of parties is to pursue personal gain in the form of profit.250 An important case 
on this subject where an agent was liable for account of profit is Boardman v Phipps.251 Here the 
agent had in fact placed themselves in a position of a fiduciary nature which presented the agent with 
an opportunity to make a profit for themselves. By not receiving ‘fully informed consent’252 they 
were in breach of their fiduciary duty.253  
A further example are cases concerning retention of title clauses. Here unpaid sellers retain title in 
goods until payment all money due to them is paid. They may include all-monies clauses (where 
property passes when all money is paid), proceeds clauses (where the seller owns the proceeds of 
sale from the goods supplies) and products clauses (these impact the ownership of items to which the 
relevant goods are incorporated or added to doing the process of manufacture).254 In Aluminium 
Industrie Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium,255 a fiduciary relationship was deemed to exist because 
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of the particular conditions of sale. As a result, an obligation was implied into the contract that 
required the defendants to account for the proceeds of any sub-sales. 
The claim is that ‘compelling a commercial party to act not in what he considers to be his interest 
but in what an honest person would consider the best interests of another sits uncomfortably with 
what theorists generally believe the role of law in commerce should be about’.256 That is acting in 
one’s own best interest and a general assumption that parties to the contract will be acting in pursuit 
of profit. Like the reasoning regarding proprietary estoppel, it appears that different types of 
relationship will feature different rights, interests and expectations which will require protection and 
enforcement. As such, context is of paramount importance. Fiduciary duties will be imposed where 
it is appropriate, and necessary to do so.  
 
3.6.3 Conclusion 
 
What can be concluded based on this brief discussion on equitable devices is that like in contract, 
there exists a distinction between commercial and non-commercial relationships.257 This supports the 
assertion that the type of interest which is being pursued or protected will influence the court’s 
judgment. In cases concerning proprietary estoppel, it is made clear that parties entering into typical 
arms’ length commercial dealings are considered to be capable of protecting themselves, as well as 
to understand any risks which they face.258 Context is a key consideration for the court. For example, 
commercial relationships have consistently been distinguished from those of a familial nature such 
as that which exists between married couples.259 It can be inferred that the court’s reasoning is 
informed type of interest which is being pursued or protected. The division concerns rights of a 
personal nature, versus attempts to make a profit or commercial gain.260 The clearest example of this 
can be seen in the contrasting decisions of Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd261  and Thorner 
v Major.262 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd makes it clear that the general approach of the 
court in respect of commercial cases will be to avoid the type of uncertainty which promissory 
estoppel is capable of introducing.263 In this case, the claimant was considered to have taken a 
commercial risk, and based on his pre-existing industry experience it was reasonable for him to bear 
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the costs.264 Promissory estoppel was allowed in Thorner v Major based on the circumstances and 
context of the relationship between the parties. In this case it was a family relationship. It is possible 
that promissory estoppel could be raised in a commercial setting. However, based on the approach 
which can be seen in the cases noted above, the fact that a relationship is commercial in nature will 
make this less likely. It is harder to trigger because any non-contractual assurances which may be 
provided by one party to another would be assessed in part based on the context in which they are 
made. As we have seen, relying on such an assurance is generally considered to be a business risk 
which should be shouldered by the party who takes it.  
The general position is that fiduciary duties will not apply in commercial relationships except for 
those which specifically require them. Examples of such commercial relationships may include 
trusts, agency relationships, partnerships and joint ventures.265 These relationships will feature 
varying rights, interests and expectations that will require protection and enforcement. As such, 
context is of paramount importance. It will not be the norm for equity to intervene and impose 
fiduciary duties in typical commercial relationships. The courts will only impose fiduciary duties 
where it is appropriate and necessary to do so. We can see that the court will look to utilise equitable 
mechanisms based on the reasoning behind a claim being brought. Context is a contributing factor 
in the court’s decision-making process and, as such, whether the claim which is being made in a 
commercial or non-commercial context is a relevant consideration. This is not an absolute bar to their 
use, but it is quite clear that convincing the courts to trigger them will be more difficult. 
 
3.7 Overall Conclusion 
 
Based on this analysis, there are a number of conclusions which have been outlined. Discussion 
began by considering literature on the process of judicial decision-making. Next was the work of the 
American Legal Realists who were focused on context and the potential for the incorporation of non-
legal factors such as commercial norms into judicial decision-making. This highlighted the potential 
that non-legal norms could be a factor in judicial decision-making in commercial cases. However, it 
is important to bear in mind that in a common law legal system like that of the UK, the importance 
of precedent cannot be discounted. This is because judges are bound by precedent and are required 
to follow the rulings of previous courts. They must also adhere to the reasoning which is within those 
rulings. With this in mind, that reasoning was extracted. It is the wording used in the rulings of the 
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courts in both commercial and non-commercial cases which has led to the overall conclusions in this 
chapter. They have allowed the reasoning behind treating commercial contracts as a distinct category 
to be inferred on the face of that wording. 
With these decisions in mind, it appears that on a fundamental level contract law will remain the 
same whether or not a dispute concerns a commercial contract. What can be inferred from the 
approaches adopted by the courts is that despite being a part of the same legal construct, it is 
necessary to interpret commercial contracts differently to those which are not.266 This is required in 
order to ensure that certainty and predictability in commercial dealing can be guaranteed. This 
predictability is based on what can be described as commercial norms and practices which are at all 
times influenced by context. The rationale behind adopting such an approach is based on the type of 
right which a party is attempting to protect or enforce. When this is done for commercial purposes 
with the overriding intention of creating profit, the courts will take into account certain factors. These 
could include commercial reasonableness, as well as industry customs and practices and will 
influence their interpretation.267  
In cases of a non-commercial nature, where a right is being enforced or protected for purely personal 
ends such as pleasure or enjoyment, the courts will take account of that.268 They will consider 
personal preferences ahead of what would generally be considered to make commercial sense. Such 
factors are not considered by the courts in purely commercial cases.269 There is a need for the courts 
to find balance between these approaches. The reasoning applied in Ruxley Electronics & 
Constructions Ltd v Forsyth270 demonstrates this. There was an acceptance that damages should be 
paid for loss of amenity, but a refusal to extend this to what would amount to reinstatement or specific 
performance based on unreasonable cost. Such a cost would have severely impaired the commercial 
party going forward. With this in mind, there is a claim that ‘in refusing reinstatement on the basis 
of reasonableness, and in making an award on the basis of a subjective loss of amenity, the judgments 
are consonant with precedent. In trammelling the extent of the award by reference to an objective 
standard, the judgments are consonant with principle’.271 The objective standard which is being 
referred to is, of course, reasonableness, while the subjective element concerns the award for loss of 
amenity. The application of this type of reasoning regarding commercial value and cost of 
                                                          
266 See the awards for loss of amenity in Ruxley Electronics & Constructions Ltd v Forsyth (n 129) as well as 
the “Holiday” cases including Diesen v Samson (n 122); Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd (n 111); Watts v Morrow 
(n 116); Farley v Skinner (n 118); Milner v Carnival Plc (n 106): These can be compared with the 
approaches in specifically commercial cases such as The Rozel (n 54); The Maersk Colombo (n 58).  
267 On rational commercial purpose see Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov (n 61) [5]-[7]; One ‘business 
common sense’ see Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (n 63) 201. 
268 See Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233; Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421; Farley v Skinner 
[2001] UKHL 49; Diesen v Samson (1971) SLT 49. 
269 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13; [2003] 1 AC 518 [70] (Millet LJ). 
270 Ruxley Electronics & Constructions Ltd v Forsyth (n 129). 
271 Rosalind MM McInnes ‘The yellow brick road: Ruxley revisited: Case Comment’ (1998) 14 Construction 
Law Journal 33, 43. 
109 
 
reinstatement that would be more common within commercial contracting demonstrates a level of 
discretion which judges utilise in their decision-making.  
One could make the claim that assessing damage awards in a commercial context is a simpler process. 
Commercial settlements consider commercial value, whether this is the reduction in value, the market 
cost of a replacement or the relevant resale value for example.272 In contrast, non-commercial 
disputes consider other, often intangible losses. These may include injury to feelings as a result of 
loss of enjoyment, distress or disappointment.273 Calculating an award for loss of amenity or for a 
lost consumer surplus is a difficult task. Despite this, it is something that should be compensated 
where required. There is a suggestion that there is nothing special about commercial contracts and 
that they ‘are construed in the same way as any other contracts’.274 Staughton suggests four principal 
tools which the courts will adopt in interpreting contracts. These include, first, the wording of the 
contract. Second, any surrounding circumstances to which both parties were aware. Third, in the 
event that absurdity could arise based on the ordinary meaning of wording used, what they could 
reasonably be likely to mean may be considered. Fourth is the reality and customs of the market.275 
That these tools can be adopted is not in dispute. In fact, they are a logical set to utilise. However, if 
it is accepted that the commercial setting is different, it follows that elements such as the surrounding 
circumstances, as well as the reality of the market will have an impact on the way that a contract is 
interpreted. Based on the discussion of case law which considers measures for commercial value,276 
commercial reasonableness,277 time for delivery,278 and restraint of trade,279 it is clear that this is the 
case. When this, as well as the decision in Ruxley Electronics & Constructions Ltd v Forsyth is 
considered, it appears that while it may well be true that there is nothing special about commercial 
contracts, there is at the very least, something different about them. 
Finally, the interest-based approach can also be seen in equity, specifically in the case of proprietary 
estoppel, as well as in the application of fiduciary duties. Again, there exists a clear distinction 
between the way a court will treat disputes arising from commercial and non-commercial 
relationships.280  It is evident that a party who enters into typical commercial dealings are considered 
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able to protect themselves and to understand any risks which they face.281 Contrast this with 
relationships of a familial nature like those between married couples.282 It can be inferred that the 
court’s reasoning is informed type of interest which is being pursued or protected. The division 
concerns rights of a personal nature and attempts to make a profit or commercial gain.283 The clearest 
example of this can be seen in the contrasting decisions of Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management 
Ltd284 and Thorner v Major.285 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd makes it clear that the 
general approach of the courts in respect of commercial cases will be to avoid the uncertainty which 
promissory estoppel may introduce.286 In contrast, promissory estoppel was allowed in Thorner v 
Major based on the circumstances and context of the relationship between the parties.287 It is possible 
that promissory estoppel could be raised in a commercial setting. However, this will be less likely. 
This is because relying on non-contractual assurances in a commercial setting is considered to be a 
risk which should be shouldered by the party who chooses to rely on them.288 Note also that fiduciary 
duties will only be applied by the courts in commercial relationships which specifically require them. 
Such relationships may include trusts, agency relationships, partnerships and joint ventures for 
example.289 These types of relationship will feature varying rights, interests and expectations that 
will require protection and enforcement. As such, whether a claim is being made in a commercial or 
non-commercial context is of paramount importance and contributes to a court’s decision-making 
process. 
With respect to the overarching intention of this thesis, the conclusions reached within this chapter 
are relevant on the basis that they elucidate the context based approach which is being applied by the 
court in contract cases. This is in the sense that the interests of the parties involved influence the 
commercial distinction. This is based on whether they are profit driven, or, of a more personal nature. 
This distinction, which has been shown to exist, and be routinely applied will be carried forward 
within the remainder of this thesis. It will be set out that the efficient breach of commercial contracts 
is legitimate based on the underlying profit generation intent that underpins commercial contracts.  
 
  
                                                          
281 ibid [88] (Nicholls LJ). 
282 See Stack v Dowden (n 190); Pettitt v Pettitt (n 192); Gissing v Gissing (n 193). 
283 See Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd (n 201) [91] (Walker LJ); Thorner v Major (n 196). 
284 ibid. 
285 Thorner v Major (n 196). 
286 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd (n 201) [81] (Walker LJ); See also Motivate Publishing FZ LLC 
v Hello Ltd (n 209) [74]. 
287 Thorner v Major (n 196). 
288 See Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd (n 201) [81] (Walker LJ). 
289 See Boardman v Phipps (n 251); Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (n 247); Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v 
Romalpa Aluminium (n 255); See also Mason (n 242) 245: See also Steven White ‘Commercial Relationships 
and the Burgeoning Fiduciary Principle’ (2000) 9 Griffith Law Review 98, 99. 
  
Chapter 4 
 
An Argument against Promise as the Basis of English Contract Law: Allaying 
Concerns Regarding Efficient Breach in the Commercial Contracting Context 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that broadly deontological concerns regarding efficient 
breach are not relevant in the commercial setting. Originality stems from the approach that is adopted 
in order to deal with some of the perceived moral issues surrounding efficient breach of contract. 
This will involve outlining that the perception that breach of contract is akin to breaking a promise, 
and thus, morally impermissible, is incorrect. This is on the basis that promising does not form the 
basis of English contract law and thus, any moral requirements that may be attached to promise 
making, and breaking, are not applicable. The technicalities or characteristics of an efficient breach 
will not be discussed in depth here. The intention is to provide a grounding upon which the theory 
may be applied.  
Much of the existing literature that disputes the legitimacy of efficient breach takes the position that 
it is wrong because it is synonymous with promise breaking. By considering commercial contracting 
in light of the purpose for which it operates, the moral issues regarding promise breaking will be 
shown to be inapplicable. This will demonstrate that contracting is treated differently in the 
commercial sphere, allowing the approach of the courts in commercial disputes to be better 
understood.  
Grounding the claims which this thesis makes regarding the theory of efficient breach by setting out 
that classically promise based concerns are irrelevant in the commercial context, will allow the 
legitimacy, as well as the technicalities of the theory’s application to be discussed later. This is 
important because it will aid in demonstrating that contracting is treated differently in the commercial 
sphere.1 Further, a grasp of this principle allows the approach of the courts to commercial disputes, 
and the subsequent remedies to be better understood. The case will be made for the legitimacy of an 
act consequentialist attitude to breach of contract in the commercial context.2 A breach would be 
                                                          
1 See generally Chapter 2; See also Chapter 3. 
2 Act consequentialism is concerned with the direct consequences of a particular action. An action will be 
considered morally right if it creates the maximum level of utility compared to other available options. 
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efficient (and desirable) where the position of the breaching party after the payment of expectation 
damages would be preferable to that which would have followed performance.3  
It will be set out that a promise and a contract are fundamentally different concepts based on the 
domain in which they operate. They serve different purposes specific to where they are utilised. As 
such, it would be inappropriate to consider them as synonymous. This separation is particularly 
resonant in the case of commercial contracts. The suggestion is that commercial contracts sit 
separately to non-commercial contracts based on the profit generation focus which underpins them.4 
As a result, attempts to discount the legitimacy of the theory of efficient breach, as well as its 
consequentialism-based ideology on the basis that contractual enforceability is built on the promise 
principle would be flawed. A further issue is when, where, and how the state should intervene through 
the use of the courts. It will be set out that the state does not seek to enforce contracts in order to 
uphold private morality. Rather, their intention is to protect reliance on reciprocal exchanges. 
Whether the promise principle forms the basis of English contract law on a practical level will then 
be considered. This involves investigating the development of contract law in a historical sense. This 
will provide an outline of contract law’s development that will then be utilised in order to demonstrate 
that promise is not in fact a foundational element within English contract law. The key consideration 
will be the development of English contract law which grew from tortious roots through trespass, 
debt, covenant and assumpsit.5 This displays a genesis which does not include the practice of 
promising. Also, that the additional formalities which are required in order to make a contract 
enforceable highlight the difference between contract and promise.6 It will be set out that in English 
law, contracting is based on reciprocal exchange rather than the moral power of a promise. It does 
not protect promises; rather it protects reliance and exchange. This is more in line with harm based 
torts and compensating for this harm (or loss). With this in mind, it has been outlined that ‘an 
Englishman is liable not because he has made a promise, but because he has made a bargain’.7 
                                                          
3 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 462. 
Reprinted in (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991, 995; See also RL Birmingham, ‘Breach of Contract, 
Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency’ (1970) 24 Rutgers Law Review 273; John H Barton, ‘The 
Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract’ (1972) 1 The Journal of Legal Studies 277, 300; RA 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1st edn, Little, Brown and Company 1972) 57. 
4 See 2.8 Overall Conclusion. 
5 See Ranulf de Glanville, The treatise on the laws and customs of the realm of England commonly called 
Glanvill (GDG Hall ed and tr, New Edited edn, OUP, 2002); See also Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic 
William Maitland, The History of English Law before the time of Edward I (2nd edn, CUP 1898) 136; SFC 
Milsom, The Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths 1969); Sir John Baker, The Oxford 
History of the Laws of England (OUP 2003); JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, 
OUP 2011); David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 2006).  
6 See for example AWB Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit (OUP 1987). 
7 MP Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract (16th edn OUP 2012) 41. 
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To provide some additional context, the development of contract law elsewhere will be considered. 
This will include Roman law, the development of medieval European contract law, and the canon 
law. The relevance of this is highlighting that English contract law developed differently to that of 
continental Europe, which is more in line with holding promise to be a foundational principle. Also, 
it will be highlighted that claims which suggest that in the 19th century the laws of Europe were 
imported into English law are unlikely to be correct.8 This is due to the process of English legal 
education at that time. The education of legal practitioners was undertaken within the Inns of Court, 
a practical setting, rather than in Universities. While Roman law was taught in English universities 
by the late 19th century, it was not applied to practice.9 There will also be a note on the contrast 
between contract and equity in respect of the formalities which, while they are a pre-requisite in 
contract, are not in equity. The differing approach to providing remedies for breach of trust will also 
be highlighted.10 This will aid in demonstrating that in English law, contract and promise are distinct 
entities and should be viewed as such.  
It will be outlined that English contract law is consequentialist in a positive sense. Following this, it 
will be necessary to deal with the normative issue at hand and analyse whether this should be case. 
The contrasting positions of the consequentialist, and deontological outlooks on promise breaking 
will be set out. Consequentialist ideology aligns with utilitarianism (act utilitarianism) and considers 
that promises should be kept when doing so will achieve the highest overall level of good.11 This 
means that the reasoning behind keeping a promise will be based on achieving the best possible 
consequences.12 The Deontological view is that keeping a promise is the only acceptable course of 
action. It is focused on the need to keep an individual promise rather than encouraging ‘the 
intrinsically good state of affairs of people keeping their promises’.13 There will also be a note on 
aretaic concerns which are based on virtue ethics.  
                                                          
8 See for example James Gordley, Foundations of Private Law (OUP 2006). 
9 See JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, OUP 2011) 161-162; See also Geoffrey 
Samuel, A Short Introduction to the Common Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 74; MH Hoeflich, ‘The 
Americanization of British legal education in the nineteenth century’ (1987) 8 The Journal of Legal History 
244, 246; Roy Stuckey, ‘The Evolution of Legal Education in the United States and the United Kingdom: 
How one system became more faculty oriented while the other became more consumer oriented’ (2004) 6 
Journal of Clinical Legal Education 101, 108; Andrew Boon and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and 
Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future?’ (2008) 58 Journal of Legal Education 79, 82. 
10 See generally John McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014); See also Jamie 
Glister and James Lee (eds), Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015). 
11 See John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) 64 The Philosophical Review 3, 13. 
12 ibid; See also David Ross and Phillip Stratton-Lake, The Right and the Good (OUP 2002) 38: ‘Utilitarians 
say that when a promise ought to be kept it is because the total good to be produced by keeping it is greater 
than the total good to be produced by breaking it, the former including as its main element the maintenance 
and strengthening of general mutual confidence, and the latter being greatly diminished by a weakening of 
this confidence’. 
13 Stephen Darwall, ‘Agent-Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out’ in Stephen Darwall (ed) Deontology 
(Blackwell 2003) 114. 
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It will be clear that promissory theories of contracting align with the deontological approach, but that 
there is a flaw within deontological ideology. This is on the basis that it is at best difficult, and at 
worst, impossible to judge whether or not an action is good without taking into account its 
consequences. Also, claims regarding the wrong which exists within promise breaking are based 
predominantly on their virtuous nature. While these virtues may seem intuitive, it is peculiar that 
they should form the basis of contractual liability, without the reasoning behind them being 
articulated. These virtues, as well as the reasoning behind them, should be evidenced, rather than be 
based on an assertion that they are valid. Framing the discussion of efficient breach that is to follow 
based on this foundation is an original approach that has not been attempted elsewhere.  
It will be concluded that it is incorrect to suggest that the promise principle forms the basis of 
contractual enforceability in English law. This is based on the domain in which contracting operates. 
Also, that the application of the theory of efficient breach in any given context requires that the 
consequentialist approach is adopted. With that in mind, it is essential that consequentialism and an 
approach focused on wealth maximisation are justified. Ultimately, the consequences which will 
flow from entering into a contractual agreement provide the reason for doing so. As such, a 
consequentialism based attitude to contracting is legitimised. This leads to the assertion that an 
efficient breach in the context of commercial contracting cannot be discounted based on issues of 
morality which arise from promise breaking.  
 
4.2 What is a Promise and what is a Contract?  
 
There are two predominant approaches which are adopted in terms of defining a contract. They are 
described as either a promise which is enforced by law, or as an agreement which gives rise to legally 
enforceable obligations.14 Before discussing the relationship which exists between a promise and a 
contract, it is important to outline working definitions for the two. This is on the basis that the 
argument that will be advanced within this chapter is that the two are distinct entities. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 See generally Hugh G Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1-014; See also 
Edwin Peel, Treitel on The Law of Contract (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1–001. 
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4.2.1 On Promise 
 
Hogg notes that much of the literature which discusses promise and contract does not attempt to 
provide a definition for “promise”,15 and that it ‘is a statement by which one person commits to some 
future beneficial performance or the beneficial withholding of a performance, in favour of another 
person’.16 Other definitions include a promise as ‘a commitment or assurance that something will (or 
will not) be done in future’,17 or as representing ‘the promisor’s commitment to carry out the initial 
decision by doing what is promised at some future time despite a subsequent change of mind’.18 The 
common theme is that it is an undertaking to carry out future action for another’s benefit.  
A promise will normally require an existing relationship between promisor and promisee, meaning 
that they may trust another.19 Trust is said to explain why breaking a promise is wrong, as the parties’ 
commitment to one another is influenced by their relationship.20 It is outlined that ‘promissory 
relations are open and flexible, providing greater room for moral development’.21 Penner sets out 
that promises are a type of voluntary obligation that ‘enable people to make arrangements and carry 
on relationships they could not do otherwise, thus allowing people to establish special bonds’.22 Like 
Raz, Penner also notes that these bonds characterise ‘our relationships with others that we consider 
valuable’.23 Scanlon suggests that the obligations which arise from a promise are based on the social 
practice. Further, that there is a moral judgment placed on breaking, or violating certain norms.24 It 
is highlighted that Hume considered that such moral judgments are ‘a reaction of impartial 
disapproval toward acts of promise-breaking, a reaction that reflects our recognition that the 
institution of promising is in everyone’s interests’.25 Also, that the motivation to keep a promise 
could be influenced by a variety of factors which include cost, commitment and conditions.26 
There is a suggestion that promises play a role in producing trust, which serves to facilitate social 
coordination and cooperation. However, it seems that without the existence of trust, the moral force 
                                                          
15 Martin Hogg, Promises and Contract Law (CUP 2011) 4: Hogg cites three examples including PS Atiyah, 
Promise, Morals, and Law (OUP 1983) 8; Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (Harvard University Press 
1981) 9; Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (Hart 2003).  
16 ibid, 6. 
17 Henry Mather, Contract Law and Morality (Greenwood Press 1999) 1. 
18 E Allan Farnsworth, Changing Your Mind: The Law of Regretted Decisions (Yale University Press 1998) 
29. 
19 Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (Hart 2003) 11. 
20 ibid, 20. 
21 Prince Saprai, ‘Balfour V Balfour and the separation of contract and promise’ (2017) Legal Studies 1, 24. 
22 JE Penner, ‘Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory, 325, 326. 
23 ibid, 325, 326; See also Joseph Raz, ‘Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise’ in Gregory Klass, George 
Letsas and Prince Saprai (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014) 64. 
24 TM Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press 2000) 295-296. 
25 ibid, 296; See also David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Book III, Part II Section V ‘Of the 
Obligation of Promise’ (1739). 
26 Richard B Brandt, Facts, Values, and Morality (CUP 1996) 148. 
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of promising is diminished. Any requirement to keep a promise is informed by an individual’s 
internal moral conscience. This will mean that any requirement to keep a promise is effectively self-
imposed.27 As Hume observed:  
Since every new promise imposes a new obligation of morality on the person who promises, 
and since this new obligation arises from his will; it is one of the most mysterious and 
incomprehensible operations that can possibly be imagined, and may even be compared to 
transubstantiation or holy orders, where a certain form of words, along with a certain 
intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, and even of a human creature.28 
That an obligation arises from the will of promisors may lead to problems regarding enforceability 
where the promisor finds promise breaking advantageous. There is also a suggestion that ‘if promises 
are ever binding that is because of the value of people having the power to determine (up to a point) 
the strength of the promised act relative to other interests’.29 Further, that an individual has ‘the power 
intentionally to shape the form of his moral world, to obligate himself to follow certain goals, or to 
create bonds and alliances with certain people and not others’.30  
The key points are that a promise can be defined as an undertaking regarding a future course of action 
for the benefit of another. They will usually take place within an existing relationship of trust and 
confidence between promisor and promisee. Finally, whether a promise will be kept is very much 
contingent on the relationship between the people who are a party to it. With this in mind, it is now 
necessary to move on to outline the characteristics of a contract. This is to allow the two to be 
compared. 
 
4.2.2 On Contract 
 
Contracting signals intentions and shared understandings as well as providing the enforceability 
which promises lack. It requires committing to legal responsibility in the event of non-performance.31 
They have been described as ‘closed and relatively rigid’.32 Enforceability comes from the consent 
                                                          
27 See Steven Shavell, ‘Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct’(2002) 4 American Law and 
Economics Review 227, 236. 
28 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Book III, Part II Section V ‘Of the Obligation of Promise’ 
(1739). 
29 Joseph Raz, ‘Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise’ in Gregory Klass, George Letsas and Prince Saprai 
(eds) Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014) 64. 
30 Joseph Raz, ‘Promises and Obligations’ in PMS Hacker and J Raz (eds) Law, Morality, and Society (OUP 
1977) 228. 
31 Randy E Barnett, ‘Contract is Not Promise; Contract is Consent’ in Gregory Klass, George Letsas and 
Prince Saprai (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014) 48. 
32 Saprai (n 21) 24. 
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to be legally bound.33 Consent provides an additional commitment to go alongside any moral 
requirements.34 This is on the basis that ‘contractual promisors intend to give their promisees not just 
moral authority but also the legal capacity to compel them to pursue the ends that the contract 
specifies’.35 As such, contract law can be seen ‘as a mechanism for enforcing an obligation that is 
morally complete without it’.36 Raz set out that communicating an intention to undertake an 
obligation ‘does not “produce” an obligation by any form of magic which can then be “intuited”. 
Indeed, some such communications do not create any obligation’.37 The claim is that a conception of 
contracts based on an obligation relies on the perception that actions will only be obligatory if a 
mandatory rule requires it.38  
The obvious question is whether enforceable agreements change the dynamic with regard to 
promising? Rawls noted that ‘the rules defining promising are not codified, and … one’s moral 
thinking of what they are necessarily depends on one’s moral training’.39 Shavell sets out that the 
threat of a loss of wealth or a custodial sentence outweighs guilt or the disapproval of others.40 Also, 
that there is dilution of the impact of moral sanctions regarding commercial firms.41 Further, because 
undesirable conduct (promise breaking) often leads to large private gains, legal sanctions will be 
required.42 A practice’s moral standing may generate the obligation to keep agreements but this is 
not binding unconditionally or absolutely.43 This suggests that any binding nature of a promise will 
be based on the relationship between the parties rather than any overarching moral force. Contract 
could be said to transform a ‘promisor's choice to perform the promised act into an external object 
that juridically belongs to the promisee’.44 Prior to the contract’s formation, ‘the choice to act in a 
specific way is a function of the actor's self-determining agency’.45 A contract’s key characteristics 
are reciprocity, and enforceability.  
 
 
                                                          
33 See for example Randy E Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 269. 
34 Barnett (n 31) 48; See also Randy E Barnett, ‘Some Problems with Contract as Promise’ (1992) 77 Cornell 
Law Review 1022. 
35 Daniel Markovits, ‘Contract and Collaboration’ (2004) 113 The Yale Law Journal 1417, 1449. 
36 Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (OUP 2012) 52. 
37 Raz (n 30) 218. 
38 ibid, 223. 
39 Rawls (n 11) 31. 
40 Shavell (n 27) 236. 
41 ibid, 242. 
42 ibid, 252. 
43 Scanlon (n 24) 309-314. 
44 Weinrib (n 36) 139. 
45 ibid. 
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4.2.3 Conclusion 
 
Like promises, contracts concern obligations which are undertaken voluntarily, but which are 
bilateral or multilateral joint ventures requiring collaboration.46 This squares with the view that 
contracts are based on protecting reliance on reciprocal exchange. English contract law developed 
with this in mind.47 As well as signalling intent and highlighting shared understandings, a contract’s 
function is to provide a method to seek a remedy following breach. Enforceability can be seen as 
additional to any moral commitment which may exist in promising by invoking the legal system 
through court action. The final contrast between a promise and a contract is that despite both being 
voluntary, a contract will be reciprocal in nature. These conclusions illustrate a fundamental 
difference between a promise, and a contract. 
 
4.3 Contract is distinguishable from Promise based on the Domain in which it is utilised 
 
Having outlined the basic difference between a promise, and a contract, the intention here is to 
analyse the details of their application. It is important to consider the context within which a promise, 
or a contract is being employed in order to fully understand its normative force. The normative power 
of a contract will, in a general sense, be different to the normative power of a promise made between 
friends or relatives for example. As such, any moral force which is embodied within a promise will 
not necessarily be equivalent to that which exists in contracting. Also, that commercial contracting 
sits separately to non-commercial contracting.48 This is important because where the intention behind 
a commercial contract will be the generation of profit, a non-commercial contract may have broader 
intentions such as facilitating pleasure or enjoyment.49 The domain within which contracting sits is 
separate from promises. Contract functions not to ensure the fulfilment of promises, but to protect a 
party’s reliance and expectation.50 With this in mind, it has been suggested that ‘moral generalities, 
to the extent that they exist, are at best domain-specific’.51 This means that moral obligations are not 
ubiquitous and therefore, must be considered in light of the context in which they are being discussed. 
                                                          
46 See James Penner, ‘Promises, Agreements, and Contacts’ in Gregory Klass; George Letsas; Prince Saprai 
(eds) Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014) 117-118. 
47 See Glanville (n 5); See also SFC Milsom, The Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths 
1969); Sir John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England (OUP 2003); Baker (n 9); David Ibbetson, 
A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 2006); Simpson (n 6); Furmston (n 7) 41. 
48 See Chapters 2 & 3. 
49 See for example the holiday cases: Diesen v Samson (1971) SLT 49; Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 
233; Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421; Farley v Skinner [2001] UKHL 49; Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] 
EWCA Civ 389; [2010] 3 All ER 701. 
50 See for example Nathan B Oman, The Dignity of Commerce (The University of Chicago Press 2016) 67. 
51 Johan Brannmark, ‘Moral Disunitarianism’ (2016) 66 The Philosophical Quarterly 481, 482. 
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This is not to suggest that no moral requirement to keep a promise exists. However, there is an 
obvious problem because despite evidence of distaste for promise breaking, there is difficulty 
preventing it. Parties look to protect themselves against non-performance, particularly in commercial 
relationships. This is because:  
[A]s commerce (that is, trade, and interaction generally) expands a need arises for a method 
by which strangers, lacking regular and intimate contact which breeds trust, can bind 
themselves to actions at a distance … Making a promise, on Hume’s account, is a special, 
relatively formal, method of undertaking obligations to others, one in which the use of 
language and formalized devices plays a crucial role.52  
As such, it seems reasonable to assert that the prominence of the reciprocal contract results from the 
problems in enforcing promises. 
 
4.3.1 Understanding Contract Law  
 
It is useful to consider the ultimate aims which contracting seeks to fulfil within the domains in which 
they exist. An effective way to understand contract law is to consider which system of rules will 
contribute to the best consequences within a particular setting. Goodin suggests that utilising 
utilitarian ideology in a decision making capacity is potentially legitimate when we consider who is 
tasked with utilising that approach to reach a decision, the context and circumstances in which that 
decision is being made, as well as the purpose and aims of the decision.53 By applying this 
methodology to commercial contracting we can see where a utilitarian (or consequentialist) approach 
could be utilised legitimately. Due to the overriding profit generation intention which underpins 
commercial contracting, a broadly act utilitarian (or act consequentialist) approach will be justifiable. 
This feeds naturally into the overarching claim which this thesis seeks to advance regarding the 
legitimacy of the efficient breach of commercial contracts. 
 
4.3.2 The Role of the State 
 
Questions could also be asked regarding when, and where the state should be expected to intervene 
through the use of the courts. It is clear that the keeping of promises between private individuals is 
                                                          
52 See Gerald J Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (OUP 1986) 85; See also Hume (Treatise 
515-20 and Treatise 519-20). 
53 Robert E Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (CUP 1995) 61. 
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not an issue which the state will be required to intervene on. Mill set out that ‘the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others’.54 It is not for the state to uphold a particular standard of private morality. 
Contractual actions in court are intended only to ensure that interests in reciprocal exchanges which 
have been contracted for are protected. 
 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
 
It is the case that the domain within which contracting sits is separate to that of promises. Contracting 
functions to invoke reliance where there is not necessarily a pre-existing relationship of trust and 
confidence between parties. This is particularly salient in commercial contracting. As Atiyah 
suggested, ‘philosophers who still write about the duty to keep promises with the high moral tone 
that one often finds (for example in Ross, Hare, Hart, Warnock, or Rawls) appear to be reflecting the 
moral attitudes of the last century rather than those of the present day’.55  
 
4.4 The Historical Development of English Contract Law 
 
Having set out that promise and contract are distinct on a modern sense, it is now necessary to assess 
whether there is any legitimacy to claims that the English law of contract grew from promising. To 
achieve this, the development of English contract law in a historical sense will be discussed. There 
is a suggestion that legal principles which originated elsewhere and which featured promise as a key 
feature were imported into the English law of contract.56 However, it will be outlined that English 
contract law is rooted in tort, more specifically in trespass.57 As such, compensation is awarded to 
reflect harm (or loss) suffered with the intention of placing the injured party, so far as is possible, in 
the position that they would have been in had the contract been performed.58 Also that it developed 
with a focus on reciprocity.59 This will aid in demonstrating further that the perceived likeness 
                                                          
54 See John Gray and GW Smith, JS Mill’s On Liberty in Focus (Routledge 1991) 30. 
55 PS Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (OUP 1983) 139. 
56 See James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (Clarendon 1991) 161. 
57 David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 2006) 130: See generally Sir 
Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the time of Edward I 
(2nd edn, CUP 1898) 184. 
58 See Beale (n 14) 26-001; See also Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850, 855; Livingstone v Rawyards 
Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, 39 (Blackburn LJ). 
59 See generally Glanville (n 5); See also SFC Milsom, The Historical Foundations of the Common Law 
(Butterworths, London, 1969); Sir John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England (OUP, 2003); 
Baker (n 9); Ibbetson (n 57); Simpson (n 6); Furmston (n 7) 41. 
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between promise, and contract is unfounded, and thus, that moral impermissibility arguments raised 
to counter the theory of efficient breach based on that likeness cannot be applied, at least in the 
commercial context.  
 
4.4.1 English Contract Law’s Tortious Roots 
 
Baker notes that because the common law was based on precedent from the very beginning, the first 
book (or treatise) written on the subject written between 1187 and 1189 was ‘a compilation of writs 
with an account of the procedures which they initiated’.60 Based on this it seems that the logical 
starting point is the law surrounding debt. A writ of debt was employable in contractual contexts and 
allowed that a contractor had the potential to receive compensation for the defendant’s wrong.61 
Glanville noted that ‘the cause of the debt may be loan for consumption, or sale, or loan for use, or 
letting, or deposit or any other just cause of indebtedness’.62 It is suggested that ‘Glanville’s writ of 
debt was sufficiently flexible to encompass claims to specific chattels as well as goods and money’.63 
It is the case that ‘in its earliest form, the action of trespass had the capacity to deal with breaches of 
contract’.64 This is based on harm committed by one party against another.  
 
4.4.2 The Action of Covenant  
 
The next phase of development took place in the thirteenth century which saw the emergence of the 
action of covenant.65 These were much like in modern day contractual disputes.66 They have been 
said to occupy a ‘niche between the entitlement-based action of debt and the loss-based action of 
trespass’.67 By the fourteenth century, a deed under seal was required to bring an action of covenant 
in the King’s courts, meaning that an action of covenant was barred in cases of informal contracts.68 
In the case of informal contracts, another form of action was required, namely an action in debt which 
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did not require the support of a document under seal.69 This change has been said to have led to the 
action of covenant falling into disuse by the close of the fourteenth century.70 This is clear evidence 
of a growing need to ensure that an action could successfully be brought.  
 
4.4.3 The Action in Assumpsit 
 
Following the action of covenant was the action in assumpsit. This could be brought in order to 
recover damages following a breach of an assumpsit (or contract) where a plaintiff could demonstrate 
that they had entered into an agreement with the defendant. It is outlined that assumpsit was ‘not 
treated as basing the action upon contract, but as one of the elements leading up to damage to the 
plaintiff’s person or property’.71 This meant that ‘the defendant undertook to do something, and did 
it so badly that the plaintiff, who had relied upon the undertaking, suffered damage at the hands of 
the defendant’.72 Furthermore, assumpsit ‘was primarily meant to fix a tortious liability on the 
defendant’.73 Importantly, simply promising to do something did not render the defendant liable.74 
There are two key points to note here. First, that entering into an agreement had to be evidenced, 
meaning that where ‘there was written evidence of a contract, in the form of a document under seal, 
there were few theoretical obstacles to liability’.75 Second, the law was only concerned with 
reciprocal relationships.76 Baker set out that an action of assumpsit would be ‘founded on mutual 
promises, and therefore places the emergence of a consensual view of contract quite close to the first 
establishment of assumpsit for nonfeasance’.77 This further illustrates the growing need to utilise 
formal measures in order to show that the agreement was enforceable. Focus was placed on 
reciprocal, rather than gratuitous or unilateral agreements. 
By the middle of the sixteenth century the promise was formally separated from the contract as ‘the 
King’s Bench held that this subsequent promise might be an empty fiction, and that the plaintiff was 
entitled to judgment if the jury was satisfied that a contract had been made’.78 Following Slade’s 
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case,79 the action of assumpsit was based on promise but ‘only in the weakest sense of the word’.80 
“Promise” simply denoted that it was a voluntary undertaking. The result was that ‘by separating the 
promise from the underlying obligation it was possible to meet the objection that debt, which was 
referable only to the underlying contract, was the appropriate form of action’.81 As such, assumpsit 
which began its life as an action in trespass moved towards consensual contract.82 This is important 
as it demonstrates that in reality, the role of promise within English contract law is a minor one.  
 
4.4.4 The Role of Consideration 
 
Contract’s reciprocal nature is evidenced by the growing importance of consideration.83 This is the 
next key stage of English contract law’s development which must be considered. Ibbetson highlights 
that informal contracts were only enforceable in medieval law when they were reciprocal in nature. 
This was ‘the very essence of the idea of contract’.84 In the sixteenth and seventeenth century there 
existed a different common law of contract in respect of the requirement for consideration to that 
which can be seen today.85 Simpson highlighted that there was at this time ‘a firm association 
between the action of assumpsit and the need to aver consideration in the pleadings’.86 Blackstone 
noted that some sort of consideration was ‘absolutely necessary to the forming of a contract, that a 
nudum pactum or agreement to do or pay anything on one side, without any compensation on the 
other, is totally void in law’.87 A promise would not be binding, thus creating no obligation without 
proper reason or motive.88 Examples of consideration could include land, chattels, and services.89  
Atiyah suggested that consideration was pivotal in creating an obligation, while promise was less of 
a concern.90 Two sided agreements would be enforced by the common law.91 Farnsworth sets out 
that contract law would generally only acknowledge two legal bases for enforcement. These included 
the formality of the seal, and the doctrine of consideration. The two were intended to distinguish 
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effective transactions from those which are not.92 Fuller noted that the use of formalities such as 
consideration had three key functions. An evidentiary function, a cautionary function (effectively a 
check against inconsiderate action), and a channelling function (such as using a seal to formalise a 
promise).93 The seal insured ‘a satisfactory memorial of the promise and induces deliberation in the 
making of it. It serves also to mark or signalize the enforceable promise; it furnishes a simple and 
external test of enforceability’.94 This extended to the commercial sphere as a business person who 
wished to make a promise binding could utilise the seal.95 This demonstrates the importance of 
ensuring that commercial transactions were enforceable, a theme that continues today.  
Based on its historical development, it is clear is that reciprocal exchange, rather than promise forms 
the basis of English contract law. This is demonstrated by way which formal measures, particularly 
the doctrine of consideration function.96 With the development of English contract law outlined, the 
next issue for discussion is its contrast with civil law systems. This is done order to outline that 
English contract law is fundamentally distinct in terms of its characteristics regarding compensation, 
namely its focus on damage that is caused. 
 
4.4.5 A Contrast between Common Law and Civil Law Systems 
 
There is a contrast between contract law in the English common law and contract law in civil legal 
systems.97 English law is based on precedent, while civil law systems utilise a codified framework.98 
This is borne out when claims breach of contract are considered in respect of the type of interest 
which is protected. The issue is whether it is the damage that is suffered, or the interest in 
performance which is compensated. It is set out that ‘in both German and French law … a contractor 
is in principle entitled to demand that his contract be performed in specie’.99 In German law, a creditor 
may ‘bring a claim for performance of a contract and to obtain a judgment ordering the debtor to 
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fulfil it’,100 though this can only be ordered where performance is still possible. The French civil code 
outlines that ‘a party to a synallagmatic contract who has not received what he was promised is 
entitled to demand resolution of the contract and damages or “to require the other to perform the 
agreement in so far as that is still possible”’.101  
There has been a recent reform of French civil code relating to contract.102 It is suggested that this 
was done due to a lack of clarity within the code, as well as because French law was viewed as 
commercially unattractive.103 The reforms are said to affirm the centrality of specific performance as 
a remedy within the French system. Note though that this had ‘been construed by the courts 
restrictively as only applying to obligations which were personal in character’.104 Specific 
performance will now not be available if there is a ‘disproportion between its cost to the promisor 
and the benefit to the promisee’.105 Previously a contract breaker could not avoid performance based 
‘on grounds of proportionality or reasonableness’.106 This is said to bring about some level of 
alignment with the English system ‘where specific performance is granted only exceptionally, the 
remedy will be refused if it would cause undue hardship to the defaulting promisor’.107 
In English law ‘the innocent party’s only right, in general, is to bring a claim for breach of contract, 
a claim which is historically derived from the tort remedy of trespass and which always leads to 
monetary compensation or damages’.108 An award will customarily reflect any disparity between the 
contract price and market value.109 There is also a suggestion that in English law there is no legal, or 
moral reason to perform a contract, only that there may be a duty to provide compensation in the 
event of breach.110 There are limitations placed on damage awards based on reasonableness, 
mitigation, and rules limiting the compensation of non-pecuniary losses. Contrast this with French 
law where ‘there is no such requirement of reasonableness, non-pecuniary loss is widely 
compensated, and there is no doctrine of mitigation’.111 The suggestion is that the reasons for this 
difference in approach in French law include ‘the binding force of contract, incentivizing 
performance, the desire for transactional security, and the principle of full compensation’.112 Also, 
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that breach is considered to be reprehensible and that ‘French law is morality-orientated’.113 It is 
noted that because ‘English contract law has historically developed in a very commercial context, it 
is the product of commercial consciousness and pragmatism’.114 Further, that this may explain the 
reasoning behind the limitations placed on damage awards.115 These include the requirement to 
mitigate, meaning that ‘a claimant cannot recover for losses which he could have avoided by taking 
reasonable steps’.116 Also, the rule on remoteness means that only losses which arise in the usual 
course of dealing or which were contemplatable by the parties at the time will be recoverable.117 
Finally, after the ruling in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas)118 a 
claimant will be unable to claim for losses for which the defendant could not reasonably be assumed 
to have taken responsibility for.  
 
4.4.6 Conclusion 
 
English contract law’s development started in tort where compensation is awarded in respect of harm 
(or loss) suffered, rather than in respect of the performance that should have been rendered. It has 
developed with reciprocity in mind.119 Based on the roots which are tort based, English contract law 
is detached from promise. This is unlike the contract law of other jurisdictions which feature promise 
as a foundational principle. The result is that English contract law features a consequentialist nature 
in a positive sense. This is visible with respect to assessing damages for breach of contract. Awards 
of damages are intended to provide compensation for any damage, loss, or injury suffered as a result 
of a breach. The intention is to place an injured party in the position which they would have been in 
had the contract been performed, in so far as far as is possible.120  
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4.5 The Historical Development of Contract Law Elsewhere 
 
The next step will be to look at the development of contract law elsewhere. This is because contract 
law in other jurisdictions developed differently to English contract law. References are made to 
promising as well as the requirement that something was added to it to allow enforceability. This has 
relevance as it has been argued that English contract law has been influenced by the development of 
contract in Roman law, continental Europe, and the canon law.121 Also, based on the legal training 
process which was employed at this time, it is unlikely that English contract law was influenced by 
outside sources. The relevance of this discussion comes in reaffirming that English contract law 
developed in a way which did not feature promise as a foundational influence. 
 
4.5.1 Roman Law 
 
In Roman law, promise is said to have formed the basis of the stipulatio.122 It required a request for 
a promise to act in a particular way, followed by providing further consent in a formal manner.123 
This could include ‘writing down an agreement, signing that agreement, shaking hands, registration 
in some central archive, or even using the word “contract”’.124 It is notable that this ‘insistence on 
question and answer with the characteristic repetition of at least a key word (the verb) also make it 
abundantly clear when a contract had in actual fact been concluded’.125 The formality served an 
important purpose, ensuring that the party who was to incur the obligation was aware of what was 
going to happen and allowing for it to be seriously considered.126 Also, an agreement in writing would 
provide clarity, as well providing a source of evidence.127  
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4.5.2 European Contract Law  
 
The next area of interest is its development in continental Europe.128 Here relevant jurists and 
philosophers drew on the work of Aristotle who had characterised such transactions as sales and 
leases ‘as acts of “voluntary commutative justice”. The transaction was just when the value of what 
each party gave equalled that of what he received’.129 In contrast, acts of liberality concerned ‘giving 
resources to enrich another person’.130 Aristotle set out that a system of distributive justice would 
secure a fair share of resources amongst citizens. It followed then that commutative or corrective 
justice would serve to protect that share.131 Further, that ‘if one person takes or destroys what belongs 
to another, commutative justice requires that an equivalent amount be paid as compensation’.132 A 
number of medieval jurists and philosophers are considered to have drawn on this approach in 
formulating their ideas of contract law. These include Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, as 
well as the late scholastics (or Spanish natural law school) who, during the sixteenth century are said 
to have ‘rebuilt the Roman law in force in their day on Aristotelian principles’.133 In addition, 
Tomasso di Vio (or Cajetan) claimed that an individual who was promised a gift could not demand 
that the promise was kept because making a gift was a matter of liberality.  
The Aristotelian distinction is important because in the case of commutative justice the object is to 
protect an individual party’s share of a particular resource. In the case of a gift, a ‘refusal to perform 
leaves the disappointed party no worse off than if the promise had never been made’.134 It is suggested 
that much like the late scholastics, Molina was of the view that contract rules in the Roman tradition 
were matters of positive law which required formality on occasion; however, it was possible, in 
principle to ‘transfer a right to another by indicating one's intention to do so’.135 They distinguished 
contracts of reciprocal interest from liberalities in the same way as Roman law.136 Pufendorf is said 
to have believed that a binding promise required acceptance, as well as a visible sign on consent.137 
However, it was noted that written evidence was a ‘much stronger security, both against 
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forgetfulness, and against unfaithfulness’.138 Grotius made a distinction between a contract and a 
promise in setting out that ‘contract is something more than promise. Promise has indeed the 
consequence that it is improper not to perform what is promised, but does not give another party any 
right to accept the same’.139 French jurists Domat and Pothier also utilised this distinction setting out 
that it ‘meant more than the tautology that a party either does or does not receive back something in 
return for what he gives’.140 They viewed a gratuitous contract as one whereby a ‘donor must actually 
intend to benefit the other party, and if he does not, the contract is not a gratuitous contract whatever 
the documents to which the parties subscribed may say’.141 They believed that any rules which 
purport to govern the obligations of parties to an agreement should be dependent on the type of 
agreement which they entered into. Rules governing an exchange would be intended to ensure that 
‘each party receives an equivalent, and in the case of a gratuitous contract, that the donor behaves 
sensibly’.142 
The legal scholars of continental Europe carried through the distinction which Aristotle applied to 
different types of transaction. Where acts of commutative justice included bargains or exchanges, 
acts of liberality concerned gifts. The development of this area of law came about differently to that 
which took place in England. While there is a distinction between enforceable and unenforceable 
agreements, it seems more likely that, like in Roman law, the contract law of continental Europe 
could have grown out of promise. This was not the case in English contract law. 
 
4.5.3 The Canon Law 
 
The next consideration is the canon law, which featured a focus on promises.143 The canon law has 
also influenced English equity with a focus being placed on fairness and morality.144 In Canon law 
courts common law practitioners had no right of audience.145 The practitioners who operated within 
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these courts did so within the Doctors’ Commons, which was the equivalent of the Inns of Court.146 
Medieval canon lawyers viewed breaking a promise as a wrong and as such, an action could be 
brought before a canon law court.147 When an oath was added to a promise, “spiritual jurisdiction” 
could be utilised in order to enforce it leading to a situation where ‘the courts of the English church 
came to exercise a very considerable jurisdiction over promises coupled with an oath’.148 This 
addition served to make a promise enforceable. In terms of a remedy, the courts would make order 
to “unbreach” that faith which was achieved not through specific performance, but through the 
payment of a sum of money.149 Note that as time moved on, the jurisdiction which the church held 
over promises disappeared. This began in the late fifteenth century and was effectively complete by 
the 1530s.150 This demonstrates a clear role for promise within canon law. However, it is again clear 
that a promise alone was not enough to attract the involvement of a canon law court. In this case, an 
“oath” was added in order that the promise in question would become enforceable. 
 
4.5.4 Conclusion 
 
The importance of discussing elements of Roman law, European contract law and the canon law is 
based on the suggestion that they have influenced English contract law.151 It is true that Roman law 
was taught at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge.152 However, it is important to keep in mind 
that in England, legal practitioners where not educated in a university setting as is the case today. 
The ‘English professional structure was wholly independent of the university law faculties, where 
only canon law and Roman Civil law were taught, and this … ensured the autonomous character of 
English law and its isolation from the influence of Continental jurisprudence’.153 Rather, these legal 
practitioners were trained at the Inns of Court.154 This approach to legal education did not begin to 
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change until the second half of the 19th century.155 Roman law was ‘a subject of no interest to those 
practising the common law’.156 As such, it seems clear that Roman law was not in fact “received” by 
the English law as it was in continental Europe.157 There is a suggestion that Roman law has 
influenced English law in some ways. For example, Glanville is said to have drawn on this “foreign 
law” in discussing agreements and contracts and that Roman law’s influence can be seen in a variety 
of English law’s basic principles.158 Also, there is a claim that a ‘knowledge of Roman law is often 
a prerequisite to a basic understanding of the legal norms in force. An understanding of Roman law 
is also important for the critical evaluation of present or proposed legislation’.159  
There is a suggestion that European principles have been imported into English contract in their 
entirety. For example, Gordley's claim is that contract law has experienced major doctrinal change, 
but that it continues to exhibit the structure built by the late scholastics which drew on the work of 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas but has become detached form the philosophical basis of that 
structure.160 The claim is that during the nineteenth century Anglo-American (as well as French and 
German) jurists and treatise writers ‘purged the doctrines of the natural lawyers of Aristotelian 
concepts and principles that seemed wrong or unintelligible to them. They bent and stretched the 
ideas they retained to make them do the work of those they had abandoned’.161 However, it seems 
unlikely that the English law of contract which developed from tortious roots has had European 
influences in an all-encompassing sense. To recall the discussion of the Lex Mercatoria, in particular, 
the work Lord Mansfield which took place in chapter 2, there is evidence of certain practices being 
imported.162 Mansfield’s aim is said to have been the incorporation of European commercial law 
principles into the common law.163 This is evidenced by what effectively amounts to implying 
consideration regarding letters of credit and bills of exchange.164 However, this was done in a very 
specific way. It was intended to encourage practicality within the commercial sphere. It did not 
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fundamentally alter English contract law doctrine in a wider sense; rather it added a useful element 
to it.165 This type approach has been described as ‘a cautious sampling of the new ideas (from the 
continent) while adapting them to the necessities of legal, political and social life’.166 Keeping this, 
and the approach to English legal education in mind, it appears that while promise may have been a 
foundational principle of contract elsewhere, this is unlikely to be the case in English contract law. 
This is an important factor with respect to the overarching claim of this thesis. This is because it 
negates claims regarding the moral impermissibility of the efficient breach of contract based on a 
perceived likeness with promise breaking. This is on the basis that promise has not played a part in 
the development of English contract law. 
 
4.6 A Contrast between Contract and Equity  
 
To further illustrate that English contract law is based on reciprocal exchange rather than promise, 
some elements of English equity will be discussed. It will be set out that a contrast can be drawn 
between contract law and equity in requiring formalities. In addition, the way in which equity 
approaches the provision of remedies for breach of trust will be noted. The intention is to highlight 
that English contract law has specific characteristics, particularly with respect to commercial 
contracts, and that these characteristics differ from other areas of English law. 
 
4.6.1 On Formalities and Moral Conscience 
 
Generally speaking, equity sits separately from other areas of English law. Newman noted that 
‘administration of equity in a separate court has placed a seemingly indelible stamp on Anglo-
American law … the impression remains that the principles of equity are less appropriate in actions 
for damages than in suits for specific relief’.167 English equity grew from the canon law, which is 
influenced by Christian morality and Roman law, as well as the Lord Chancellor’s authority to hear 
cases where the common law failed to provide solutions.168  Lord Chancellors, unlike common law 
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judges were usually clerics trained in the canon law.169 Chancellors are perceived to have played a 
dual role as judge and jury. Their reasoning was informed by conscience.170 On the case law 
concerning conscience in medieval equity, it is outlined that the petitions in question alleged that the 
defendant had fallen below a standard required by morality.171 
 
4.6.2 On Awards of Damages 
 
A moral standard is demonstrated within remedies for breach of trust. In trust law:  
[T]he conscience of the trustee is bound to give effect to the entitlements of the beneficiary 
or to carry out the purposes for which the property was vested in him … the trust is imposed 
upon the trustee to prevent him from benefiting unconscionably from his ownership of the 
property.172  
The suggestion is that equity is better known for non-monetary remedies including rescission, 
rectification, specific performance, or an injunction. However, situations may arise where the court 
will order a monetary payment in respect of a personal claim.173 Trustees could be liable for personal 
remedies which would require them to take account of their stewardship of the trust’s assets, and for 
proprietary remedies. This would allow a beneficiary to seek to recover trust assets or their traceable 
proceeds. This will also apply where assets have been transferred to a third party by the trust, 
assuming that the beneficiary’s equitable interest in that property has not been extinguished.174  
Traditionally equity has utilised taking account of the trust.175 A trustee will be ‘liable to pay a sum 
of money that will restore the trust to the position it would have been in if the breach had not 
occurred’.176 This may be described as providing equitable compensation, intended to be 
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restitutionary or restorative rather than providing compensation for a loss.177 An award seeks to 
provide compensation in respect of the performance interest, rather than to repair harm. Target 
Holdings Ltd v Redferns178 set out that the intention is ‘to make good a loss in fact suffered by the 
beneficiaries and which, using hindsight and common sense, can be seen to have been caused by the 
breach’.179 In AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors180 it was noted that ‘where there 
has been a breach of that duty, the basic purpose of any remedy will be either to put the beneficiary 
in the same position as if the breach had not occurred or to vest in the beneficiary any profit which 
the trustee may have made by reason of the breach’.181  
Damage may include a loss of profit, which is different to loss of profit within contract law. The 
expectation measure of damages in contract will compensate lost profits, but will not necessarily 
mean that an order for account will be made, as would be the case following breaches of trust. This 
is because profit made stemming from a breach of trust may be attributed to the trust. The approach 
is restitutionary, or gains-based. This contrasts with the loss-based approach in compensatory 
contractual awards. It is noted that:  
[T]he concepts of restitution and compensation are not the same though they will on 
occasions fulfil the same need. Restitution is analogous to property: it concerns wealth or 
advantage which ought to be returned or transferred by the defendant to the plaintiff. It is a 
form of specific implement.182  
Restitutionary awards may be available for breach of contract in exceptional cases.183 Here it was 
noted that a court may use discretion and make an order for the account of any profits which they 
deem to have been unjustly received. This is on the basis that ‘the plaintiff's interest in performance 
may make it just and equitable that the defendant should retain no benefit from his breach of 
contract’.184 The suggestion is that in assessing whether such an approach would be legitimate ‘a 
useful general guide, although not exhaustive, is whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in 
preventing the defendant's profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving him of his profit’.185 It was 
set out that it would be wrong to consider restitution for breach of contract without considering the 
fact that it is intended to provide a substitute for a performance interest.186 However, there would be 
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difficulty in awarding restitutionary damages for breach of contract in all cases. Issues may include 
that a defendant’s gains may not correlate with a claimant’s interest, as well as a lack of guidance 
which exists regarding the type of occasion where a defendant should be stripped of their gain.187 
Also, it may ‘undermine the existing contractual compensatory regime and the particular balancing 
of relevant values (such as the avoidance of waste, overcompensation and harshness to the defendant) 
which that regime represents’.188  
 
4.6.3 Conclusion 
 
The intention of this discussion was to highlight that English contract law developed into a system 
based on reciprocal exchange, while, in contrast, equity focused on creating a method for redressing 
wrongs which were unfair or morally impermissible. Equity’s grounding within England’s church 
courts appears to be the reason for this distinction. Those who passed judgment believed it to be their 
duty to enforce morality and private conscience. It is set out that: 
[T]he inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and all its successor courts in common 
law jurisdictions across the world, to supervise and if necessary intervene in the 
administration of trusts is an ancient and well-established jurisdiction of such courts. It is a 
jurisdiction that marks a radical distinction between the law of trusts and the wider law of 
obligations.189  
Had contract grown out of the moral requirement to keep promises, it would likely be more in line 
with equity in terms of its operation. The most probable consequence would be a preference for 
remedies which are restitutionary. These would be gains-based, rather than loss-based following a 
breach of contract and may include specific performance or an order for account of profits (or 
disgorgement damages). The key point is that unlike in equity, English contract law has distinct 
characteristics which lend themselves to the application of efficient breach of commercial contracts. 
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4.7 The Deontological, and the Consequentialist approaches to Promising  
 
The next issue for discussion are the contrasts between the deontological and consequentialist views 
of promising. Broadly speaking, the deontological approach is one that conflicts with efficient 
breach, while the consequentialist approach is one which endorses it. The two approaches will be 
outlined before moving on to set out that consequentialism is synonymous with act utilitarianism. 
Aretaic concerns, which are based on virtue ethics will also be noted. This will serve to set up the 
discussion of promissory theories of contract that will follow. These theories align with the 
deontological approach.  
 
4.7.1 The Deontological Approach 
 
In characterising the deontological approach, Kaplow and Shavell cite Kant, Ross, and Searle.190 
They set out that ‘the broadly held intuition that promises should be kept, even when breaking them 
would advance the greater good’.191 Also, that a promise is ‘something that prima facie ought to be 
kept, and it does not, on reflection, seem self-evident that production of maximum good is the only 
thing that makes an act obligatory’.192 Further, that once a promise is made, whether or not it has 
been relied upon or either party has benefitted from it, a duty to keep it arises, even where there will 
be no reliance, or benefit in future.193 Deontology attaches weight to values such as ‘autonomy, 
human dignity, basic liberties, truth telling, fidelity, fair play, and keeping one’s promises over the 
promotion of good outcomes’.194 However, it is notable that deontological disdain towards acts such 
as promise breaking, lying or withholding information, is perceived to be weaker than “more serious” 
infringements on the liberty of others.195  
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4.7.2 The Consequentialist Approach 
 
Consequentialism views that all that determines whether an act is moral are its consequences. As 
such, ‘the way to tell whether a particular choice is the right choice for an agent to have made is to 
look at the relevant consequences of the decision’.196 The consequentialist attitude to promising is 
that keeping it, or breaking it, should be informed by the consequences that would follow.197 Rawls 
characterised the approach to mean that ‘when a person makes a promise the only ground upon which 
he should keep it, if he should keep it, is that by keeping it he will realize the most good on the 
whole’.198 A consequentialist will see breaking a promise as an acceptable course of action if it lead 
to what they perceive to be a greater good. This reflects classic economic theory on welfare 
maximisation, where parties are rational actors whose actions intend to serve their own interests. It 
has been set out that in a scenario concerning a potentially efficient breach, ‘the promisor is obligated 
to perform the promise only if an independent assessment of the consequences recommends 
performance’.199  
Some view the consequentialist (or utilitarian) view as incompatible with the perceived moral 
requirements of promising.200 Rawls suggested that a promisor should consider both the specific 
impact of breaking a promise, and the effect that breaking that promise will have on the practice of 
promising generally.201 The argument is that because ‘the practice is of great utilitarian value, and 
since breaking one’s promise always seriously damages it, one will seldom be justified in breaking 
one’s promise’.202 Also, that ‘if we view our individual promises in the wider context of the practice 
of promising itself, we can account for the strictness of the obligation to keep promises’.203 Other 
criticism includes the suggestion ‘that failing to follow through on a contractual relationship is not 
conducive to virtuous character or to the maintenance of a flourishing community’.204 Additionally, 
that resistance to the concept of efficient breach can be attributed to aretaic concerns that are based 
on virtue ethics, and thus, from his perspective nothing short of actual performance is acceptable.205 
With this in mind, it is set out that a reinterpretation which aligns monetary damages does nothing to 
dispel the moral impermissibility of breach.206  
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The flaw in the arguments against consequentialism is that it is difficult to judge an action’s impact 
without taking account of its consequences. This is particularly relevant in contracting because the 
consequences stemming from the agreement provide the reason for entering into them. In commercial 
contracting, the primary inspiration will be the financial consequences which follow. It has been set 
out that:  
[T]he argument suggests is that the very best arguments for nonconsequentialism will all 
turn out, on closer inspection, to be arguments for consequentialism, albeit versions of 
consequentialism that are grounded in relative values that had hitherto escaped our 
attention.207  
Arguments which encourage the adoption of an approach based on virtues rely not on evidence of 
those virtues and their effects, but on a somewhat nebulous conception that they are valid. Further, 
it has been suggested that ‘ethical common sense not bolstered by consequentialism leaves us merely 
with our inhibitions and our prejudices’.208  
 
4.7.3 Act and Rule Utilitarianism 
 
Act utilitarianism concerns the consequences of an action. It is considered morally right if it creates 
the greatest level of utility. Rule utilitarianism views ‘that the right action is that which is in accord 
with that set of rules which, if generally or universally accepted, would maximize utility’.209 It 
considers that a rule which requires that a promise be kept will produce the best consequences overall. 
Rule utilitarianism focuses on actions but ‘rightness and wrongness depends on rules’.210 It is argued 
that rules should be selected based on which one will provide the greatest expected value.211 The 
claim is that an act will be ‘morally permissible if it is allowed by the rules whose widespread 
internalization (including the costs of getting them internalized) has the greatest expected value’.212 
Atiyah set out that a rule utilitarian will accept that it is not possible ‘to weigh up the probable 
consequences of every single act which we are called upon to perform’.213 The suggestion is that 
general rules, or conduct that is of utilitarian character, should be adopted on the basis that adherence 
would lead to a greater good than an alternative rule. This relieves the responsibility of making a 
                                                          
207 Michael Smith, ‘The Value of Making and Keeping Promises’ in Hanoch Sheinman (ed) Promises and 
Agreements: Philosophical Essays (OUP 2011) 215. 
208 Joel J Kupperman, ‘A Case for Consequentialism’ (1981) 18 American Philosophical Quarterly 305, 312. 
209 See JS Mill, Utilitarianism (Roger Crisp ed, OUP 1998) 16.  
210 ibid. 
211 Brad Hooker, ‘Promises and Rule-Consequentialism’ in Hanoch Sheinman (ed), Promises and 
Agreements: Philosophical Essays (OUP 2011) 244. 
212 ibid, 245. 
213 Atiyah (n 55) 80. 
139 
 
decision based on the best outcomes, requiring only that a relevant rule be followed. It would be 
unnecessary for a promisor to concern themselves with the consequences attached to performance, 
or breaking a promise. They should ensure that their promise would fall under the general rule that 
promises should be kept, subject to potential exceptions. In short, ‘the rule itself must be adopted on 
utilitarian grounds; but the individual act need not be’.214  
 
4.7.4 On Aretaic Concerns 
 
Katz notes that beyond deontological and consequentialist approaches are aretaic concerns based on 
virtue ethics.215 These are said to be “prior” or more important than those concerning rightness or 
wrongness.216 It is set out that the debate over efficient breach has ‘focused on deontological concerns 
(specifically, whether contract breach is equivalent to promise-breaking, and whether promise-
breaking in the contractual context is necessarily wrong)’.217 It is also noted that Shiffrin combined 
deontological and aretaic issues and that ‘the intuitive resistance that many people experience to the 
concept of efficient breach may be better explained by aretaic concerns-that is, by virtue ethics’.218 
However, it does not appear that the gulf between deontological and aretaic concerns is as great as 
Katz suggests. Deontological issues in this context can be distilled down to a requirement that a 
promise is kept because keeping that promise is valuable in itself, while aretaic issues require that a 
promise is kept because that is what a person of virtuous character should do and that this is valuable 
to the “community” as a whole. In reality, the two are similar in that the reasoning behind keeping a 
promise is based on the moral requirements of promise making. 
 
4.7.5 Conclusion 
 
The intention of this discussion was to outline that consequentialist (or act utilitarian) approaches 
will align with the classical conception of the theory of efficient breach which is concerned only with 
the consequences of a breach. The key point is that it would be difficult, if not impossible to assess 
whether an action has a positive or a negative impact without taking account of the consequences. 
This is of great importance within contracting as those consequences provide a reason for entering 
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into them. This is of note with regard to commercial contracting as the overriding intention of the 
contracting parties will be the production of profit. As such, any arguments that encourage the 
adoption of an approach based on virtues alone rely not on evidence of those virtues and their effects, 
but on a broad assumption that they are valid.  
 
4.8 Promissory Theories of Contract  
 
Promissory theories of contract broadly align with the deontological (or aretaic) approach. They seek 
to explain contract law using promise as a guiding principle. They view a contractual obligation as 
self-imposed as it is created through the communication of an intention to perform a promise.219 
Obligations are perceived to arise because of a promisor’s voluntary act, rather than any outside 
influence.  
Fried suggested that contract features the promise principle as its central moral theme.220 Kimel notes 
that in Fried’s view ‘the requirement to keep a promise as arising primarily out of the very act of 
promise-making, rather than from the consequences that breaking or keeping a promise may 
entail’.221 The claim is that promises should be kept because that is the course of action which is 
morally right. More recently Fried outlined that his intention in Contract as Promise was to provide 
a ‘structure by which actors could determine for themselves the terms of their interaction and 
cooperation—whether in commercial or personal relations’.222 It has been suggested that by placing 
focus on individual rights, with an aversion to both collective interest, and to economic analysis, 
Fried aligns himself with Kant,223 who, in Metaphysics of Morals set out that rather than a particular 
good or service, a promisee acquires the right to make a claim against the promisor in respect of that 
right.224 This could be interpreted in one of two ways, either that the promisee has a right to claim 
performance specifically, or that they may claim for damages in respect of that.  
Fried is criticised for appearing to depart from the moral requirements of promising.225 The issue is 
the acceptance of damages as an appropriate remedy. The obvious issue concerns how a connection 
between the promise principle and expectation damages be nuanced in the way that Fried suggests. 
This is problematic because if a promise should always be performed, then remedies of a 
                                                          
219 Stephen Smith, Contract Theory (OUP 2004) 44; See also Oman (n 50) 76. 
220 Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (OUP 2015). 
221 Kimel (n 19) 8. 
222 Fried (n 220) 137. 
223 Weinrib (n 36) 51. 
224 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor ed and tr, CUP 1996) Para 6:274. 
225 Seanna V Shiffrin, ‘The Divergence of Contract and Promise’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 708; See 
also Kaplow and Shavell (n 191) 160. 
141 
 
restitutionary nature, or potentially specific performance would be appropriate.226 This is the view 
which Fried’s critics, most notably Shiffrin, adopt.227 
The need to go beyond moral sanctions is a consistent problem. Benson notes that a moral obligation 
‘does not go so far as to explain a duty that is owed to another as a matter of justice, in contrast to a 
duty of fidelity or of self-consistency that, though it may relate to another, is required only as a part 
of virtue’.228 The claim is that the morality of promising does not create a basis for contract law 
because in a contractual context an obligation is based upon a relation. This is in the sense that ‘not 
only must the contractually bound defendant perform the promised act, but that performance is owed 
to a particular plaintiff’.229 Any moral obligation will be relevant to the promisor alone. Therefore, 
the promisee would possess no right to insist that performance takes place.  
 
4.9 Overall Conclusion  
 
The primary intention of this chapter was to provide a platform to go on to analyse efficient breach 
in the context of commercial contracts. This was original based on the approach that has been adopted 
in order to deal with some of the perceived moral issues surrounding an efficient breach of contract. 
It has been demonstrated that broadly deontological concerns regarding efficient breach are irrelevant 
within commercial contracting by dealing with the moral issues surrounding efficient breach. These 
take the position that breach of contract is wrong because it is synonymous with breaking a promise.  
In English law promise is not, and moreover, should not be considered to form the basis of 
contracting. Promises require an existing relationship of trust and confidence between promisor and 
promisee. This relationship will contribute to the moral force which influences whether a promise 
will be kept. In contrast, contracts seek to invoke reliance without the necessity for a pre-existing 
relationship of trust and confidence between those involved. They are bilateral, or multilateral in 
their nature. As such they require collaboration between the parties involved and are focused on 
protecting reliance.230 A primary function of contract is to provide a method for one party to seek an 
enforceable remedy against another following breach, a feature which promises lack. It was set out 
that contracting’s domain differs from that of promising. This is reflected by the state’s role in 
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enforcing them. This is not enforcing a standard morality between individuals, but protecting 
reciprocal exchanges. This is particularly resonant in the context of commercial contracting.  
It was set out that English contract law has developed with reciprocity in mind.231 Also, based on its 
tortious roots, it is practically detached from promises. This is unlike the contract law of other 
jurisdictions which appear to have featured it as a foundational principle. As a result, it has developed 
a consequentialist nature. This is most apparent with regard to the approach to assessing damages for 
breach of contract, which are intended to provide compensation for any damage, loss, or injury which 
is suffered as a result of a breach, placing an injured party, as far as is possible, in the position that 
they would have been in, had the contract been performed.232 This method for assessing damages is 
naturally consequentialist in seeking to provide compensation based on the actual loss suffered.  
After outlining the characteristics of deontological, consequentialist, and aretaic approaches, it was 
set out that the application of the theory of efficient breach in any given context requires that the 
consequentialist approach is adopted. In any context, it is the consequences of entering into a contract 
which provide the reason for doing so. More specifically, in commercial settings, contracts are 
entered into with the intention of generating a profit. With this in mind, an act consequentialist 
approach to contracting is legitimate as it offers the potential to maximise the levels of profit, or 
equally minimise losses. It was also made clear that deontological (or aretaic) approaches adopted in 
promissory theories of contract are problematic because promise breaking carries only moral 
sanctions which are relevant to the promisor alone. The promisee has no mechanism to enforce 
performance.  
Within commercial contracting, which is geared towards profit generation, it is reasonable to assert 
that a different standard should be applied to assessing any requirements which parties are held to. 
As such, an efficient breach in the context of commercial contracting cannot be discounted based on 
issues of morality that arise from promise breaking. Moving on to build a defence of efficient breach 
of contract in the commercial context on this foundation will be the focus of the remaining chapters 
of this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
231 See Glanville (n 5); See also Milsom (n 66); Baker (n 75); Baker (n 9); Ibbetson (n 57); Simpson (n 6); 
Furmston (n 7) 41. 
232 See Beale (n 14) 26-001: See also Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850, 855; Livingstone v Rawyards 
Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, 39 (Blackburn LJ). 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Economic Analysis of Law and the Theory of Efficient Breach  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The intention of this chapter is to set up the original analysis which will follow. This includes the 
criticisms of efficient breach in chapter 6 and the case that will be made for the functionality of 
efficient breach of commercial contracts in chapter 7. Setting out the foundation upon which chapters 
6 and 7 are built is essential because to demonstrate how and why the efficient breach of commercial 
contracts is legitimate, an understanding of the theory is required.  
First of all, the economic analysis of law will be introduced. This is done in order to ground the 
theory of efficient breach. Some of the criticisms directed at the economic approach will also be set 
out, though these are not problematic as the claims which this thesis makes relate only to the breach 
of commercial contracts. This is important because chapter 7 asserts that within this context, adopting 
an approach in line with pursuing economic efficiency regarding breach of contract is legitimate. The 
theory of efficient breach will then be outlined because in order to analyse its application to 
commercial contracts in chapter 6, the theory must be understood. This will include outlining some 
relevant English case law examples, as well as some from the United States. 
Next, the idea of efficiency will be discussed. This includes introducing a number of measures which 
are utilised within economics, as well as economic analysis of law. This is essential because it may 
vary in different settings. It is necessary to understand the differing approaches which may be 
adopted, as well as to justify which ones should be utilised within commercial contracting. This will 
be followed by a discussion of the role which efficiency may play within decision making. It will be 
set out that elements of economic efficiency, in this case wealth maximisation and the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion,1 may legitimately inform decisions relating to the breach of commercial contracts. This is 
due to the profit producing intent which underpins them.2 Issues stemming from a pursuit of 
efficiency will then be highlighted. This includes noting that the legal process has a value beyond 
solely efficiency. Examples of this include the criminal law as well as the process of judicial decision 
making. There will also be a note on the problematic nature of interpersonal utility comparisons in 
                                                          
1 See 5.4.3 Welfare Maximisation and Utilitarianism; See also 5.4.2 The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion 
2 See 2.8 Overall Conclusion; See also 3.7 Overall Conclusion. 
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assessing efficiency. However, it will be outlined that efficiency can be of use in appropriate settings 
of which commercial contracting is an example.  
It will be set out that economic theories of contract primarily seek to answer two questions. First, 
which contracts should be enforceable? Second, which remedies should be available following 
breach?3 Also, that these theories tend to adopt an approach which seeks to promote economic 
efficiency by promoting the movement of resources into the possession of those who value them 
most.4 Economic theories of contract have been criticised due to a perceived failure to provide a fully 
explanatory theory of contract.5 There is also criticism of the court’s role in terms of the application 
and enforcement of contract law.6 In addition, it is essential to discuss the methods by which damage 
awards for breach of contract are assessed with a focus on the expectation measure.  This seeks to 
put a claimant in the position that they would have been in had performance taken place, in so far as 
this can be achieved through a monetary award.7  
Ultimately it will be made clear that it is most appropriate to utilise economic principles only in 
suitable settings within contract law. The assertion made is that commercial contracting is such a 
setting. It will be concluded that within the commercial contract context, efficiency may legitimately 
be judged based on wealth maximisation, as well as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion featuring the caveat 
that compensation must be paid. Additionally, it will be set out that a simple approach to 
characterising an efficient breach will be adopted. This will involve characterising it as a breach of 
contractual terms on the basis that it is more cost effective to do so. This will take into account the 
cost of performance compared with the cost breach and the payment of compensatory damages. Such 
an approach may be adopted to either reduce losses, or to maximise total gains. 
 
5.2 The Economic Analysis of Law 
 
The theory of efficient breach is a product of the economic analysis of law which has both positive 
and normative elements. It is positive in the sense that it can be perceived to explain the structure of 
the law, suggesting that it has evolved in pursuit of efficiency. In a normative sense, economic 
analysis is said to be useful in suggesting how the law may be improved.8 The approaches to the 
                                                          
3 See Thomas J Miceli, Economics of the Law (2nd edn, Stanford University Press 2009) 88; See also Robert 
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (6th edn, Pearson 2013) 299; Lewis A Kornhauser ‘An 
introduction to the economic analysis of contract remedies’ (1986) 57 University of Colorado Law Review 
683, 685. 
4 See 5.4.4 Economic Efficiency. 
5 See 5.7 Economic Theories of Contract. 
6 See 6.2.1.3 The Role of the Court. 
7 See 5.8.2 The Expectation Interest. 
8 Miceli (n 3) 2.  
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economic analysis of law can be split between three schools; the Chicago (or positive) school, the 
Yale (or normative) school and the functional school.9 The positive school is concerned with the 
incentives which the legal system produces based on the natural evolution of legal rules.10 For 
example, it is noted that Posner has used efficiency in a positive or descriptive way.11 The approach 
of the positive school is restricted ‘to the descriptive study of the incentives produced by the legal 
system largely because its adherents believe that efficient legal rules evolve naturally’.12 It is 
primarily concerned with the market system and its influence on an economy which is focused on 
property and contract as well as the allocation of resources.13 However, there is a suggestion that 
scholars within this school have ‘acknowledged from the outset that the economist’s competence in 
the evaluation of legal issues is limited’.14 This is on the basis that: 
While the economist’s perspective can prove crucial for the positive analysis of the 
efficiency of alternative legal rules and the study of the effects of alternative rules on the 
distribution of wealth and income, Chicago style economists generally recognized the limits 
of their role in providing normative prescriptions for social change or legal reform. 15 
Next, the normative school views the law as a facility to remedy perceived failure within the market.16 
The belief is that ‘there is a larger need for legal intervention in order to correct for pervasive forms 
of market failure’.17 Further, that this school is ‘often presented as more value-tainted and more prone 
to policy intervention than the Chicago law and economics school’.18 Unlike the positive school, it 
seeks to inform, or influence the market system, rather than be informed or influenced by it directly. 
Finally, the functional school focuses on the preferences of individuals which are informed by their 
circumstances.19 It is set out that: 
                                                          
9 See generally Francesco Parisi, ‘Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics’ 
(2004) 18 European Journal of Law and Economics 259; See also Jonathan Klick and Francesco Parisi, 
‘Wealth, Utility, and the Human Dimension’ (2005) 1 New York Journal of Law and Liberty 590. 
10 Jonathan Klick and Francesco Parisi, ‘Wealth, Utility, and the Human Dimension’ (2005) 1 New York 
Journal of Law and Liberty 590, 591. 
11 David Partlett ‘Economic Analysis of Law – Book Review’ (1980) 11 Federal Law Review 238, 243; See 
also RA Posner, ‘The Economic Approach to Law’ (1975) 53 Texas Law Review 757; RA Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law (9th edn, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2014). 
12 Francesco Parisi and Jonathan Klick, ‘Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-Neutral 
Principles of Lawmaking’ (2004) 79 Chicago-Kent Law Review 431; See also Charles K Rowley, ‘Social 
Sciences and Law: The Relevance of Economic Theories’ (1981) 1 OJLS 391. 
13 Francis E Holahan and Edward Sussna, ‘Economic Analysis of Law – Book Review’ (1977) 28 Journal of 
Legal Education 234, 237; See also Lawrence Lessig, ‘The New Chicago School’ (1998) 27 The Journal of 
Legal Studies 661; Robert C Ellickson, ‘Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms’ (1998) 27 Journal of 
Legal Studies 537, 550. 
14 Parisi and Klick (n 12) 434. 
15 ibid. 
16 Klick and Parisi (n 10) 591; See also Parisi and Klick (n 12) 431; Jules L Coleman, ‘The Normative Basis 
of the Economic Analysis of Law’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 1105, 1131. 
17 Parisi and Klick (n 12) 435. 
18 ibid, 434-435. 
19 Parisi (n 9) 266; See also Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law (Basic Books 1971). 
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[T]he functional school allows for the possibility of using insights from public choice 
economics to remedy faulty legal rules at a meta-level. However, unlike the normative 
school, the functional school also recognizes that there are failures in the political market 
that make it unlikely that changes will be made on a principled basis. Also, because it is 
difficult to identify all of the ultimate consequences of corrective legal rules, the functional 
school focuses on using economic theory to design legal meta-rules that lead to efficiency 
ex ante. Achieving this ex ante efficiency requires the design of legal institutions that induce 
individuals to internalize the effects of their private activities, as well as to reveal their true 
preferences in situations where collective decisions must be made.20  
The claim is that it ‘focuses on mechanism design issues to explain the origins of law, capturing both 
the efficiency and non-efficiency perspectives of the other two schools’.21 It is therefore more able 
to acknowledge the impact of preferences which are not necessarily efficiency focused.  
With all of this in mind, the approach which will be advanced by this thesis is broadly normative. It 
will suggest an approach that should be explicitly adopted with regard to the efficient breach of 
commercial contracts. That being said, it will be set out that the approach has effectively already 
been applied.22 It is not intended to attempt to predict the behaviour of contracting parties. There is 
also a functional element as the preferences of the breaching party will be considered.23 The 
suggestion is not that an efficient breach should, or will take place, only that a party to a commercial 
contract will be justified should they choose to pursue it. Again, it must be made clear that this 
justification applies to the relevant party’s choice to breach efficiently, as well as to the law’s 
approach in limiting the available remedy to expectation damages. The use of this remedy in 
commercial contract disputes effectively condones the breach. 
The approach is justifiable based on the context within which it is to be utilised. As Coleman outlined, 
the Kaldor-Hicks (or wealth maximisation) approach is generally ‘not a defensible conception of 
justice’.24 However, it is the case that ‘whether or not a Kaldor-Hicks efficient change in policy is 
warranted or an institution designed to maximize wealth is justified depends on a much richer 
conception of moral agency, the good, justice, institutional competence, and the nature of the state’.25 
Therefore, the validity of the application of this kind of approach is contextual.  
 
                                                          
20 Parisi and Klick (n 12) 431-432. 
21 ibid, 450. 
22 See 5.3.3 Examples of Efficient Breach in English Case Law. 
23 See 5.5 Efficiency Based Decision Making. 
24 Jules L Coleman, ‘The Normative Basis of the Economic Analysis of Law’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law 
Review 1105, 1131. 
25 ibid. 
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5.2.1 The Genesis of the Economic Analysis of Law 
 
Marrying the law with economics is not a new approach.26 In its current form, economic analysis of 
the law dates back to the early 1960s, specifically the works of Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi.27 
Calabresi suggested that economic reasoning could be applied to tort law to ascertain who bears the 
cost of an accident.28 The field was advanced by Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law in 1973.29 
Posner focuses on wealth maximisation which concerns allocating resources to those who value them 
most.30 Maximising wealth and efficiency is placed at the forefront of legal analysis.31 Becker applied 
economic analysis to human behaviour.32 On the criminal law, Becker noted that optimal 
enforcement will depend on factors including the costs attached to catching and convicting offenders, 
whether punishments are fines or prison terms and how offenders respond to changes in enforcement 
methods.33 In this case, focus will be placed on attempting to maximise the wealth which stems from 
contractual dealing.  
 
5.2.2 Rationality and the Preferences of Decision Makers 
 
Within the economic analysis of law, assumptions are made regarding the rationality, and the 
individual preferences of decision makers.34 This is said to explain the way which parties respond to 
                                                          
26 See for example Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (Stephen Gould 
1809); See also Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (InteLex 
Corporation 1995); JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (University of Wisconsin Press 1957); 
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production (Allen & Unwin 1938); Adam Smith, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Liberty Classics 1981). 
27 See RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1; See also 
Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70 Yale Law Journal 
499; For a brief overview of the economic analysis of the law prior to 1960 see Wolfgang Weigel, Economics 
of the Law: A Primer (Routledge 2008) 12-13. 
28 Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70 Yale Law Journal 
499. 
29 RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1st edn, Little Brown and Company, 1973); See also Francesco 
Parisi, ‘Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics’ (2004) 18 European Journal of 
Law and Economics 259, 260. 
30 See RA Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 103. 
31 Robert D Cooter, ‘Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of 
Law and a Review of the Major Books’ (1981) 29 UCLA Law Review 1260, 1265. 
32 Gary S Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (The University of Chicago Press 1976). 
33 Gary S Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ in Gary Becker and William M Landes 
(eds), Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment (National Bureau of Economic Research 1974) 2; 
See also RA Posner, ‘Gary Becker's Contributions to Law and Economics’ (1993) 22 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 211. 
34 See Gary S Becker, Economic Theory (Alfred A Knopf 1971) 25; See also Lewis A Kornhauser ‘An 
introduction to the economic analysis of contract remedies’ (1986) 57 University of Colorado Law Review 
683, 687; See also Francesco Parisi, ‘Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics’ 
(2004) 18 European Journal of Law and Economics 259, 262. 
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legal rules in that they will account for the legal consequences of their decisions.35 Posner set out that 
law and economics assumes that individuals will act rationally to maximise their own satisfactions.36 
Further, that the task which faces economics is to analyse the implications of acting in this way.37 
The rational person (or Homo-Economicus) is a creation of economics used to analyse group 
behaviour. It is a weighted average of the behaviour of a number of individuals. The suggestion is 
that overall a group will act as if its members are rational.38 Rational decision making involves 
comparing costs with benefits and choosing an option which best suits the decision maker.39 Becker 
noted that “each consumer has an ordered set of preferences, and he chooses the most preferred 
position available to him”.40 Also, that there is a consensus that rational behaviour will imply 
“consistent maximisation of a well-ordered function, such as a utility or profit function”.41  
There is a suggestion that the rational person will seek to maximise their self-interest and in doing 
so, only limited concern will be demonstrated for the well-being of others.42 To clarify, economists 
do not necessarily believe that all individuals act this way.43 It is set out that human behaviour should 
not be compartmentalised. At this point it is worth noting that issues relating to behavioural 
economics will be dealt with later.44 On occasion it may be based on maximisation, on others it may 
                                                          
35 Lewis A Kornhauser ‘An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies’ (1986) 57 
University of Colorado Law Review 683, 690. 
36 RA Posner, ‘The Economic Approach to Law’ (1975) 53 Texas Law Review 757, 761. 
37 RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th edn, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2014) 3. 
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Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory’ (1977) 6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 317; 
See also Girardeau A Spann, ‘A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on Contract Law and Practice’ (1988) 
Annual Survey of American Law 223; Elizabeth Anderson, ‘Should Feminists Reject Rational Choice 
Theory’ in Louise M Anthony and Charlotte E Witt (eds) A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason 
and Objectivity (2nd edn, Westview Press 2002); 374-375; Neil H Buchanan, ‘Playing with Fire: Feminist 
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36 The Journal of Socio-Economics 118; Irene CL Ng and Lu-Ming Tseng, ‘Learning to Be Sociable The 
Evolution of Homo Economicus’ (2008) 67 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 265; 
Jonathan Aldred, The Skeptical Economist: Revealing the Ethics Inside Economics (Earthscan 2009) 231; 
Chritoph Hanisch, ‘Negative Goals and Identity: Revisiting Sen’s Critique of Homo Economicus’ (2013) 4 
Rationality, Markets and Morals 157; Khandakar Elahi, ‘Behavioural Controversy Concerning Homo 
Economicus: A Humean Perspective’ (2014) 7 The Journal of Philosophical Economics 2; Klaus Mathis and 
Ariel David Steffen, ‘From Rational Choice to Behavioural Economics: Theoretical Foundations, Empirical 
Findings and Legal Implications’ in Klaus Mathis (ed) European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and 
Economics (Springer 2015). 
39 See for example John Sloman and Dean Garratt, Essentials of Economics (7th edn, Pearson 2016) 8; See 
also John Sloman, Jon Guest and Dean Garratt, Economics (10th edn, Pearson 2018) 12; Michael Parkin, 
Melanie Powell and Kent Matthews, Economics (9th edn, Pearson 2014) 10. 
40 Becker (n 34) 26. 
41 Becker (n 32) 153. 
42 Werner Z Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis (3rd edn, Academic Press 1999) 12. 
43 See Becker (n 32) 153; See also Paul Burrows and Cento G Veljanovski, The Economic Approach to Law 
(Butterworths 1981) 3. 
44 See 5.5.3 Behavioural Economics.  
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not. The claim is that human behaviour ‘can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their 
utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other 
inputs in a variety of markets’.45 Note also that an economist will often refer to utility, rather than 
self-interest.46  
 
5.2.3 Criticisms of the Economic Analysis of Law 
 
Economic analysis of the law could potentially be dismissed on the basis that the rational approach 
has been said to conflict with the interests of society as pursuing individual profit can be ‘inconsistent 
with attainment of societal net benefit objectives’.47 Next, because it fails to ‘account for the special 
nature of legal obligation and law’s relationship with morality’.48 Also, the suggestion that it should 
not extend into the law ‘because economics is about money and the goods and services it can (or 
should be made able to) buy’.49 An obvious issue is ‘the difficulty of assigning weights to the values 
which are to be incorporated in a decision’.50 Whilst this could be problematic for attempts to apply 
economic analysis to every area of the law, it does not present issues in terms of the claims which 
this thesis makes which are limited to the efficient breach of commercial contracts.51  
 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
 
This thesis is not attempting to model or predict the behaviour of a particular group. To do this would 
be economic analysis in a positive sense. As Friedman set out, the task for positive economics ‘is to 
provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the 
consequences of any change in circumstances’.52 The focus here is normative as it concerns 
‘propositions that derive ultimately from the ethics of society’.53 The intention is to set out how 
particular areas should function based on economic reasoning. It is also functional in that it will take 
account of the individual preferences of contracting parties.54 This thesis will demonstrate the 
functionality of efficient breach, a product of the economic analysis of law solely within the context 
                                                          
45 Becker (n 32) 14. 
46 Posner (n 37) 3. 
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51 See Chapter 7. 
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of commercial contracting.55 Nothing will be said regarding how a party will, or should act when 
faced with the opportunity to breach efficiently. The only claim is that they would be justified in 
choosing to do so. With this in mind, it is now appropriate to move on to outline the theory of efficient 
breach. 
 
5.3 The Theory of Efficient Breach 
 
The focus of this thesis is to advance the claim that the efficient breach of commercial contracts is 
legitimate. Any discussion of efficient breach must take account of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 
suggestion that ‘the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else’.56 This appears to cast aside any contractual 
requirement other than the need to pay damages in the event of breach.57 Buckland suggested that 
Holmes’ position regarding contractual liability is analogous to tort based on the liability to pay 
damages. Also, that there is no need to consider promising as an issue.58 As was noted previously, 
the formulation of efficient breach which this thesis advances differs to the Holmes inspired iteration 
in the sense that it is solely limited to commercial contracts. 
 
5.3.1 The Rationale for Efficient Breach  
 
The theory is based on the idea that breach will be justified where it results in a more economically 
efficient outcome. This will mean that the position of the breaching party, after the payment of 
expectation damages, would be preferable to that which would have come about through 
performance. It has been set out that ‘economic efficiency … encourages optimal reallocation of 
factors of production and goods without causing material instability of expectations’.59 Further, that 
                                                          
55 See 4.3 Contract is distinguishable from Promise based on the Domain in which it is utilised 
56 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 462. Reprinted  
in (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991, 995. 
57 See for example Posner (n 37); See also Gregory Klass, ‘Efficient Breach’ in Gregory Klass, George 
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Eisenberg, ‘Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference 
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58 WW Buckland, ‘The Nature of Contractual Obligation’ (1944) 8 Cambridge Law Journal 247. 
59 RL Birmingham, ‘Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency’ (1970) 24 Rutgers 
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‘adherence to this standard would promote proper functioning of the market mechanism’.60 In the 
first edition of Economic Analysis of Law Posner set out that: 
In some cases a party to a contract would be tempted to breach the contract simply because 
his profit from breach would exceed his expected profit from completion of the contract. If 
his profit from breach would also exceed the expected profit to the other party from 
completion of the contract, and if damages are limited to loss of expected profit, there will 
be an incentive to commit a breach.61 
The focus here is an opportunity to increase profit. It is also important to note that the same reasoning 
is applicable where a breaching party is seeking to decrease potential losses. In this way, it ‘considers 
two types of changes: good news and bad news’.62  
 
5.3.2 Illustrations of Efficient Breach  
 
Efficient breach has been illustrated through the use of paradigm hypothetical scenarios concerning 
business transactions. These illustrations are of use in an explanatory sense. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that their purpose is simply that. Posner’s position is as follows: 
Suppose I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground widgets at 10c apiece to A for 
use in his boiler factory. After I have delivered 10,000, B comes to me, explains that he 
desperately needs 25,000 custom-ground widgets at once since otherwise he will be forced 
to close his pianola factory at great cost, and offers me 15c apiece for 25,000 widgets. I sell 
him the widgets and as a result do not complete timely delivery to A, causing him to lose 
$1,000 in profits. Having obtained an additional profit of $1,250 on the sale to B, I am better 
off even after reimbursing A for his loss and B is also better off. The breach is therefore 
Pareto superior.63 
A similar approach is adopted by Klass: 
Suppose on April 1, Third Party contacts Seller and offers to purchase 100 units for $1,300, 
or $13 per unit. Third Party is a competitor of Buyer and is willing to pay more for the goods 
because it has a new, less expensive production method. Whereas Buyer’s production costs 
are $6 per unit, Third Party’s costs are $3. Seller does not have the capacity to produce more 
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than 100 units and so can sell to Third Party only if it breaches with Buyer. To keep things 
simple, suppose on April 1, Buyer has not yet invested any resources in the transaction and 
if Seller breaches, Buyer will not be able to get replacement goods elsewhere. Sale to Third 
Party is more efficient than sale to Buyer. The transaction between Seller and Buyer creates 
$4 of value for each unit sold ($18 market price - $8 Seller costs - $6 Buyer costs). Sale to 
Third Party, on the contrary, will produce $7 per unit ($18 market price - $8 Seller costs - $3 
Third Party costs). If we want to maximize social welfare (as measured in dollars), we want 
Seller to breach the contract with Buyer and sell to Third Party.64 
More generally, Eisenberg notes that the over-bidder paradigm concerns ‘a seller who has contracted 
to sell a commodity to a buyer breaches the contract in order to resell the commodity’.65 The loss 
paradigm is said to concern ‘a seller who has contracted to render a performance to a buyer breaches 
the contract because she determines that her cost of producing the performance would exceed the 
value that the buyer places on the performance’.66 Finally, the mitigation paradigm requires that ‘a 
buyer who has contracted to purchase a commodity that takes time to produce countermands 
performance by the seller because he determines that the value of the performance to him, if 
completed, will be less than the contract price’.67  
For theoretical purposes, Goetz and Scott characterise efficient breach effectively. They note that an 
award of compensation will align with the theory on the basis that it will provide ‘incentives for the 
promisor to breach a contract which has become inefficient ex post, compensate the promisee for his 
expected gain, and reallocate his resources to more highly valued uses’.68 Value will be maximised 
as no party is adversely affected. This requires that an award of damages in line with a legitimate 
expectation interest is paid. This is the approach to efficient breach that this thesis will adopt going 
forward. 
 
5.3.3 Examples of Efficient Breach in English Case Law 
 
Crucially, there is evidence of English commercial contract case law which exhibits the 
characteristics of an efficient breach. This is on the basis that a party saw breaching and paying 
damages as a more attractive option than performing the contract. However, it is notable that whether 
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the case is one of efficient breach is not expressly set out. As such, it is necessary to infer this based 
on the available facts contained within the judgments which are provided. This discussion is not 
intended to provide a comprehensive treatment of all the cases of this type. It simply seeks to 
highlight that what could be categorised as efficient breaches, can, and do take place within English 
commercial contract law. In the following cases there is evidence regarding the factors which 
influenced the decision of the breaching parties. This is information points to an efficient breach of 
contract which has been allowed to stand by the court.  
First, Morris-Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd69 concerned whether or not compensation for breach 
of contract could be valued based on what were defined as “negotiating damages”. These consist of 
the fee that would hypothetically have been charged to release a party from their existing contractual 
obligations.70 The case concerned the purchase of a business which provided ‘rented accommodation 
and support services to enable vulnerable individuals referred by local authorities … to live as 
independent lives as possible in the community’.71 The agreement in question contained non-
compete, as well as non-solicit covenants. This required that the defendant would ‘keep information 
concerning its business transactions confidential’.72 They would also be prohibited ‘from engaging 
in a business that was in competition with it or soliciting its clients, without its consent’.73 A second 
defendant also agreed to by bound by a similar form of covenants after having terminated their 
employment with the claimant.74 
In the Supreme Court, the defendant sought to avoid liability for damages stemming from the 
principles established in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd.75 Lord Reed outlined that 
the claimant: 
‘[I]n respect of the breach of the non-compete and non-solicit covenants … sought an 
account of profits, or alternatively what were described as restitutionary damages, in such 
sum as it might reasonably have demanded as a quid pro quo for releasing the defendants 
from those covenants, or, in a further alternative, what were described as compensatory 
damages for the loss it had suffered by reason of the defendants' breach of those covenants. 
In respect of the breach of confidence, it sought an account of profits, or alternatively 
damages’.76 
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Importantly, the defendant did not seek to suggest that they had not breached the terms of the 
agreement. Only the quantification of damages was in contention. This suggests that they knowingly 
acted in breach with the intention of benefitting themselves financially. This is in line with the 
characteristics of an efficient breach.77  
Lord Reed set out that: 
[T]his is a case brought by a commercial entity whose only interest in the defendants’ 
performance of their obligations under the covenants was commercial. Indeed, a restrictive 
covenant which went beyond what was necessary for the reasonable protection of the 
claimant's commercial interests would have been unenforceable. The substance of the 
claimant's case is that it suffered financial loss as a result of the defendants’ breach of 
contract. The effect of the breach of contract was to expose the claimant’s business to 
competition which would otherwise have been avoided. The natural result of that 
competition was a loss of profits and possibly of goodwill. The loss is difficult to quantify, 
and some elements of it may be inherently incapable of precise measurement. Nevertheless, 
it is a familiar type of loss, for which damages are frequently awarded.78 
Further, that this case was ‘not one where the breach of contract has resulted in the loss of a valuable 
asset created or protected by the right which was infringed’.79 This is particularly resonant with 
respect to the claims which this thesis advances with respect to the legitimacy of the efficient breach 
of commercial contracts. The Supreme Court were unwilling to depart from the usual approach with 
respect to quantifying compensatory awards of damages. Most notably, they did not seek to punish 
the party who sought to improve their position through breach by awarding damages for account of 
profit. This suggests that the court are not averse to allowing behaviour which features the 
characteristics of an efficient breach to take place. Here this is displayed by their unwillingness to 
award “negotiating damages” where they may ostensibly have been required. This is because 
‘common law damages for breach of contract are not a matter of discretion. They are claimed as of 
right, and they are awarded or refused on the basis of legal principle’.80 
Next, in Vitol SA v Beta Renowable Group SA,81 a contract for the provision of biofuel was breached. 
Importantly, the defendant ultimately accepted that they had breached the contract.82 There was 
substantial discussion which concerned whether or not the defendant’s obligations had been removed 
following their communication of their intention to breach. This resulted from the claimant’s failure 
                                                          
77 See 5.3.2 Illustrations of Efficient Breach. 
78 Morris-Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd (n 69) [98] (Lord Reed); The point regarding a particular asset is 
notable; See also 6.2.1.6 Restitutionary Remedies. 
79 ibid [99] (Lord Reed). 
80 ibid [95]. 
81 [2017] EWHC 1734 (Comm). 
82 ibid [3]. 
155 
 
to nominate a vessel as per the agreement. The issue that was being considered was whether this 
amounted to a clear and unequivocal acceptance of the breach.83 This was effectively an attempt by 
the defendant to cleverly avoid any liability by contending ‘that its obligation to deliver the biofuel 
was conditional upon nomination by Vitol of the time(s) for loading and the performing vessel(s)’.84 
Importantly though, this did not negate the existence of a breach of contract based on the defendant’s 
‘openly declared inability to perform in advance of the deadline for nomination’.85 As a result, the 
claimant was entitled to damages.86  
Despite the approach adopted in terms of the defence that was raised, it is important to consider the 
actions of the defendant prior to this. It is evident that their approach aligns with the characteristics 
of an efficient breach. The defendant made a decision to breach contract and communicated that 
intention to the claimant. The very fact that this took place highlights that at the time of that 
communication being made, the defendant preferred to breach and pay damages, rather than perform 
the contract. The rationale behind the decision to breach was covered within correspondence between 
the two parties. It was outlined that they were unable to produce the required biodiesel and did not 
expect to be able to do so in the short to medium term. Also, that they hoped to enter that market 
again in future.87 This suggests that the defendant was taking precautions in to protect their ability to 
function effectively going forward. Therefore, it seems intuitive that the defendant was of the view 
that at that time, the costs of performing the contract outweighed the benefits.88 There were attempts 
on the part of the claimant to negotiate potential alternatives to allow some form of performance to 
take place.89 This was unsuccessful leading the defendant to again outline that they were unable to 
perform.90 They then went on to acknowledge the claimant’s rights under the agreement, which 
amounted to an ability to claim damages.91  
The claimant sought to claim damages based on two approaches.92 Their primary claim accounted 
for lost profit from a hypothetical sub-sale, as well as the use of hedging instruments.93 The court 
viewed that this did not represent ‘a fair or proper basis of compensation’94 and thus, the claim was 
rejected. The court outlined that ‘it is common ground that, if liability is established, Vitol is entitled 
to damages on a market value basis’.95 As a result, damages were awarded to reflect this convention. 
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This amounted to the difference between the original contract price, and the higher price which the 
claimant was required to pay for a replacement.96 On a potential sub-sale, it was set out that there 
was no evidence of an agreement at the suggested price. Also, that ‘the factors that might justify an 
award of loss of profit on a sub-sale … are not obvious on the facts’.97 This suggests that had the 
claimant been able to prove that their opportunity to complete a sub-sale at a specific price had 
existed, they would have been able to claim compensation for that loss. This would align with the 
expectation measure of damages, which includes lost profit and is a feature of an efficient breach.98  
Next, in Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA v The Bronx Engineering Co Ltd,99 a seller was 
unable to complete delivery of machinery by a specified date. Delivery would have only been 
possible at a later date, by which time ‘the plaintiffs’ import licence from the Tunisian Government 
had expired and their request for an extension thereof was still being dealt with’.100 On the 11th of 
December 1973, the seller outlined that unless arrangements were made to allow them to complete 
delivery by the 25th of December 1973 they would treat the contract as repudiated. On the 20th of 
December, they communicated the fact that they were treating the contract as repudiated to the 
buyer.101 It is important to note that by that time, the seller had found an alternate buyer for the 
machinery who agreed to pay a ‘substantially enhanced price’.102 The defendant sought to complete 
the sale to this new purchaser. This feature of the case is particularly resonant when this case is 
considered alongside the principles of an efficient breach noted above.103 
The claimant sought an injunction to prevent the sale to the new buyer in order for it to ‘be possible 
for the Court at the trial to decree specific performance if that be deemed to be an appropriate form 
of remedy’.104 The core of their claim was that ‘were they … obliged to go to another manufacturer 
they would probably have to wait another 9-12 months before they could get delivery of such new 
machinery and that, by reason of that delay and other factors, they would stand to lose a substantial 
sum’.105 The primary issue considered by the court was whether specific performance, which the 
claimant coveted, would be available. This would prevent the defendant from completing the sale of 
the machinery to the new buyer, and force them to perform as per the terms of the contract. 
While there was some sympathy with the claimant’s position, the view of the court was that there 
was ‘nothing which removes this case from the ordinary run of cases arising out of commercial 
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contracts where damages are claimed’.106 The position was that they would ‘not decree specific 
performance where the commodity is one which can be ordinarily obtained in the market, because in 
such a case damages are a sufficient remedy’.107 In this case it was ‘true that you cannot walk into a 
store or warehouse or a shop and buy this type of machinery from stock’.108 However, it was thought 
to be ‘a type of machinery which is obtainable in the market in the ordinary course upon placing an 
order’.109 As a result, the court chose to enforce a payment of damages. This was said to be 
appropriate despite potential difficulty in quantification as the view was ‘that the damages would 
eventually be satisfactorily quantified’.110 The financial position of the defendant was also 
considered. It was outlined that there was ‘no suggestion of financial inability in the defendants to 
satisfy such a money judgment (whatever its dimensions) as might be awarded against them to cover 
all such items of damages as the plaintiffs could legitimately rely upon’.111 The reasoning in Re 
Wait,112 where Lord Atkin set out ‘that in contracts for the sale of goods the only remedy by way of 
specific performance is the statutory remedy, and it follows that as the goods were neither specific 
nor ascertained the remedy of specific performance was not open to the creditors’113 was considered 
here.  
In terms of analysing this case with efficient breach in mind, the approaches adopted by the 
defendant, as well as the court must be considered. The defendant’s approach suggests that in their 
view, choosing to breach and pay damages was the more cost-effective option in the relevant 
circumstances. While their rationale is not expressly set out, the fact they sought to avoid being 
forced to perform in specie, in favour of paying damages suggests that they believed that the benefit 
derived from selling the machinery to the new buyer outweighed the cost of paying those damages. 
This is in line with the characteristics an efficient breach.114 In addition, the court’s response to the 
actions of the defendant demonstrates acquiescence to the approach advanced by the theory of 
efficient breach. This is on the basis that they refused to enforce specific performance, favouring an 
award of damages. This is important for two reasons. First, they took the view that monetary damages 
would adequately compensate the claimant’s losses. Second, they did not seek to punish the 
defendant for breaching contract by restricting their ability benefit by selling the machinery to an 
alternate buyer at a higher price.  
The next case of note is Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd115 which 
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concerned a tenant of a retail unit within a shopping centre breaching a keep open covenant. This 
was done because the supermarket which they were operating was making a substantial loss.116 As a 
result, the decision to breach the covenant and pay damages, rather than continue trading was made. 
Again, this is important when considered alongside the characteristics of an efficient breach noted 
previously.117 The claimant’s response was to attempt to ensure that the tenant continued trading, at 
least until an alternate tenant could be found by enforcing the covenant, as well as offering to 
negotiate a temporary rent concession. This was done on the basis that believed that the 
supermarket’s closure would have a detrimental effect on the shopping centre and the other tenants 
who operated within it.118 Legal proceedings were brought ‘claiming specific performance of the 
covenant to keep open and damages’.119 
Ultimately, specific performance was refused by the court. The reasoning for this is of note. First, it 
was set out that: 
To compel the operation for an indefinite period of a business by a person who is unwilling 
to operate it and has formed a commercial judgment that it is not viable is a serious restriction 
on the operation of the market and commercial flexibility. In the present case, the reopening 
of the store temporarily pending an assignment would have been extremely wasteful.120 
Also, that ‘it cannot be in the public interest for the courts to require someone to carry on business at 
a loss if there is any plausible alternative by which the other party can be given compensation’.121 
This highlights that the courts are averse to enforcing performance where the decision not to perform 
has been made for commercial reasons. It was outlined that ‘the purpose of the law of contract is not 
to punish wrongdoing but to satisfy the expectations of the party entitled to performance’.122 Further, 
that damages would end the legal relationship between the parties meaning that ‘the forensic link 
between them is severed, they go their separate ways and the wounds of conflict can heal’.123 
Again, to analyse this case with efficient breach in mind, the approach adopted by the defendant, and 
the response of the court must be considered. First, the defendant made the decision to breach for 
financial reasons, namely to reduce inevitable losses. By doing this they were accepting that they 
would become liable to pay damages. This aligns with the characteristics of an efficient breach.124 In 
response, the court were of the view that it would be wrong to force the defendant to carry on a loss 
making business activity. As such, they chose to award damages in preference to specific 
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performance. 
In addition to cases such as those noted above, there are also situations where the reasons behind a 
party’s decision to breach are not evident within the judgments. This is potentially problematic in 
terms of analysing whether or not such cases are examples of an efficient breach of contract. 
However, there are occasions where in the event of a repudiatory breach of a commercial contract, 
the case could be made that the reasoning for doing so relates to the financial consequences that 
follow. This is on the basis that if the assumption that commercial parties are primarily interested in 
profit generation and maximising their own wealth is accepted, then a decision to repudiate is likely 
to be informed by the pursuit of that interest. This approach would be akin to that of an efficient 
breach on the basis that a party viewed breaching and paying damages as a more attractive option.  
In Hinde v Liddel125 a defendant was unable to supply grey shirtings by a specified date. They 
informed the claimant that they would be unable to perform five days prior to the agreed date of 
delivery.126 This amounted to repudiatory breach of contract. Whilst it is unclear why the defendant 
was unable to provide the product as per the agreement, it seems reasonable to assert that this would 
be due to the cost of sourcing it by the required date. This is inference is made on the basis that that 
claimant was able to mitigate their loss by finding a suitable (but not exact) replacement by the date 
that was specified, though this was at a higher cost due to their superior quality.127 Following this, 
the defendant admitted that the claimant had made every possible effort to acquire an appropriate 
replacement and that it was the nearest match in terms of quality and price which could be delivered 
by the required date.128 It is this feature of the case that is particularly interesting. This is because the 
obvious question that could be raised concerns why the defendant chose not to attempt to source this 
replacement themselves. Based on the information that is available it seems legitimate to infer that 
in the circumstances, the defendant viewed that the costs attached to sourcing this replacement 
outweighed the benefit that they would derive by performing the contract as had been agreed. 
It was outlined that ‘the general measure of damages in such a case would be the value of the thing 
on the day when the contract ought to have been fulfilled, and in general the market price gives this 
value’.129 However, because of the lack of a market for a direct replacement, the view was that ‘the 
value of the goods contracted to be supplied by the defendants at the time of their breach of contract 
was the price the plaintiff had to give for the substituted article’.130 As a result, the claimant was 
entitled to the difference in price between what had been contracted for originally, and the price 
which they paid for the more expensive replacement. This was because ‘the only reasonable thing 
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the plaintiff could do was to put himself in the same position as if the defendants had fulfilled their 
contract by obtaining a somewhat dearer article’.131 It therefore appears that a requirement to pay that 
difference in price rather than endeavour to perform was deemed to be preferable by the defendant. 
This would align their approach with an efficient breach of contract.132 
The Golden Victory133 primarily concerned the date from which damages should be assessed due to 
the existence of a clause which provided the right to cancel the contract should war or hostilities 
commence between specified countries.134 However, prior to this taking place the contract was 
repudiated. This led to a legitimate claim for damages.135 Most of the discussion concerned whether 
or not the inevitable award of damages should reflect the fact that had the contract not been breached, 
it would have been cancelled under the relevant clause when the Second Gulf War began in March 
of 2003. However, for the purposes of this analysis the focus is the repudiatory breach itself. It was 
set out that: 
The Charterers in breach of contract repudiated the charter on 14 December 2001 when the 
charter had nearly four years still to run (but subject, of course, to the clause 33 possibilities 
of cancellation). The Owners accepted the repudiation on 17 December 2001 and claimed 
damages for the Charterers’ breach of contract.136 
Whilst the information that is available is admittedly limited, specifically the fact that the reasoning 
for repudiation is not expressly set out, it seems intuitive that the defendant  saw breaching and 
paying any subsequent damages as a cost effective course of action. This is on the basis that by they 
were accepting a liability to pay damages by repudiating the agreement almost four years early. This 
suggests that in their view, the benefits that would flow from breaching and paying damages would 
outweigh the costs attached to performance. If this were the case, this approach is clearly in line with 
the ideology of an efficient breach of contract.137 The fact that the agreement included a clause 
allowing it to be cancelled should war break out, which was then considered to limit the value of 
damages that could be awarded to the claimant simply adds to the benefit which the defendant 
ultimately derived through choosing to breach. 
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5.3.4 Additional Examples in US Case Law 
 
For illustrative purposes a small number of US cases will now be noted. In Peevyhouse v Garland 
Coal & Mining Company,138 a breach of contract related to a failure to perform reparative work to 
land which had been impacted upon by one party’s mining activity. Because the cost of the work far 
exceeded the impact it would have had on the value of the land in question, increasing it by only 
$300, whilst costing $29,000 to carry out, the court chose to award a far smaller sum in damages.  
Next, in Patton v Mid-Continent Systems Inc,139 a breach took place in relation to a franchise 
agreement regarding the operation of truck-stops. This concerned only franchising truck-stops 
operated by the claimant with respect to the ability to accept the defendant’s credit card. The 
defendant committed a breach by franchising other truck-stops within a specified excluded area. The 
breach was not in question. Initially the claimant was awarded $2,250,000 in punitive damages. 
However, this was subsequently reduced to $100,000; a far lower amount. It was Posner, in his role 
as a judge, who set out that: 
Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy. The promisor may simply 
have discovered that his performance is worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is 
promoted by allowing him to breach his promise, provided he makes good the promisee’s 
actual losses.140 
Furthermore, punitive damages were said to inappropriate on this occasion as they would lead to an 
inefficient result.141 Interestingly, Tawil has set out that whilst Posner noted the theory of efficient 
breach, in this case, the result did not flow from it. It is suggested that had this been the case, ‘he 
would have undoubtedly formed a general proposition which resists the idea that punitive damages 
should be awarded in breach of contract cases’.142 Further, that ultimately the decision ‘was that the 
breach, regardless of its efficiency or otherwise, did not justify punitive damages because it was not 
wrongful according to the necessary legal definition’.143 
Finally, a particularly interesting case is Walgreen Co v Sara Creek Property Co144 where Posner 
awarded an injunction rather than damages in respect of a breach of contract regarding restrictions 
on the letting of retail space to a competing pharmacy within a shopping mall. The defendant raised 
the argument that the breach was efficient and thus, that damages should be awarded in preference 
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to an injunction. It was set out that there were obvious advantages to awarding an injunction in this 
case. First, that the approach ‘shifts the burden of determining the cost of the defendant’s conduct 
from the court to the parties’.145 This was on the basis that if it was the case ‘that Walgreen’s damages 
are smaller than the gain to Sara Creek from allowing a second pharmacy into the shopping mall, 
then there must be a price for dissolving the injunction that will make both parties better off’.146 The 
rationale was that ‘a battle of experts is a less reliable method of determining the actual cost to 
Walgreen of facing new competition than negotiations between Walgreen and Sara Creek over the 
price at which Walgreen would feel adequately compensated for having to face that competition’.147 
Whilst this may appear to be supportive of a claim against efficient breach, it is the case that Posner’s 
focus on the pursuit of efficiency remained. An interesting question surrounds the approach which 
would have been adopted had it been clear based on the facts that an award of damages would have 
been efficient in this case 
This small group of US cases set out that an efficiency based rationale is utilised in reaching 
judgments regarding breach of contract. However, much like in English case law, there is resistance 
in terms of articulating that that the theory of efficient breach is being applied. Even Posner is 
unwilling to go this far as is clear in Patton v Mid-Continent Systems Inc.148 However, it is notable 
that the result in Peevyhouse v Garland Coal & Mining Company149demonstrates the characteristics 
of an efficient breach quite obviously. 
 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
 
The theory of efficient breach functions based on the rationale that it will be justified where it results 
in a more economically efficient outcome. Breach will be considered to be desirable if the position 
of the breaching party is preferable to that which would have come about through contractual 
performance after the payment of expectation damages. There is evidence of attempts to make claims 
regarding the functionality of efficient breach through the use of hypothetical paradigm scenarios 
which tend to concern business transactions. This can be a useful tool in terms of explaining the 
theory. However, it is important to note that the efficiency of a breach may only be assessed based 
on empirical evidence. The use of hypotheticals simply provides examples of efficient or inefficient 
breaches. They prove nothing in terms of the validity of the theory itself.  
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Most crucially, there is evidence within English case law that breach has taken place based on 
financially minded reasoning.150 However, it must be noted that the reasoning behind these decisions 
is not made explicitly clear within the judgments. As such, it must be inferred. This is also the case 
within some US case law as the unwillingness to articulate that the theory is being applied is clear.151  
 
5.4 Measures of Efficiency 
 
Having briefly outlined the economic approach to law, as well as the basic features of an efficient 
breach, it is now necessary to deal with the technical elements of what efficiency means. It is the 
case that pursuing efficiency is a key element of the economic analysis of law as it informs much of 
the reasoning which takes place. With that in mind, it is essential to set out what efficiency means in 
this context. This is less straightforward than may be expected due to a lack of clarity resulting from 
economists’ use multiple forms of efficiency. The differences between these forms can prove 
difficult for non-economists.152 It will be set out that an approach in line with wealth maximisation 
and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (featuring the caveat that compensation is paid) is legitimate when 
the efficient breach of commercial contracts is being considered. This is due to the underlying profit 
driven motivation that underpins them. 
 
5.4.1 Pareto Optimality 
 
Pareto Optimality is the measure of efficient allocation of resources most frequently referenced by 
economists.153 It is also often noted within law and economics.154  It functions on the basis ‘that one 
allocation of resources is superior to another if at least one person is better off under the first than 
under the second and no one is worse off’.155 An outcome will be Pareto optimal when the well-being 
                                                          
150 See 5.3.3 Examples of Efficient Breach in English Case Law. 
151 See 5.3.4 Additional Examples in US Case Law. 
152 Cooter (n 31) 1263: These different forms of efficiency are said to include efficient production, efficient 
exchange, Pareto efficiency, national income maximisation, wealth maximisation, and utilitarian efficiency. 
153 See Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel D’economie Politique (1927 edn) translated in Terence Wilmot Hutchison, A 
Review of Economic Doctrines 1970-1929 (Clarendon 1953); See also EJ Mishan, Elements of cost-benefit 
analysis (2nd edn, George Allen and Unwin 1976) 14; John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Myles, A 
Dictionary of Economics (OUP 2012); John Sloman, Jon Guest and Dean Garratt, Economics (10th edn, 
Pearson 2018) 348. 
154 See Posner (n 37) 14; See also Frank H Stephen, The Economics of the Law (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1988) 
41; Wolfgang Weigel, Economics of the Law: A Primer (Routledge 2008) 16; Jules L Coleman, ‘Efficiency, 
Utility and Wealth Maximisation’ (1980) 8 Hofstra Law Review 509, 512; Nathan B Oman, The Dignity of 
Commerce (The University of Chicago Press 2016) 68. 
155 RA Posner, The Economics of Justice (Reprint edn, Harvard University Press 1981) 88. 
164 
 
of one party cannot be improved without causing detriment to another party. An outcome will be 
Pareto superior when an action would improve the position of one party without diminishing that of 
another. Issues arise when an action would improve the position of one party whilst simultaneously 
diminishing that of others. This is because such situations would no longer be advantageous to a 
community as a whole.156 
On a theoretical level, the Pareto measure demonstrates what will be efficient (or optimal) in a 
particular setting. It is set out that ‘a Pareto improvement which positively requires that when some 
are made better off, no one is actually made worse off, is assured of fairly wide acceptance’.157 
However, there are claims that Pareto optimal could describe any status quo and that Pareto superior 
scenarios are, in fact, unlikely to exist.  It has been suggested that ‘in real life … there are few changes 
that hurt no one; thus the Pareto criterion effectively becomes a recipe to stick to the status quo and 
let things be’.158 Lawson notes that ‘if Pareto superior moves are a virtual impossibility … then any 
given state of affairs will be Pareto optimal’.159 Also, Mokal, writing in a corporate insolvency law 
context, highlights that because ‘few Pareto superior transactions can be made, it follows that almost 
any state of affairs is Pareto optimal’.160 It is suggested that ‘not much guidance can be gained about 
the real world from a set of criteria which outlaws virtually every transaction, and which validates 
almost any distribution of resources’.161 Posner notes that because ‘the conditions for Pareto 
superiority are rarely satisfied in the real world, yet economists talk quite a bit about efficiency … 
the operating definition of efficiency in economics cannot be Pareto superiority’.162 Also, that when 
an economist notes efficiency, ‘nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks efficient’.163 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
156 Pareto (n 153) 225. 
157 EJ Mishan, Elements of Cost Benefit Analysis (2nd edn, George Allen and Unwin 1976) 15; See also 
Guido Calabresi, ‘The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further’ (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 
1211, 1216. 
158 Ha-Joon Chang, Economics: The User’s Guide (Pelican Books 2014) 122; See also Joseph V Femia, 
Pareto and Political Theory (Routledge 2006) 51; See also Nicola Acocella, The Foundations of Economic 
Policy: Values and Techniques (Brendan Jones tr, CUP 1998) 32. 
159 Gary Lawson, ‘Efficiency and Individualism’ (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal 87. 
160 RJ Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP 2005) 22. 
161 ibid; See also Guido Calabresi, ‘The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further’ (1991) 100 The 
Yale Law Journal 1211, 1216. 
162 Posner (n 37) 15. 
163 ibid. 
165 
 
5.4.2 The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion  
 
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion represents a development on the Pareto measure.164 It assumes that 
monetary compensation can effectively repair any damage caused when one party’s position is 
improved whilst another’s is simultaneously diminished.165 To be clear, here compensation is being 
considered in a broad theoretical sense. The rules which apply to damage awards for breach of 
contract such as remoteness and mitigation will not be considered at this point. They will, of course, 
be discussed later. The case made for the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is as follows: 
It is possible to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people 
better off without making anybody worse off … if all those who suffer as a result are fully 
compensated for their loss, the rest of the community will still be better off than before.166 
Coase suggested that most economists would agree that problems will be solved satisfactorily when 
the damage causing party is required to pay for any damage that is caused. The provision of suitable 
compensation will mean that the outcome will be Kaldor-Hicks efficient.167  
It is the Kaldor-Hicks approach to wealth maximisation which dominates the application of economic 
analysis to contract law. However, there are potential problems; the most obvious is that it functions 
based on the assumption that monetary compensation can adequately remedy any damage that is 
caused. The suggestion is that all that is required for it to fail is the involvement of one individual 
‘who sincerely cannot be bought’168 by any level of after-the-fact compensation. However, in this 
case the suggestion is that monetary awards will be legitimised as it will allow the profit orientated 
interests of the contracting parties to be effectively compensated. An additional issue stems from 
Kaldor’s apparent suggestion that the payment of compensation is not actually required. Following 
the example provided it was noted that whether or not a party ‘should in fact be given compensation 
or not, is a political question on which the economist, qua economist, could hardly pronounce an 
opinion’.169 This view separates the production of wealth from its distribution. Here, focus is solely 
on increasing total value. However, in the context of an efficient breach of contract, the payment of 
compensation will clearly be required. 
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5.4.3 Welfare Maximisation and Utilitarianism  
 
It is suggested that efficiency will be achieved through moving to maximise overall total welfare, 
often characterised as maximising social welfare. The claim is that law and economics scholars will 
deem ‘actions or institutions “efficient” to the extent that they increase or improve ‘social welfare’.170 
This is in line with principles of utilitarianism.171 There are different forms of utilitarianism which 
could be considered.172 However, for current purposes it is only necessary to discuss it in a broad 
sense. Bentham set out that ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of 
right and wrong’.173 Also, that ‘the obligation to minister to general happiness, was an obligation 
paramount to and inclusive of every other’.174 According to Mill, utilitarianism ‘holds that actions 
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse 
of happiness’.175 Happiness is characterised as ‘intended pleasure, and the absence of pain’ and 
unhappiness as ‘pain, and the privation of pleasure’.176 There is a suggestion that utilitarianism will 
be faced with issues in ‘explaining to someone who loses in a Benthamite calculation why it is fair 
to make him suffer simply so that others may prosper’.177 More recently utilitarianism has been said 
to view that the legitimacy of an action will be tied to whether its outcome will increase the total 
level of well-being when compared with an alternative. It is focused on acts and will determine 
whether they are right based on their outcomes.178 
Utilitarianism assumes that happiness is a good in itself. It is irrelevant whose happiness is being 
considered:  
The only thing that matters for a utilitarian is how much happiness there is, and if he takes 
distributional considerations into account it is only because these have some bearing on the 
total amount of happiness in the world. From a utilitarian point of view, there is only one 
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relevant yardstick by which to assess the morality of actions and institutions: their tendency 
to increase or decrease overall happiness.179 
It concerns ‘pleasures, satisfactions, or preferences of the actor’,180 and ‘requires the aggregation of 
all of the subjective goods of individuals and it considers as best the outcome in which the total of 
individual satisfactions is maximized’.181  
Utilitarianism has been criticised on various occasions from a number of perspectives.182 A key issue 
is the subjective nature of pleasures, satisfactions and preferences which are generally intangible. 
What this means is that they are at best difficult, and at worst impossible to measure effectively. This 
issue relating to quantification naturally leads us on to economic efficiency in search of an effective 
measure. 
 
5.4.4 Economic Efficiency 
 
Economists have described efficiency as a ‘making the maximum use of available resources’.183 Also, 
that it concerns the value of output compared with the level of input.184 It has been likened to Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency where ‘a change is efficient when the winners from the change could, in principle, 
compensate the losers’.185 Again, it was noted within the prior discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, that within the context of the discussion of an efficient breach of contract, it is not enough 
that compensation could be paid. Actual payment of that compensation it is a requirement. The 
suggestion is that economic efficiency will be achieved when the benefits which flow from resources 
are maximised.186 In a market setting, it concerns attempts to maximise the total welfare of buyers 
and sellers.187 However, assessing welfare in this way is limited.188 Attempting to prove a claim that 
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efficiency will be achieved through an increase in total social welfare is difficult because there is no 
standard measure that every member of society will accept in terms of valuing their own personal 
preferences or satisfactions.189 Without such a measure, an increase cannot be proven. With this in 
mind, it has been noted that ‘while happiness is a philosophical concept that cannot be easily 
measured, wealth is more practical and measurable’.190  
 
5.4.5 Wealth Maximisation 
 
Dworkin highlighted a distinction between the economists’ attitude towards efficiency and that 
which is utilised in the economic analysis of law. The suggestion is that an economist will interpret 
efficiency to be based on the Pareto measure while those who deal in law and economics will interpret 
it to mean wealth maximisation.191 Under wealth maximisation, resources will be allocated efficiently 
when no further reallocation would increase the overall wealth of society.192 An action will be 
efficient to the extent that it increases wealth, rather than welfare or utility.193 This is an important 
distinction because unlike welfare, or utility, “wealth” is being used to denote a specific, measurable 
approach to assessing an increase in value. It relates to ‘the sum of all tangible and intangible goods 
and services’.194 This is assessed based on the monetary value attached to those goods and services. 
Maximising value is seen as socialistic because if those who improve their position gain more than 
those who lose, total value can be said to have increased. This is despite the individualistic nature of 
any valuation.195 Value is assessed ‘based on what people are willing to pay for something rather 
than on the happiness they would derive from having it’.196 Dworkin set out that maximum wealth is 
achieved ‘when goods and other resources are in the hands of those who value them most, and 
someone values a good more if and only if he is both willing and able to pay more in money (or in 
the equivalent of money) to have it’.197 It concerns only the ‘private wants and preferences of affected 
individuals, weighted by disposable income’.198 Claims based on desire alone are excluded. An 
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inability to pay more for a particular resource than its current owner, or those competing for it will 
mean that a claim to that resource cannot be established. This is irrespective of the level of desire 
which is harboured for that resource.199  
Posner disputes claims that wealth maximisation and utilitarianism are synonymous.200 This is due 
to utilitarianism’s focus on happiness rather than wealth.201 Wealth maximisation is focused on 
preferences, which are based on a monetary value within a market.202 Adam Smith set out that the 
market value of a resource is intrinsically linked to the available quantity and the existing demand.203 
When demand exceeds the available quantity, the value market value will rise. When the available 
quantity exceeds demand, the market value will be reduced. Finally, where the available quantity is 
equal to the existing demand, the market value will reflect (or very closely reflect) the natural price.204  
The aim of wealth maximisation is to reallocate resources to their most valued use through market 
transactions. It is claimed that most economists would agree that free markets do, in fact, maximise 
society’s wealth.205 This is based on an implicit acceptance that when resources go through market 
exchanges they will find their way into the hands of those who value them the most.206 Posner set 
out that wealth maximisation: 
[E]ncourages and rewards the traditional virtues … and capacities associated with economic 
progress. The capacities (such as intelligence) promote the efficiency with which resources 
can be employed; the virtues (such as honesty, and altruism in its proper place), by reducing 
market transaction costs, do the same.207  
Coleman has been critical of Posner’s use of wealth maximisation as an alternative to the Pareto 
criterion as a moral basis for economic analysis.208 It is suggested that wealth maximisation is not an 
efficiency criterion but ‘an alternative to the utilitarian basis for justifying the pursuit of efficiency- 
in this case, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency’.209 The dispute concerns whether increased wealth is 
synonymous with increased utility. Concern is also raised regarding the claim that wealth 
maximisation is capable of providing a moral defence for the pursuit of a Kaldor-Hicks 
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improvement.210 The suggestion is that maximising wealth is objectionable because it is defined by 
an individual’s willingness to pay. This is problematic because it favours parties who possess greater 
levels of money or necessary resources.211 It is also set out that Posner’s approach, where ‘monetary 
value is not an instrument of measuring the maximand; it is the maximand” 212 is implausible because 
money is not a moral good. Further, that ‘a rich person is not ipso facto morally superior to a poor 
one’.213 With this in mind, the claim is that the way in which Posner’s wealth maximisation principle 
is different to utilitarianism is that it demands that ethical issues are monetised.214  
It is legitimate to utilise wealth maximisation, where efficiency is assessed using monetary value as 
a measure when discussing the efficient breach of commercial contracts. This is on the basis that the 
primary reason for their existence is the production of profit. It is acknowledged that assessing wealth 
(or welfare, or utility) in this was may not be appropriate in other settings. However, there are no 
issues regarding the use of this approach for the purposes of this specific analysis.  
 
5.4.6 Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, it is the case that in assessing efficiency, it is important to keep in mind the context in 
which it is being done. It has been set out that there is a variety of approaches which may be adopted 
and that it is important to consider wealth maximisation because efficient breach is built on the idea 
that it is a legitimate goal. While there are potential moral issues with this approach based on the use 
of money, or monetary value to measure utility, it will be outlined that this is not the case within the 
context of commercial contracting. This is due to the underlying profit driven motivation behind it. 
With this in mind, this analysis will proceed on the basis that an approach which is in line with the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion (featuring the actual payment of damages) and wealth maximisation, is 
legitimate when the efficient breach of commercial contracts is being considered.  
 
5.5 Efficiency Based Decision Making 
 
A key claim which this thesis makes is that when an opportunity to breach efficiently arises, it does 
not necessarily have to be acted upon. However, should a party choose to pursue it, that course of 
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action will be justified. What they have available is efficient optionality. It is the case that when an 
opportunity to breach efficiently arises, a contracting party will have a decision to make. This will 
involve carrying out a cost-benefit analysis. In this case, it will be a subjective measure based on the 
individual preferences of the party involved. There are some natural limitations placed on this 
however. These are based on bounded rationality. 
 
5.5.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Making a decision regarding an efficient breach would likely involve the application of a cost-benefit 
analysis which is based on following a particular course of action ‘only if the sum of the measures 
of its costs and benefits is positive’.215 Its requirements are said to be synonymous with those of a 
potential Pareto improvement. This is otherwise known as an outcome that will be Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient.216 There is also an implicit assumption that it will be measurable by units of currency.217 
As a result, there are difficulties in terms of integrating elements which concern a social welfare 
function. This leads to the suggestion that it should be confined to estimating only monetary gain and 
loss.218  
The relevance of a cost-benefit analysis is informing decisions based on the balance of probability, 
as well as the preferences of the decision maker. It has been set out that any information ‘when 
reduced to a single point of time by acceptable methods, are to be interpreted as contributions, 
positive or negative, to the magnitude of some resulting Pareto improvement’.219 It is intuitive that 
some type of cost-benefit analysis will play a role where parties are considering an efficient breach. 
They may simply consider the total value of performance vs the total value of breach in a specific 
transaction. However, they may opt to take into account other factors beyond costs and benefits in a 
monetary sense. These could include the potential impact on their relationship with the other party, 
or the potential damage which may be caused to their reputation within a particular industry, for 
example. The next point for discussion are the limits which bounded rationality will place on a cost-
benefit analysis. 
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5.5.2 Bounded Rationality  
 
There is inherent uncertainty when utilising a cost-benefit analysis due to bounded rationality.220 This 
concerns the limitations which exist in relation to the information-processing capacity of an 
individual.221 It exists because ‘people are not omniscient; their information is imperfect and 
improvable only at a cost’.222 Limits on a party’s rationality include a lack of perfect knowledge, 
incomplete information regarding potential alternatives, and an inability to calculate the best course 
of action based on complexity in assessing cost as well as other environmental constraints.223 
However, this does not negate the process. Parties will be able to make decisions based on the 
information which they possess, as well as informed predictions.  
 
5.5.3 Behavioural Economics 
 
There is a view that people ‘are not entirely rational in any strict sense of the term’.224 This refers to 
rationality in an individual utility maximising sense. The role of behavioural economics is to test 
whether or not people operate in a way which is representative of the homo-economicus model upon 
which economic analysis of the law has relied.225 The suggestion is that while useful, predictions 
based on the model are limited based on the impact of bounded rationality, biases, heuristics, 
willpower and the limits to which people are truly self-interested.226 This is on the basis that ‘human 
beings make mistakes in their judgment and decision-making. These mistakes are predictable, 
pervasive, and difficult to correct’.227 This could have an impact on the decisions which individuals 
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make. They could be based on preferences which are not driven by rationality in a wealth maximising 
sense. They could also be influenced by other social preferences,228 or by happiness and utility.229  
Sunstein notes that a gap in relation to the application of the behavioural approach ‘is especially 
important for economic analysis of law’230 on the basis that it is concerned with non-market 
behaviour to a large degree. Further, that it is within non-market transactions ‘that from the 
conventional model are - it is generally conceded-most likely to occur’.231 Additionally, it is notable 
that ‘the principal general difficulty of modern economic theory is surely the difficulty of assigning 
weights to the values which are to be incorporated in a decision’.232 However, it is within the context 
of commercial contracting, where acting rationally in terms of seeking to maximise wealth seems 
intuitive. This, by its very nature allows weight to be assigned to values in a monetary sense. Again, 
this is not to say that parties to commercial contracts must act in this way as it is important to make 
clear that this is not prescriptive approach. This means that other relevant preferences may play a 
roll. As such, the only claim is that a party will be justified in breaching efficiently should they 
choose to.233 This justification applies to the party’s choice to breach efficiently, and also, to the 
law’s approach in limiting the available remedy to expectation damages. 
 
5.5.4 Conclusion 
 
In relation to the overarching intention of this thesis, the key point here is that in the case of an 
efficient breach, a breaching party will make a decision which is informed by efficiency. However, 
there are other factors which may contribute to it. The total value of performance vs the total value 
of breach may simply be considered. Additionally, factors beyond costs and benefits in a monetary 
sense (such as impact on a contracting relationship or industry reputation) may also be taken into 
account. There is, of course an inherent level of uncertainty when utilising a cost-benefit analysis 
due to bounded rationality. However, this does not negate the legitimacy of the claim. This is because 
contracting parties will be capable of making decisions based on the information which they possess 
alongside informed predictions. The homo-economicus model has limitations. However, within the 
context of commercial contracting, acting in line with this approach seems intuitive based on the 
profit generation focus of commercial agreements. Most importantly, this is not intended to suggest 
that parties will act in this way. The only claim is that they will be justified in doing so should they 
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choose to. Once again, this applies to the breaching party’s choice, as well as to the law’s approach 
in limiting the available remedy to the expectation measure of damages. The use of this remedy in 
commercial contract disputes effectively condones the breach. 
 
5.6 Issues with Pursuing Economic Efficiency 
 
The pursuit of economic efficiency is, in a general sense, contentious. This is because economic 
efficiency will, by design, be less concerned with whether a process by which an outcome is achieved 
is fair, just or moral. Focus is on whether that outcome is economically efficient however that 
outcome is achieved.234 It is important to deal with these issues effectively because the theory of 
efficient breach with regard to commercial contracts relies on the pursuit of economic efficiency in 
a specific, and legitimate setting. 
There is a view that issues such as justice and equity should not be judged based on efficiency.235 
Further, that a legislator can legitimately adopt policies that are not necessarily efficient based on 
moral reasoning.236 Posner has been criticised for ‘not sufficiently reminding his readers, that the 
inefficient result may be socially desirable, either because it is more just or fair or is designed for 
some other legitimate social purpose’.237 There is also a claim that simply pursuing efficiency ‘says 
nothing about what the decision maker is or ought to be trying to do’.238 It will be set out that whilst 
economic efficiency is not a justifiable goal in many legal settings, it can be legitimised with respect 
to the efficient breach of commercial contracts. Again, this is due to the underlying profit production 
intent which underpins those contracts, and the parties’ reasons for entering them. 
 
5.6.1 Application to the Criminal Law and Judicial Decision Making 
 
Issues may arise relating to the potential application of economic analysis to the criminal law, as well 
as to judiciary’s decision making. In criminal law there is potential for a clash between punishing 
criminal acts and the forward looking nature of economics in terms of deterrence. It is suggested that 
‘punishment is justified if and to the extent that it produces a desired state of affairs; if the optimal 
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degree of punishment so derived is out sync with intuitions about the reprehensibility of a particular 
crime, so much the worse for those intuitions’.239 This means that whilst it may not be cost-effective 
to punish certain criminal acts, other factors may require that it takes place.  
On judicial decision making it is suggested that ‘the economic analysis of law provides an inadequate 
account of judicial behaviour because economic models are incompatible with a jurisprudence that 
recognizes basic rule-of-law values’.240 Additionally the judicial process is said to be ‘ill equipped 
to register and consider all the costs and benefits that might flow from a particular decision … it is 
impossible for a passive judiciary to identify all the external effects of its actions’.241 Also that one 
may question ‘whether judges have the authority to seize upon a private dispute framed by and in 
terms of the respective litigant’s interest as an opportunity to promote desirable social policies, for 
example, efficiency and distributional justice’.242 Ultimately these are criticisms of the way in which 
the consideration of moral principles may be limited within the economic analysis of law.243  
 
5.6.2 Could Economic Efficiency Lead to Efficient Crime or Efficient Tort? 
 
One may also look to the suggestion that the economic approach, more specifically wealth 
maximisation, could lead to issues such as efficient crime or efficient tort. This issue will be dealt 
with in more detail in chapter 6.244 For now it is emphasised that an approach in line with wealth 
maximisation is only being suggested in the context of the breach of commercial contracts. This will 
mean that because loss or damage may be adequately compensated through an award of damages, it 
will satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. This would not necessarily be the case in other areas of the 
law because unlike parties to commercial contracts, affected parties cannot be presumed to act with 
the underlying intention of generating a profit.  
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5.6.3 The Issue of Interpersonal Comparisons 
 
It is clear that the pursuit efficiency has issues because ‘unless one is willing to make interpersonal 
comparisons … it simply cannot be said that such an uncompensated Kaldor-Hicks move is an 
improvement’.245 This means that attempts to utilise efficiency outside the realm of market 
transactions is problematic.246 Coleman notes that interpersonal utility comparisons must be made in 
order to establish whether the efficiency test has been satisfied. This requires that a net gain in utility 
is created as it is necessary to know whether the winners in a given scenario have won more than the 
losers have lost.247 Katz sets out that economic efficiency does not illustrate whether goals like 
material gain, private profit, protection of the environment, or social justice are legitimate. Rather, 
its function is to demonstrate how best these goals could be pursued.248  
Pursuing economic efficiency is legitimised based on the belief that total wealth will be promoted. 
This will take place when rational self-interested individuals engage in the process of free exchange 
and the belief that Pareto improvements will ultimately increase utility. Calabresi noted that the 
approach ‘only necessarily serves “utility” on the most peculiar, not to say absurd, assumption about 
the relationship between wealth and utility, namely, that $1 is as likely to be worth as much to the 
rich person as to the poor person’.249 Also that an efficiency move based on maximising wealth is 
‘merely instrumental and needs to be attached to some account of what it is instrumental toward 
before it can be evaluated’.250  
 
5.6.4 Conclusion 
 
Any case which is made for efficient breach in a particular context must accept that the pursuit of 
efficiency (or wealth maximisation), where monetary value is the measure is a legitimate and 
justifiable goal. This is a key requirement within this thesis because ultimately, the intention is to 
justify the efficient breach of commercial contracts. There is a suggestion that law and economics 
differs from neoclassical economic theory where efficiency yields predictions of the behaviour of a 
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party based on promoting their own interests.251 This is because economic efficiency has a clear role 
and a direct influence within economics, but the same cannot be said of the law. While some areas 
of the law can potentially be illuminated by economic reasoning, there are others that cannot.252 This 
issue will be touched upon in discussing the legitimacy of economic theories of contract. The 
suggestion will be made that economic reasoning, more specifically the pursuit of efficiency, will be 
appropriate in certain settings and that commercial contracting is such a setting. This is because 
commercial contracts exist primarily to facilitate the generation of profit for the parties involved, 
therefore it follows that pursuing wealth maximisation will be legitimised. 
 
5.7 Economic Theories of Contract  
 
Economic theories of contract seek to interpret or explain contract law using economic analysis. 
Contract law is considered by many to be the natural environment for the application of economic 
analysis,253 and that there is an economic basis of contract law.254 A recurring theme regarding the 
intention of contract law is that it seeks to outline which contracts should be enforceable, as well as 
which remedies should be available following breach.255 From the perspective of an economic theory, 
contract law aims to facilitate, as well as to promote efficient exchanges. This means that they will 
help a good or service find its way into the possession of the party who values it most. It is set out 
that ‘contract law has developed over the centuries as a means of facilitating economic exchanges’.256 
Also, that ‘contract law enables people to make credible commitments to cooperate with each other. 
They maximise the gain from cooperation when law creates efficient incentives for performance and 
reliance’.257 Accordingly, the economic view regarding the intention behind contractual remedies 
will first be introduced. This will be followed by highlighting some of the criticism which has been 
directed at the economic analysis of contract law before outlining the role which the court plays in 
the application and enforcement of contract law. It will be set out that the most appropriate way to 
                                                          
251 See Hardin (n 236) 342. 
252 Cooter (n 31) 1266. 
253 See for example Catherine Mitchell, Contract Law and Contract Practice (Hart 2013) 150. 
254 See Anthony T Kronman and RA Posner, The Economics of Contract Law (Little, Brown and Company 
1979) 10: Cites Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan  (Blackwell) 192-196; John Umbeck, ‘A Theory of Contract 
Choice and the California Gold Rush’ (1978) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 421; Robert L Birmingham, 
‘Legal and Moral Duty in Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies’ (1969) 18 Buffalo 
Law Review 99, 103 - 110; Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law (Basic Books Inc 1971) 35-47; Charles O 
Hardy, Risk and Risk-Bearing (University of Chicago Press 1923) 1-5 and 60-61; Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Common Law (1881) 298-305; Ronald H Coase, ‘The Nature of The Firm’ (1937) 4 Economics 386, 
390-392. 
255 Miceli (n 3) 88; See also Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (6th edn, Pearson 2013) 
299; Lewis A Kornhauser ‘An introduction to the economic analysis of contract remedies’ (1986) 57 
University of Colorado Law Review 683, 685. 
256 Hirsch (n 42) 105. 
257 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (6th edn, Pearson 2013) 297. 
178 
 
use economic theories of contract, or to apply economic principles to contract law is to do so only 
where it is appropriate. Once again, the claim is that commercial contracting is an appropriate setting 
based on the underlying profit driven motives which underpin such contracts.  
 
5.7.1 The Intention of Contractual Remedies 
 
The suggestion within economic theories of contract is that remedies are intended to induce efficient 
actions and that individuals seek to enter into contracts featuring terms that will maximise their own 
profits.258 For example, it is set out that that damage awards ‘should induce the seller to perform 
when the parties would have so agreed, and in other cases to provide the appropriate alternative 
performance in damages’.259 In addition, it is suggested that the courts should look to enhance the 
efficiency of contracting by providing missing terms should contracts be incomplete, as well as to 
maximise the gains which flow from trade.260 This reference to trade suggests a focus on commercial 
transactions within a market. However, while inducing efficient actions may be the intention of 
standard compensatory damage awards, it must be noted that this will not necessarily be the case for 
other remedies which can occasionally be awarded for breach of contract.  
Specific performance is a discretionary remedy for breach of contract which is not utilised on a 
regular basis. Importantly, it will not be awarded where an award of damages is deemed to be 
adequate.261 It requires that a contract is performed in specie.262 Importantly, specific performance 
will only be enforced when it is deemed appropriate to do so.263 It is intended to provide exactly what 
the contract specified rather than its monetary equivalent. This is an issue which will be discussed at 
greater length later.264 For now it is sufficient to note that specific performance exists as a contractual 
remedy which, on occasion, can be utilised for a purpose which does not induce an efficient action. 
Next, disgorgement (or account of profit) requires that a defendant must turn over any profit which 
they accrue as a result of the breach.265 This may take place without causing any loss to a claimant 
in terms of a reduction on wealth, but could deprive them of ‘the opportunity to charge the defendant 
for permission to carry on the activity which has led to the defendant's enrichment’.266 It is intended 
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to punish what is perceived to be wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant. Again, this remedy 
for breach of contract will be discussed in more depth in chapter 6.267  
The important point is that whilst these remedies exist, they will not be problematic with regard to 
the efficient breach of commercial contracts. This is on the basis that the types of behaviour which 
would trigger their use will not necessarily be evident.268 In this specific sense then, the idea that 
remedies in the form of compensatory damages for the breach of commercial contracts can be said 
to seek to induce efficient actions.  
 
5.7.2 Criticism of the Economic Analysis of Contract Law  
 
There has been some criticism of the application of economic analysis to contract law. This is based 
on a perceived failure to fully explain it using economic principles. There a three parts to this 
criticism. First, it is suggested that economics ‘does not explain why expectation damages are the 
standard remedy … or why liquidated damages are not always enforced’.269 Second, that ‘it does not 
explain the function of the consideration doctrine or promissory estoppel’.270 Third, that ‘it does not 
explain why the law sometimes encourages people to disclose information and at other times does 
not’.271 In response, Craswell suggests that the most important goal of economic analysis has been 
misidentified, outlining that the normative goal which economists pursue ‘does not demand a fully 
worked out theory with complete and close-ended answers’.272 Rather, its goal is simply to shed more 
light on contract rules.273  
With this in mind, the suggestion is that the economic approach should be utilised where it is most 
appropriate to do so. This is in place of attempting to use it to explain contract law in its entirety. In 
this case, the context of commercial contracting provides what can be described as a natural 
environment for economic principles to be utilised.274 This is based on the intention to generate profit 
which underpins commercial contracts.275 This is an intention which aligns with wealth 
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maximisation. Because of this, the economic approach can be utilised effectively. In other areas of 
contract law, or the law more generally, this would not be the case.  
 
5.7.3 Conclusion 
 
The most suitable way to utilise economic theories of contract, or equally to use economic principles 
to interpret or analyse contract law is to do so only where it is appropriate. This is far more functional 
than attempting to explain the entirety of contract law.276 The claim which this thesis makes is that 
the setting of commercial contracting is an appropriate area of contract law in which certain economic 
principles (such as a preference for wealth maximisation) may be applied. This is based on the 
underlying profit driven motives of the parties to a commercial contract.  
 
5.8 Measures of Damages 
 
Within any discussion of efficient breach, it is vital that the issue of compensatory damages is dealt 
with. This is because their legitimacy is a foundational feature in terms of justifying any version of 
the theory. Birmingham set out that ‘efficiency requires a measure of damages for breach of contract 
which places the innocent party in as good a position as he would have been in if default had not 
occurred rests largely in the presumed relevance of the competitive model to the modern market 
system’.277 There exists a preference for monetary damages where it is adequate.278 Damages seek to 
provide compensation for any damage, loss or injury suffered as a result of that breach intended to 
place the injured party on the position they would have found themselves had the contract been 
performed to the extent that money can achieve it.279 Eisenberg highlights the indifference principle 
which requires that ‘contract remedies should be designed to make a promisee indifferent between 
performance by the promisor and legal relief for breach’.280 There are three primary methods of 
measuring damage awards which are generally acknowledged by law and economists. These are the 
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restitution interest, the reliance interest, and the expectation interest. There is also a suggestion that 
there could be scope to protect a fourth interest based on the cost of a lost opportunity. 
 
5.8.1 Restitution, Reliance and Loss of Opportunity  
 
The restitution interest concerns recovery of a benefit where one party has paid money, or 
alternatively conferred some other type of benefit on another. It seeks to restore any payments which 
are made prior to a breach.281 The intention is to restore the performance interest, rather than 
providing compensation for harm or loss.282 This gains-based recovery system is more commonly 
seen following breach of trust, however, in exceptional cases it may be extended to breach of 
contract. 283  
The reliance interest concerns losses or expenses which a victim of breach has incurred. It seeks to 
place the wronged party in the position which they would have been in had the contract never been 
made.284 It is said to warrant protection because it is based on the amount by which a victim of breach 
has lost.285 A claimant is only able to claim for the value for any wasted expenses incurred in 
anticipation of contractual performance.286 This is limited to expenses which are incurred after the 
contract has been made.287 Claimants will be required to choose to claim for wasted expenditure or 
to claim for lost profits.288 The suggestion is that a claimant will be likely to seek damages based on 
the reliance interest should they lack adequate proof to demonstrate their loss based on the 
expectation interest, or where a contract has become unprofitable, meaning that a net loss could not 
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be proven.289 Reliance will likely be simple to measure as any claim will reflect expenditure which 
has already taken place.  
Cooter and Ulen suggest the Opportunity Cost measure.290 This is very much like the English concept 
of loss of chance.291 This is subject to the limits imposed by remoteness and causation.292 It is set out 
that:  
[I]n some cases the amount of the claimant's loss cannot be precisely ascertained because it 
is not known what would have happened had the defendant not broken the contract, as, for 
example, where whether the claimant would have made a profit or gained some advantage 
depends on a contingency, does not deprive the claimant of a remedy.293  
The suggestion is that entering into a contract may lead to the potential loss of an opportunity to 
negotiate an alternate contract elsewhere. This measure of damages would be calculated based on the 
value of the lost opportunity.294 However, it would potentially be harder to measure than the 
expectation interest as it would require information regarding potential alternate contracts. Also, 
problems may arise because the courts are wary of awarding hard to measure damages.295 
 
5.8.2 The Expectation Interest  
 
The expectation interest concerns any benefit which the victim legitimately expected to receive 
following a contract’s completion. It will take into account loss of profit which stems from breach.296 
Its aim is to place the wronged party in the equivalent position to that which they would have found 
themselves in had the contract been performed.297 The claim is that an award which reflects the 
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expectation interest will lead to indifference between contractual performance and breach.298 There 
is a claim that expectation damages is the only measure which promotes efficiency whilst 
discouraging inefficiency.299 With this in mind, it is set out that the expectation measure ‘is the 
primary measure for damages for breach of contract’.300 There is a suggestion that this interest is 
‘perhaps the weakest claim to protection, since it represents something that the victim did not have 
before the contract was made’.301 However, it is clear that the legitimacy of any defence of efficient 
breach rests on the functionality of the expectation measure. The need to adequately compensate the 
legitimate expectations of a party who suffers a breach cannot be underestimated. The most obvious 
point to note regarding the expectation measure is that if a payment of damages is less than the 
legitimate expectation, the breach which has occurred is by default inefficient and thus illegitimate.302 
This is because the key justification for the measure is protecting the expectation of the party who 
suffers the effects of a breach. The discussion of the efficient breach of commercial contracts within 
the remainder of this thesis will proceed on the basis that the expectation measure will fulfil the 
necessary compensatory requirements which arise. 
 
5.8.3 Conclusion 
 
The expectation measure is the foundational principle upon which the theory of efficient breach is 
built. Early on, it was acknowledged that the principle of compensation will be consistent with the 
theory of efficient breach on the basis that it will lead to resources being allocated to higher value 
uses after the payment of compensation.303 If the damages in question were less than the expectation, 
this would not be achieved. As Shavell notes, issues would arise where damages are less than the 
amount required to meet the victim’s expectation. Further, that because breach is more likely to take 
place where the cost of performance exceeds the cost of paying damages, there would be a moral 
hazard should the measure of damages fall short of a claimant’s legitimate expectation.304  
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5.9 Overall Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to provide detail on some of the key elements relating to efficient breach. The 
economic analysis of law was introduced before setting out some of the criticisms which have been 
directed at it. The criticisms were not problematic on the basis that the claims which are made relate 
to the breach of commercial contracts. The theory of efficient breach was then outlined to ensure that 
it was fully understood. This was followed by a discussion of efficiency because it was necessary to 
understand the differing approaches which may be adopted. It was also important to justify which 
ones should be utilised within commercial contracting. The role which efficiency may play within 
decision making was also discussed. The potential issues which may stem from the law’s pursuit of 
efficiency were highlighted. This included the idea that the legal process has a value which extends 
beyond efficiency. It was noted that efficiency can be of use in appropriate settings. Further, that the 
efficient breach of commercial contracts is such a setting. It was set out that economic theories of 
contract seek to assess which contracts should be enforceable, and which remedies should be 
available following breach. Also, that they tend to adopt an approach geared towards promoting 
economic efficiency. This involves encouraging the movement of resources into the possession of 
those who value them most.  
The main takeaway points for this chapter are that in the context of commercial contracting it is 
legitimate to judge efficiency based on the principle of wealth maximisation as well as to utilise the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion (where payment of compensation is required). Again, it is important to keep 
in mind that this claim is limited to commercial contracts only. Also, that a simple approach to 
defining an efficient breach will be adopted going forward. It will be characterised as involving the 
breach of a contract’s terms where it is more cost effective to do so; taking into account the total cost 
of performance vs breach and the payment of compensatory damages. This may be done either to 
reduce loss, or to maximise total gain.305 These key points will be applied throughout the remaining 
chapters of this thesis. The next step will be to deal with existing criticisms of the theory effectively. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Criticisms of the Theory of Efficient Breach  
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter’s original contribution comes in setting out why a variety of criticisms which have been 
directed at the theory of efficient breach do not derail its application to commercial contracts. Dealing 
with this variety of criticisms with this commercial contract based application in mind is yet to be 
attempted elsewhere. Providing a systematic treatment of each of these criticisms will allow the 
application of the theory of efficient breach to be discussed in chapter 7.  
Efficient breach has been discussed for many years.1 Based on the conclusions reached in chapter 5, 
the approach regarding efficiency that will be utilised is based on wealth maximisation and the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion (featuring the actual payment of compensation).2 When assessing efficiency 
it is important to consider the context in which it is being done. The suggestion is that this approach 
is legitimate when considering breach of commercial contracts. This is justified by adequately 
compensating parties who suffer a breach through a monetary award. This is efficient on the basis 
that one party is afforded the opportunity to improve their position and the other is compensated and 
will be no worse off. 
The approach that will be adopted here is thematic. The criticisms of efficient breach which will be 
considered are grouped into four categories. The first category concerns the potential clashes and 
contrasts with existing legal doctrines. These include issues relating to awards of damages, namely 
whether the difficulties inherent in calculating damages are problematic, whether damage awards are 
naturally under-compensatory, the role of the court, and the potential relevance of awards of nominal 
and punitive damages as well as the relevance of restitutionary remedies and specific performance. 
Next is a perceived likeness with a variety of torts including tortious interference with contract, 
economic duress as well as the tort of intimidation. This will be followed by considering whether 
efficient breach potentially infringes on property rights. This includes the potential extension of the 
approach to efficient crimes and efficient torts relating to property. It will then be set out that the 
duty of good faith in commercial contracting does not inhibit the legitimacy of the efficient breach 
of commercial contracts. This is because where there is no evidence of improper conduct the duty 
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will not be infringed. Finally, a contrast with trust law in terms of execution and remedies will be 
discussed.  
The second category concerns issues relating to the application of an instrumentalist approach to the 
law. The first consideration is the moral impermissibility of breach of contract.3 This is the most 
common method by which efficient breach is refuted on the basis that it conflicts with a moral 
requirement that promises should not be broken. It will be made clear that this is inapplicable to 
commercial contracts. Next is the potential that moral practices could be corroded. This is in both a 
business focused and a wider sense and includes the discussion of evidence of a distaste for promise 
breaking and “opportunistic” breach, the need to cultivate good habits, and the potential impact on 
business ethics.  
The third category concerns commercial practices. These include commercial reality, and the impact 
of relational contracting. The suggestion that efficient breach would negatively impact the 
commercial system will then be discounted. This is on the basis that it is the existence of a contract 
which allows parties to operate knowing that they will be able to pursue a remedy following a breach. 
Also, that the nature of commercial agreements limits the potential for moral considerations to be 
drawn upon. Finally, it will be highlighted that the opportunity to breach efficiently does not dictate 
that an efficient breach will take place, only that it could.  
The fourth category concerns potential clashes relating to applying the theory of efficient breach. 
This will include a discussion of whether an efficient breach is possible in a practical sense, the flaws 
in some of the current analysis of efficient breach, as well as bounded rationality, transaction costs 
and pre-risk predictions. It will be set out that there is the potential for, as well as evidence of efficient 
breach in English contract law. This draws on the discussion of the relevant case law in chapter 5.4 
Ultimately, it will be concluded that none of these criticisms successfully derail the theory of efficient 
breach with respect to commercial contracts. It will then be possible to shift focus to making the case 
for the efficient breach of commercial chapter in chapter 7. 
 
6.2 Potential Clashes and Contrasts with Existing English Legal Doctrines 
 
The first group of criticisms are based on the extent to which the theory of efficient breach clashes 
with existing English legal doctrines. Grouping these criticisms in this way is a novel approach to 
take. The issues to be analysed include clashes relating to calculating, as well as awarding damages, 
a perceived likeness with a variety of torts, as well as a potential infringement on property rights. 
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Whether any issues stem from the good faith requirement in contracting will also be considered. 
Regarding commercial contracting, it will be concluded that none of these potential clashes negate 
the legitimacy of the theory of efficient breach. The final consideration will be the clear contrast that 
exists with trust law with respect to execution and remedies. It is important to establish that efficient 
breach is able to fit amongst established legal doctrines in order to make the case for its legitimacy 
with respect to commercial contracts within English law.  
 
6.2.1 On Damages 
 
The first area of interest concerns the way in which a theory of efficient breach interfaces with 
damage awards. This includes considering the process by which awards are calculated, as well the 
problems which exist within it. The suggestion that awards are inevitably under compensatory will 
then be considered. The role of the court with regard to calculating as well as enforcing awards of 
damages will also be discussed. Finally, the potential relevance of nominal, as well as punitive 
damages will be assessed.  
It will be set out that in any area of the law, difficulty may arise whenever awards of damages are to 
be calculated. However, in commercial contracting the process is simplified because loss can be 
quantified based on market value. It will be noted that it would be bold to attempt to discount the 
damage calculation process based on inherent difficulties in quantification. Also, that issues would 
not be raised by an award of nominal damages because the practical implications of an efficient 
breach would effectively be accepted should such an award be made. The same can be said for 
punitive damages because an efficient breach of a commercial contract would not exhibit the type of 
behaviour that would trigger this type of award. 
 
6.2.1.1 Are Inherent Difficulties in Calculating Damages Problematic? 
 
There are issues surrounding whether or not an award of damages to reflect the expectation interest 
of a contracting party can truly compensate their loss. Eisenberg highlights three problems with this 
approach. First are the costs attached to dispute settlement on the basis that they would not be 
incurred following performance.5 However, it is obvious that costs are attached to any litigation. 
Also, it is important to keep in mind that in England, the loser in a contract dispute will, in principle, 
                                                          
5 Melvin A Eisenberg, ‘Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the 
Indifference Principle in Contract Law’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 975, 995. 
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be responsible for the winner’s costs. The court will assess costs based on the relevant civil procedure 
rules.6 Accordingly, it is wrong to discount the legitimacy of efficient breach based on the cost of 
legal proceedings, especially where the breaching party is responsible for costs. Second are the losses 
accrued between breach and the payment of damages. The suggestion is that this may be measured 
by compound interest to reflect the rate attached to borrowing funds during that period.7 This is not 
a novel approach. For example, the late payments of commercial debts are regulated due to the costs 
which are caused by delays.8 Third, that performance will not carry the risk of the breaching party 
going into insolvency between a breach taking place, and damages being paid.9 Whilst this is a risk, 
at any time there is the potential that a party could become insolvent. It would of course be 
unfortunate if this took place in the period. However, this is not a strong enough reason to discount 
efficient breach entirely.  
It seems illogical to suggest that damages are inappropriate because they are difficult to calculate. 
For example, in Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA v The Bronx Engineering Co Ltd,10 despite 
difficulty, damages remained the remedy.11 This was because the machinery in question was 
available from a different supplier.12 Furthermore, it would be bold to discount the entire damage 
calculation process based on inherent difficulties in quantification. It is also notable that calculating 
awards is simplified in commercial settings on the basis that losses will be assessed based on 
commercial (or market) value. This is particularly straightforward in areas such as commodities and 
sale of goods. In addition, non-pecuniary losses would not be considered, simplifying the process 
further.13  
 
6.2.1.2 Are Awards of Damages Under Compensatory? 
 
Efficient breach is also criticised based on the damage calculation process. Eisenberg’s position is 
that conventional approaches to damage awards do not fulfil the indifference requirement. This is 
due to ‘the way in which market-price damages are measured, the way in which the uncertainty rule 
is administered in contract law, and the principle of Hadley v Baxendale’.14 The Achilleas15 sets out 
that it is not enough that possible loss could be foreseen. Responsibility must be assumed for that 
                                                          
6 CPR 44.3. 
7 Eisenberg (n 5) 995. 
8 Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998, s 1.  
9 Eisenberg (n 5) 996. 
10 [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 465. 
11 ibid, 470 (Buckley LJ). 
12 ibid, 469 (Buckley LJ). 
13 See 3.5.2 Loss of Amenity and the Consumer Surplus. 
14 Eisenberg (n 5) 1049; Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 156 ER 145; (1854) 9 Ex 341.   
15 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48; [2009] 1 AC 61. 
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loss. With this in mind, it has been noted that Hadley v Baxendale16 has ‘been effectively ousted by 
the market convention’.17 Further, that “Lord Hoffmann … regarded this convention as 
independently reflecting the expectations of a reasonable or prudent commercial contractor’.18 The 
argument is that specific performance will better satisfy the principle of indifference. There is a 
suggestion that this would place pressure on promisors to terminate a contract through mutual 
negotiation rather than unilateral breach.19 The contention is that normal methods for quantifying 
damages will fail to provide full compensation which would result in inefficient breach.20  
In analysing examples discussed by Macaulay as well as by Macneil, Campbell outlined that it would 
be wrong to allow breach where the claimant would not be compensated as efficiency requires.21 It 
is suggested that a cooperative attitude to potential breach will result in either allowing it, or 
anticipating it.22 The conclusion is that when properly applied, efficient breach ‘articulates a 
contractual norm of cooperation’ and that this will allay any concerns raised by relational contract 
theorists.23 Efficiency will be achievable because breach will incorporate ‘flexibility into the system 
of exchanges, allowing parties’ relief from unanticipated expensive obligations when further 
performance would merely be wasteful as the plaintiff can be compensated in damages’.24 Campbell 
asserts that a key function of contract law is to allow breach where it is properly regulated and 
involves adequate compensation so as to be a ‘normative contractual action’.25  
It is impossible to draft a contract which accounts for all future contingencies as a consequence of 
bounded rationality. Should they arise, there is a need to adapt. Where an agreement has become 
inefficient, it could be renegotiated. It could also be terminated by mutual consent. Both options 
assume that common ground can be found, and also that the relationship between the parties remains 
functional. However, it could be the case that parties may be unwilling to renegotiate. The possibility 
of a breach provides leverage to trigger renegotiation, encouraging an unwilling party to reconsider 
their position. If this was impossible then breach provides a final option. In this way breach plays a 
key role in the way which Campbell suggests. 
 
                                                          
16 (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 ER 145. 
17 Catherine Mitchell, Contract Law and Contract Practice (Hart 2013) 77. 
18 ibid. 
19 Eisenberg (n 5) 1049. 
20 David Campbell, ‘Breach and Penalty as Contractual Norm and Contractual Anomie’ (2001) Wisconsin 
Law Review 681, 688. 
21 ibid, 690; See also Ian R Macneil, ‘Contract Remedies: A Need for Better Efficiency Analysis’ (1988) 144 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 6, 15; Stewart Macaulay, ‘The Reliance Interest and the 
World Outside the Law Schools’ Doors’ (1991) Wisconsin Law Review 247, 249. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
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6.2.1.3 The Role of the Court  
 
Issues also exist regarding the court’s role in calculating and enforcing awards of damages following 
a breach. Shavell highlights the reluctance to compensate “hard-to-measure” elements including lost 
profits or idiosyncratic losses.26 However, if a party can demonstrate the value of any lost profit, they 
would be compensated for it. There is inherent difficulty whenever non-pecuniary losses are factored 
into contractual damage awards as demonstrated in Ruxley v Forsyth.27 However, damages in 
commercial cases do not account for non-pecuniary losses. Market value is the measure, meaning 
that subjective valuation is not an issue.28 Therefore, limiting focus to commercial contracting 
negates the relevance of idiosyncratic losses.29  
The next issue is that the courts limit damages to losses which were reasonably foreseeable when the 
contract was made.30 Limitations include the rules relating to mitigation and remoteness.31 These are 
foundational rules. To suggest that they are flawed raises issues greater than simply the functionality 
of efficient breach, extending to the calculation process more generally. As such, whenever 
compensatory damages are to be quantified, issues exist regarding accuracy.  
 
6.2.1.4 Nominal Damages 
 
Questions may be raised regarding the intent behind awarding nominal damages for breach of 
contract.32 Nominal damages are used ‘to establish the infringement of the claimant's legal right’,33 
but lack a vindicatory element as an ‘award of a pound or two is unlikely … to provide adequate 
                                                          
26 Steven Shavell, ‘Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts’ 
(2009) 107 Michigan Law Review 1569, 1575. 
27 [1996] AC 344. 
28 See Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson, Remedies in Contract & Tort (2nd edn, CUP 2006) 
171; See also Channel Island Ferries Ltd v Cenargo Navigation Ltd (The Rozel) [1994] CLC 168; 
Southampton Container Terminals Ltd v Hansa Schiffahrts GmbH (The Maersk Colombo) [2001] EWCA Civ 
717; Sealace Shipping Co Ltd v Oceanvoice Ltd (The Alecos M) [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep 120. 
29 ibid, 173; See also Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 5-015.  
30 See Victoria Laundry v Newman Industries [1949] 2 KB 528, 539; See also Steven Shavell, ‘Why Breach 
of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts’ (2009) 107 Michigan Law Review, 
1569, 1575. 
31 See Generally Hugh G Beale, Chitty on Contracts (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 26-002: The 
mitigation requirement ‘mitigation’ for losses for which the defendant could not reasonably be assumed to 
have taken responsibility for; See also Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (20th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2017) 2-002; Adam Kramer, The Law of Contract Damages (2nd edn, Hart 2017) 300. 
32 ibid, 26-009; See also Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 12-
001. 
33 ibid; See also David Pearce and Roger Halson, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, 
Restitution and Vindication’ (2008) 28 OJLS 73, 76. 
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satisfaction for the fact that a wrong has been committed’.34 They may ‘indicate a lack of any 
substantive merit in the claimant’s case’.35 A claimant who recovers nominal damages ‘has in reality 
lost and in reality the defendant has established a complete defence’.36 In Mappouras v Waldrons 
Solicitors,37 no loss was caused by a breach. The court awarded ‘a small sum, not intended to 
compensate for anything at all, in order to mark the fact that there has been a breach of contract, but 
not in any way to compensate the appellant’.38 In The Mediana,39 it demonstrated ‘an infraction of a 
legal right’.40 The sum ‘has no existence in point of quantity’.41 However, it is suggested that 
‘nominal damages are an ineffective means of vindicating the performance right’.42 
Unlike contractual claims, not all common law claims can be made where no damage exists. 
Negligence requires damage in order to be compensated. The availability of nominal damages in 
contract suggests that despite evidence of a “wrong” per se, the nature of that wrong does not require 
punishment. It should be noted that nominal damages are a technical win for the party receiving 
them. This may be important regarding costs.43 Here the question is how the award of nominal 
damages would impact a case concerning the efficient breach of a commercial contract. An award 
would mean that the court acknowledges that a wrong has been committed, but would also make 
clear that there is no ascertainable damage to the claimant. It would be symbolic in three senses. 
First, there is a wrong which must be acknowledged. Second, no ascertainable damage has been 
caused. Third, any wrong does not require substantial punishment. As such, the impact of an efficient 
breach would effectively be accepted should an award of nominal damages be made. 
 
6.2.1.5 Punitive Damages and Disgorgement 
 
Punitive damages may occasionally be awarded following a breach of contract.44 This is possible 
where ‘the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently outrageous to merit punishment, as where it discloses 
malice, fraud, cruelty, insolence or the like, or as where, should the defendant be a government 
                                                          
34 David Pearce and Roger Halson, ‘Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and 
Vindication’ (2008) 28 OJLS 73, 76. 
35 ibid, 77. 
36 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [1999] RPC 655, 670 (Jacob J). 
37 [2002] EWCA Civ 842. 
38 ibid [15] (Kay LJ). 
39 [1900] AC 113. 
40 ibid, 116 (Earl of Halsbury LC). 
41 Beaumont v Greathead (1846) 2 CB 494, 499. 
42 Pearce and Halson (n 34) 74. 
43 This is because the loser will be responsible for those costs which will be assessed based on part 44 of the 
Civil Procedure Rules. 
44 See Beale (n 31) 1-151 and 26-044. 
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servant, it is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional’.45 Disgorgement (or account of profit) 
concerns forcing a defendant to turnover profits accrued resulting from breach.46 They ‘are not based 
upon loss to the claimant. They are based upon a benefit received by the defendant which was 
obtained at the expense of the claimant’.47 They are different to restitutionary damages on the basis 
that they do not replace something which the claimant had previously possessed. 
Attorney General v Blake48 concerned an action against a former member of the British Security 
Services. Standard contractual remedies were unsuitable, meaning that an order for account of profit 
was made.49 This will not be available simply for breach of contract.50 It was set out that it is useful 
to consider ‘whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in preventing the defendant's profit-making 
activity and, hence, in depriving him of his profit’.51 Rookes v Barnard52 outlines that this could 
include ‘oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government’,53 and 
also where ‘the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which 
may exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff’.54 The second category stemmed from the 
view that ‘one man should not be allowed to sell another man’s reputation for profit’.55 Note that the 
case concerned an employment contract and the tort of intimidation, an issue which will be discussed 
in more depth shortly.56 It was set out that this approach may be utilised ‘whenever it is necessary to 
teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay’.57 It is also notable that employment contracts are not 
considered to be ordinary commercial contracts.58 
There are calls for wider use of punitive damages within contract law.59 Rowan suggests that they 
should feature regulatory rules and ‘could be tailored to certain types of contract which potentially 
give rise to exploitation and specific concerns about industry practices’.60 This ‘would avoid the 
potentially far-reaching and, in some respects, negative consequences of introducing punitive 
damages in commercial law’.61 Because the focus here is efficient breach in commercial contracting, 
                                                          
45 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 13-001. 
46 See Beale (n 31) 26-046. 
47 McGregor (n 45) 15-001. 
48 [2001] 1 AC 268, [2000] 3 WLR 625. 
49 Beale (n 31) 26-045. 
50 ibid 26-044; See also Crawfordsburn Inn Limited v Neill Graham [2013] NIQB 79 [18] (Weatherup J). 
51 AG v Blake (n 48) 285 (Lord Nicholls). 
52 [1964] AC 1129. 
53 ibid, 1226 (Lord Devlin); See also Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (20th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2017) 13-017. 
54 ibid; See also Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 13-021. 
55 ibid, 1227 (Lord Devlin). 
56 See 6.2.2.3 The Tort of Intimidation. 
57 Rookes v Barnard (n 52) 1227 (Lord Devlin). 
58 See 2.6.2.1 Contracts of Employment. 
59 See for example Curtis Bridgeman, ‘Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive 
Damages?’ (2003) 56 Vanderbilt Law Review 237. 
60 Solène Rowan, ‘Reflections on the Introduction of Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract’ (2010) 30 
OJLS 495, 517. 
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the suggestion is that there is no role for punitive damages on the basis that the justification for breach 
is efficiency. The party who suffers the breach will be compensated in line with the expectation 
measure. Therefore, the breach does not exhibit the behaviour which could lead to punitive damages. 
 
6.2.1.6 Restitutionary Remedies 
 
Restitutionary remedies will generally not be available for breach of contract. There is an exception 
relating to cases concerning the sale of unique goods, often land.62 It is the case that a court:  
[W]ill have regard to all the circumstances, including the subject matter of the contract, the 
purpose of the contractual provision which has been breached, the circumstances in which 
the breach occurred, the consequences of the breach and the circumstances in which relief is 
being sought.63   
In Teacher v Calder,64 it was held that a breach of contract allowing a defendant to enter a more 
profitable contract with a third party would not lead to a departure from the usual approach to 
calculating damages.65 It is noted that: 
[E]xceptional cases such as Blake do not lend themselves easily to an economic analysis, 
when dealing with commercial cases such as Teacher … the theory of efficient breach would 
tend to suggest that upholding the rule found in Teacher would be to the benefit of both 
immediate and potential commercial contracting parties.66  
This is due to a preference for certainty and providing ‘commercial parties with the opportunity to 
engage with the realities of commerce’.67 As was set out in Tito v Waddel (No 2),68 the intention is 
‘not one of making the defendant disgorge what he has saved by committing the wrong, but one of 
compensating the plaintiff’.69 
Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd70 concerned an infringed restrictive covenant. A 
restitutionary award was made as no devaluation to the land in question had taken place. As such, 
there was no damage to compensate. The result was an award that reflected what the claimant would 
                                                          
62 Hanoch Dagan, ‘Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory’ 
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63 AG v Blake (n 48) 285 (Lord Nicholls). 
64 [1899] AC 451. 
65 ibid, 467-468 (Lord Davey). 
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have charged to relax the covenant.71 This approach was considered in Morris-Garner v One Step 
(Support) Ltd72 where the term “negotiating damages” was used. Note that this case was also 
discussed in chapter 5. Key is that this claim stemmed from a contractual right concerning land. 
Jackman noted a dichotomy ‘whereby restitutionary remedies are directed against institutional harm, 
whereas compensatory remedies operate to redress personal harm’.73 Also, that the English common 
law ‘does not take a censorious attitude to breach of contract, consistently with the view that a party 
to a contract, unlike a fiduciary, operates at arm's length and holds his powers for his own benefit’.74 
This allows a party to change their mind regarding performance because ‘in the absence of specific 
performance or an injunction … on payment of compensation for the other party's reliance or lost 
expectations, he may deploy his resources more profitably elsewhere’.75  
 
6.2.1.7 Specific Performance  
 
The obvious distinction regarding specific performance relates to contracts which concern the sale 
of land, and those which do not.76 Writing with the acquisition of businesses in mind, Eisenberg and 
Miller noted the need for an asset to be unique in order for specific performance to be awarded.77 
Where a suitable replacement is available, specific performance is unlikely. Lumley v Wagner78 
featured an injunction to prevent the defendant from singing at an alternate venue to that which she 
was contractually obliged to. The court would not enforce specific performance. Lord St Leonards 
LC set out that whilst it was impossible to force the defendant to perform, they would have ‘no cause 
of complaint if I compel her to abstain from the commission of an act which she has bound herself 
not to do, and thus possibly cause her to fulfil her engagement’.79 In Warner Brothers Pictures, 
Incorporated v Nelson,80 where services were ‘of a special, unique, extraordinary and intellectual 
character’,81 they had a value which could not be ‘reasonably or adequately compensated in 
damages’.82 Like Lumley v Wagner,83 an injunction was granted to prevent the defendant working 
                                                          
71 ibid, 815. 
72 [2018] UKSC 20; [2018] 2 WLR 1353 [48] (Lord Reed). 
73 IM Jackman, ‘Restitution for Wrongs’ (1989) 48 Cambridge Law Journal 302, 320. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
76 See for example Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P Miller, ‘Damages Versus Specific Performance: 
Lessons from Commercial Contracts’ (2015) 12 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 29, 69. 
77 ibid. 
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80 [1937] 1 KB 209. 
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for anyone other than the claimant for a period of time. Grimston v Cunningham84 concerned an 
agreement between an actor and a theatrical manager. Here, because ‘the injury suffered in 
consequence of the breach of the agreement would be out of all proportion to any pecuniary damages 
which could be proved or assessed by a jury’,85 an injunction was granted. These cases highlight that 
even where a contract is for the provision of a specific service, the court may be unwilling to enforce 
specific performance. There is an aversion to forcing a party to act against their will, even where they 
had agreed to act in a certain way. Specific performance may be available with respect to contracts 
for the sale of land.86 It may be available because an award of damages is inadequate as ‘each piece 
of land is unique in character, and a disappointed purchaser cannot take any damages and buy another 
identical property’.87  
 
6.2.1.8 Conclusion  
 
Whenever damage awards are quantified, there is potential difficulty. However, in commercial 
contracting, where losses can be quantified based on market value without the need to account for 
non-pecuniary losses, the process is simplified. Issues arising as a result of the court’s role with 
respect to calculating damages following an efficient breach are not problematic as this applies 
whenever compensation is quantified. As a result, it would be a bold claim to discount the entire 
damages calculation process based on potential difficulties which are inherent in quantification. 
Similarly, issues are not raised by the potential of an award of nominal damages on the basis that the 
practical impacts of an efficient breach would effectively be accepted. The same can be said for 
punitive damages because the efficient breach of a commercial contract would not exhibit the type 
of behaviour that would trigger such an award. This is on the basis that the breach will be justified 
by efficiency, and also because the party who suffers the breach will be compensated in line with the 
expectation measure. The same applies to restitutionary awards. Ultimately, the suggestion that an 
efficient breach is impossible because normal methods for quantifying damages will fail to provide 
full compensation, is flawed.  
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6.2.2 A Likeness with Various Torts 
 
The next area of interest is the extent to which an efficient breach could exhibit the characteristics of 
various torts. These include tortious interference in the form of inducing breach of contract, economic 
duress, and the tort of intimidation. The existence of a tort that may have a likeness to efficient breach 
could shed light on any potential issues with the theory’s application.  
 
6.2.2.1 Tortious Interference with Contract   
 
It is suggested that where a third party encourages breach, it amounts to tortious interference with 
contract in the form of inducement.88 The claim is that ‘tortious interference, not “efficient” breach, 
actually is efficient—or at least should be presumed so in the absence of empirical evidence to the 
contrary’.89 A clash exists between subscribers to a Holmes inspired ideology of contractual rights 
and liability,90 and those who see ‘contractual rights as a species of property which deserve special 
protection’.91 Additionally, the existence of the tort suggests that wrongdoing may have taken place. 
Inducing breach of contract is an economic tort.92 Its genesis is Lumley v Gye93 which concerned an 
action against the inducer in Lumley v Wagner.94 A party ‘who procures the damage maliciously 
might justly be made responsible beyond the liability of the contractor’.95 Further, that ‘a person who 
wrongfully and maliciously … with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master and 
servant by procuring the servant to depart from the master’s service …commits a wrongful act for 
                                                          
88 See generally Hazel Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (OUP 2010); See also Tony Weir, Economic 
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which he is responsible at law’.96 It is a product of competition law.97 Also, a defendant does not 
necessarily have to intend to cause harm, but must have intended to cause a party to act inconsistently 
with their existing obligations by breaching the contract.98 In Douglas v Hello99 it was set out that: 
The essence of the tort is that the conduct is done with the object or purpose (but not 
necessarily the predominant object or purpose) of injuring the claimant or, which seems to 
us to be the same thing, that the conduct is in some sense aimed or directed at the claimant.100 
In OBG v Allan,101 Lord Nicholls noted that a defendant will be liable ‘if he intended to persuade the 
contracting party to breach the contract’.102 Lord Hoffmann set out that ‘if the breach of contract is 
neither an end in itself nor a means to an end, but merely a foreseeable consequence, then … it cannot 
for this purpose be said to have been intended’.103 The tort is significant regarding trade unions calling 
on their members to strike in contravention of their employment contracts. As a result, there are 
limits on actions of this type against trade unions.104 
This tort could cast doubt over the Holmes inspired view because it suggests that a wrong is 
committed by the party who encourages breach. However, punitive damages (such as an account of 
profit) will not generally be available for infringements of purely contractual rights,105 or where the 
agreement concerns commodities which are available within the market.106 It is only available in rare 
circumstances.107 Also, it is notable that the tort simply shifts the requirement to pay damages to the 
third party. The result is the same as in an action for breach of contract, but the route to achieve it is 
altered. Partlett suggested that inducing breach is intended to “alleviate long-term relational problems 
due to changing circumstances or opportunistic behaviour and therefore of encouraging cooperation 
between parties with its attendant social benefits”.108 Carty notes that these contracts could concern 
‘employment, leases, professional and long-term business relationships’.109 There is also a suggestion 
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that sanctioning the inducer will provide ‘an incentive to go to the promisee and bargain with him 
rather than seducing or browbeating the promisor’.110  
Importantly, assuming that a third party must be involved in line with the classic over-bidder 
paradigm is incorrect. This requires that a party is induced to breach a contract in favour of a 
preferable offer from a third party. However, other scenarios may arise where breach is efficient. For 
example, there could be a situation where losses could be reduced, or where a shift in the market 
value of a resource means performance would not be cost-effective. Simester and Chan note that 
‘efficient breaches do not imply third parties at all, let alone third parties who initiate breaches’.111 
However, if we assume that such a situation may arise, an obvious issue is that any action will not 
be brought not against a contracting party, but against a third party. This is problematic as the 
suggestion is that contract law protects ‘expectations of performance by the other contracting party, 
not performance by the whole universe’.112 A remedy is available against the breaching party. It is 
unclear why an alternate course of action should be available. This could be perceived as insulting 
the autonomy of the contract breaker.113 Also, that ‘damages for persuasion to breach are measured 
by contractual damages; hence, the operation of any efficient breach doctrine would, as it should, 
feed indirectly to the tort by means of the contract’.114  
Inducing breach can lead to liability for damage caused.115 This may include a profit which a claimant 
would have received, or a profit which they were subsequently unable to acquire from other 
contracts.116 However, in Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd,117 it was ruled that 
infringements of contractual rights would not lead to disgorgement.118 This was based on previous 
case law.119 In University of Nottingham v Fishel,120 the view was that an account of profit for breach 
of contract should not be available.121 This was also said to apply to employment contracts.122 Also, 
note the suggestion that an award for an account of profit should not be available where a commodity 
is replaceable within the market.123 This is important as efficient breach of commercial contracts is 
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being considered. It is also suggested that ‘the commercial law of this country should not make moral 
judgments, or seek to punish contract-breakers’.124 
An obvious question here is why a party to contract would seek to recover a remedy from a third 
party? There are two likely reasons. The first is that the prospects for recovering damages from the 
breaching party are small. For example, they may be facing insolvency or other financial difficulties.  
Second, there is a chance that there exists a desire to “punish” the inducer. However, as is set out 
above, infringements of purely contractual rights will generally not lead to disgorgement. 
Additionally, it will not be available where replacements may be sourced. As such, all that will be 
recovered is the value that has been lost. Any profit above that level is not accessible. 
The key point is that any likeness between efficient breach and tortious interference assumes third 
party involvement in line with the over-bidder paradigm. This will not necessarily be the case. Also, 
it was set out in The Sine Nominee125 that ‘international commerce on a large scale is red in tooth and 
claw … there should not be an award of wrongful profits where both parties are dealing with a 
marketable commodity … for which a substitute can be found in the market place’.126 The claims 
which this thesis advances are specific to commercial contracts which will customarily take place 
within a market place where replacements are likely to be available.127 A s such, suggesting that 
efficient breach of commercial contracts will be impermissible because tortious interference 
illustrates that there may be something objectionable about inducing a breach is incorrect. It is also 
important to note the suggestion that an order for an account of profit is not available for 
infringements of purely contractual rights,128 or where the dealing concerns a commodity which is 
replaceable in the market.129 As such, profit made following a breach would not be accessible.  
 
6.2.2.2 Economic Duress  
 
Threatening to breach contract based on efficiency could be seen to exhibit the characteristics of 
economic duress.130 This could mean ‘that certain threats or forms of pressure, not associated with 
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threats to the person, nor limited to the seizure or withholding of goods, may give grounds for relief 
to a party who enters into a contract as a result of the threats or the pressure’.131 Pao On v Lau Yiu 
Long132 outlined that such a claim may function in principle but must be made out on the facts. DSND 
Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services ASA133 set out the necessary requirements, including pressure 
‘(a) whose practical effect is that there is compulsion on, or a lack of practical choice for, the victim, 
(b) which is illegitimate, and (c) which is a significant cause inducing the claimant to enter into the 
contract’.134 In deciding whether pressure was illegitimate, the court will consider evidence of an 
actual or threatened breach, whether this was in good faith, whether there was any practical option 
aside from submission to any pressure, whether there was a protest at the time, and where affirmation 
and subsequent reliance took place.135 It must be distinguishable ‘from the rough and tumble of the 
pressures of normal commercial bargaining’.136 This is important because acting in self-interest or 
utilising practices such as hard-bargaining will be distinguishable.  
It is suggested that ‘a party who has agreed to a contractual variation cannot always avoid the 
variation simply because the other party had threatened to break the contract if it was not varied and 
this threat had some influence on the party seeking relief. Something more must be shown’.137 It is 
argued that ‘for a contract to be voidable for economic duress, the threat must not only have been 
wrongful but illegitimate in the sense of being without any commercial or similar justification’.138 
Akman notes that ‘“Economic duress” refers to one party’s using his superior economic power in an 
illegitimate manner in order to compel the other party to agree to enter into a contract or to enter it 
on particular terms’.139 Further, that commonly it is ‘a threat by one party to break an existing contract 
unless the other party agrees to its variation’.140 This is unclear because as was noted previously, the 
potential for breach may encourage renegotiation.  
In this situation the defence of justification may be raised.141 Glamorgan Coal Co v South Wales 
Miners’ Federation142 set out a number of considerations to be taken into account. These include ‘the 
nature of the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; 
the means employed to procure the breach; the relation of the person procuring the breach to the 
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person who breaks the contract; … the object of the person in procuring the breach’.143 In the case of 
an efficient breach of a commercial contract, there will be a clear commercial justification. This is 
because it will be done to maximise profit, or minimise loss. It is suggested that on occasion it may 
be commercially reasonable ‘to claim extra remuneration or some other extra-contractual 
concession’144 in order to continue performance. In such cases the threat of breach can be considered 
to be an example of reasonable commercial pressure.145 
 
6.2.2.3 The Tort of Intimidation 
 
A threat to breach could be perceived to exhibit the characteristics of the tort of intimidation.146 This 
tort was initially intended to be triggered by threats of violence, though this limitation has 
disappeared.147 It requires that a victim is targeted.148 Also, ‘there is a chasm between doing what 
you have a legal right to do and doing what you have no legal right to do, and there seems … to be 
the same chasm between threatening to do what you have a legal right to do and threatening to do 
what you have no legal right to do’.149 In Morgan v Fry,150 Lord Denning outlined that any threat of 
violence, tort or breach of contract would meet the requirements for the tort of intimidation because 
the defendant’s conduct would be unlawful.151  
It is outlined that ‘threatening a breach of contract may be a much more coercive weapon than 
threatening a tort, particularly when the threat is directed against a company or corporation’.152 This 
is noteworthy as the focus here is commercial contracting. The suggestion is that a threat to breach 
‘should only be treated as unlawful means for the purposes of three-party intimidation, that is to say 
the position in Rookes v Barnard and in most labour dispute cases, and that for two-party intimidation 
the claimant should have to show a physical threat of some kind’.153 With this in mind, it has been 
noted that ‘because the tort of intimidation has been developed to include a threatened breach of 
contract … intimidation—like inducing breach of contract—should benefit from a justification 
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defence’.154 Much like claims regarding economic duress, here there will be a clear commercial 
justification meaning that a threat of breach would not be illegitimate. 
 
6.2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
First, where a likeness is drawn between efficient breach and tortious interference, there is a natural 
assumption that there will be third party involvement. This will not necessarily be the case. Next, the 
existence of tortious interference could be seen to demonstrate that there is something objectionable 
about inducing a breach. This is potentially problematic. It is notable, however, that an order for an 
account of profit is not available for infringements on purely contractual rights,155 or where 
commodities may be replaced within a market.156 This means that profit made via breach is not 
accessible. Also, that due to the existence of a commercial justification, the efficient breach of a 
commercial contract will not be synonymous with the torts of economic duress or intimidation. 
 
6.2.3 Potential infringement on Property Rights 
 
Having discussed the potential clashes which efficient breach may have with the English approach 
to contract damages, as well as its issues relating to tort, the next issue concerns its potential 
infringement on property rights. Friedmann suggested that efficient breach ‘is in principle, equally 
applicable to property rights, where it leads to the adoption of a theory of “efficient theft” or “efficient 
conversion”’.157 This could extend to tort generally. The suggestion is that the law will not allow 
parties to ‘keep ill-gotten gains, efficient or not’.158 This raises questions as it is at odds with the fact 
that property ‘is not to be taken and given to another without the owner’s consent’.159 The claim is 
that ‘proprietary rights must be purchased, and it is not clear why contractual rights should be 
different’.160 It is important to consider the resource here. Dagan notes that individuals may value a 
resource to a level where being deprived of it leads to ‘a sense of violation and of a diminishing of 
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the self’.161 It is also noted that attempts to draw an analogy between contractual and property rights 
is difficult because, despite being valuable, contracts are considered to be a characterless good.162 
Further, where ‘a resource is viewed as a merely fungible … asset with no direct bearing on the 
identity of its holder, the more likely the holder will be willing (or less reluctant) to share it with 
others … as long as his well-being is preserved (through compensation)’.163 The difference is clear 
regarding claims for specific performance of contracts concerning land.164 
 
6.2.3.1 Contractual Rights vs Property Rights  
 
There are distinctions between property rights and contractual rights in line with the differences 
between rights in rem and rights in personam.165 Hohfield defined a right in rem (or multital right) 
as one which resides ‘in a single person (or single group of persons) but availing respectively against 
persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people’.166 A right in personam (or paucital 
right) was said to reside ‘in a person (or group of persons) and availing against a single person (or 
single group of persons); or else it is one of the few fundamentally similar, yet separate, rights 
availing respectively against a few definite persons’.167 A right in rem will apply against tangible 
property including land or a chattel and will be enforceable against the world entirely.168 They are 
genuine ownership rights. In contrast, a right in personam will apply only against certain categories 
of person.169  It is suggested that ‘the notion that the concept of a legal “right” (in the sense of a right-
claim) has as its necessary correlative the existence of a legal “duty” in someone else, is for Hohfeld 
one key to understanding the different nature of in rem and in personam rights’.170 
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Under the common law, contractual rights and proprietary rights are perceived to be ‘diametrically 
opposed’.171 Contractual rights are an example of rights in personam.172 They are said to be transient 
and able to pass into rights in rem at their conclusion. Therefore, the claim is that rights in rem are 
genuine ownership rights.173 It is also worth noting that, unlike tangible property, contractual rights 
cannot be converted.174 Hansmann and Kraakman outline that ‘the attribute that distinguishes a 
property right from a contract right is that a property right is enforceable, not just against the original 
grantor of the right, but also against other persons to whom possession of the asset, or other rights in 
the asset, are subsequently transferred’.175 Penner sets out that ‘the right to property is a right to 
exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things’176 while 
contracts concern a ‘voluntary relationship by which people can, for consideration, act co-operatively 
and consensually exploit each other’s advantages of whatever kind’.177 Lee suggests that ‘for Penner, 
property and contract are intrinsically dissimilar because they protect different interests. The interest 
that underpins property is the interest we have in using or dealing with things’.178 Penner’s focus with 
regard to property rights is the thing itself. 
A lack of clarity between proprietary and contractual rights exists ‘due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing breach and infringement’.179 Also, that the law suggests that a contract should be seen 
as a mode of acquisition but that it is still a right of ownership on the basis that it enables an exclusive 
right of possession for the thing that is contracted for.180 Additionally, the rationale behind 
compensatory damages is said to be in line with the idea that something is acquired through the 
formation of the contract.181 Whilst it is clear that a contract provides something, this seems to fall 
short of the type of complete (and exclusionary) rights which would be vested in property ownership. 
The boundary is evident with regard to attempts to extend conversion to contractual rights. OBG v 
Allan182 offered an avenue to achieve this by setting out that Lumley v Gye183 ‘treats contractual rights 
as a species of property which deserve special protection, not only by giving a right of action against 
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the party who breaks his contract but by imposing secondary liability on a person who procures him 
to do so’.184 Treating contractual rights as property suggests that it may be possible to convert them. 
However, Lee suggests that ‘the expansion of conversion is not possible because a claimant does not 
have a right, exigible against the world, to the financial value of his contractual right’. 185 This will 
mean ‘that when a defendant deprives a claimant of the financial value of his contractual right, the 
defendant does not breach a legal duty’.186 
 
6.2.3.2 Efficient Crimes and Efficient Torts relating to Property 
 
The rationale behind efficient breach could be dismissed on the basis that it could be applied to 
actions such as theft or tort. This tangential issue is to be dealt with briefly on the basis that applying 
the reasoning behind efficient breach to commercial contracting does not encourage its use in other 
spheres. On efficient crime, it is sufficient to outline that the rules relating to contract law are 
inapplicable.187 The same can be said with respect to efficient tort. Both claims appear to rely on an 
overly utilitarian approach to efficiency, considering only increases in total utility, welfare, or wealth, 
but not its distribution.188 Within commercial contracting, efficient breach would utilise the wealth 
maximisation approach but considers distribution though the Kaldor-Hicks criterion featuring the 
caveat that compensation must be paid.189 Where compensation is paid in line with the expectation 
measure, it is legitimate to claim that efficiency has been achieved as only compensatable detriment 
has been caused. Also, interests stemming from commercial contracts can generally be adequately 
compensated by an award of damages. In criminal law and the law of tort, this would not necessarily 
be the case.  
 
6.2.3.3 Conclusion 
 
The intention of this section was to set out that suggesting that the theoretical approach utilised in 
efficient breach will be equally applicable to crimes or torts relating to property is wide of the mark.190 
                                                          
184 OBG Ltd v Allan (n 91) [32]. 
185 Simon Douglas, ‘The Scope of Conversion: Property and Contract’ (2011) 74 MLR 329, 349. 
186 ibid. 
187 See the Theft Act 1968, s 1. 
188 See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Roger Crisp ed, OUP 1998) 55; See also Anthony T Kronman, 
‘Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle’ (1980) 9 Legal Studies 227, 232; Ernest J Weinrib, 
‘Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory’ (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal 307, 309. 
189 See 5.4.2 The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion. 
190 See Friedmann (n 157) 4; See also Smith (n 158) 135. 
206 
 
This is because such claims rely on overly utilitarian approaches to efficiency, where wealth or 
welfare distribution is not considered.191 Efficient breach of commercial contracts legitimately 
utilises wealth maximisation as well as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, requiring that any detriment 
caused is compensated in line with the expectation measure. This is based on the profit generation 
intention behind commercial contracting. Finally, restitutionary remedies or specific performance 
will only be available for breaches of a contract which relates to cases concerning the sale of unique 
goods such as land.192  
 
6.2.4 Good Faith in Commercial Contracts  
 
Having dealt with issues relating to damage calculation, a potential likeness with tort, and also issue 
relating to infringement on property rights, the next issue for discussion is whether good faith 
requirements in commercial contracting provides a stumbling block to the application of efficient 
breach in that context. Good faith is said to be ‘most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical 
colloquialisms as “playing fair”, “coming clean” or “putting one's cards face upwards on the 
table”’.193 It concerns ‘fair and open dealing’,194 including ‘information sharing, co-operation and 
even loyalty between contracting parties, depending on the kind of parties involved and the nature 
of the agreement’.195 Breaching a contract with the intention of pursuing self-interest could conflict 
with such requirements. It is also noted that ‘the enforceability of a good faith obligation voluntarily 
assumed by the parties should depend on the agreement itself or on reasonable inferences drawn from 
the practices or usages of the parties, not from vague moral standards of decency or fair play’.196 
 
6.2.4.1 Where Will a Requirement of Good Faith Apply? 
 
Any requirement to negotiate in good faith is irrelevant because efficient breach is concerned with 
performance only. It was suggested in Walford v Miles197 that it would be ‘unworkable in practice as 
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it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party’.198 It is noted that Lord Ackner 
viewed ‘that an undertaking to negotiate intrudes on the freedom of parties to make negotiating 
concessions, to withdraw from negotiations, or to negotiate with third parties during the course of 
negotiations’.199  
Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited200 outlined that a duty to perform 
in good faith should apply to existing contractual relationships.201 This duty is intended to ‘ensure 
that parties do not act in a way that eviscerates or defeats the objectives of the agreement that they 
have entered into’.202 It will be contingent on the context of individual cases.203 Good faith 
requirements within private relationships will not extend where no contractual relationship exists 
between the parties.204 Monde Petroleum SA v Westernzagros Limited205 set out that ‘there is no 
general doctrine of “good faith” in English contract law’206 and that any such duty will be ‘implied 
by law as an incident of certain categories of contract (for example, contracts of employment and 
contracts between partners or others whose relationship is characterised as a fiduciary one)’.207 Also, 
that ‘that the mere fact that a contract is a long-term or relational one is not, of itself, sufficient to 
justify such an implication’.208  
 
6.2.4.2 The Impact on Efficient Breach  
 
It is the case that ‘in any situation it is dishonest to deceive another person by making a statement of 
fact intending that other person to rely on it while knowing the statement to be untrue’.209 Assuming 
that one party does not mislead the other, efficient breach will not be dishonest. Assessing whether 
conduct is improper is objective, depending ‘not on either party’s perception of whether particular 
conduct is improper but on whether in the particular context the conduct would be regarded as 
commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people’.210 Assuming that damages are in line 
with the expectation interest this would be commercially reasonable. It is important to note that 
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central to good faith is ‘the presumed intention of the parties and meaning of their contract, its 
recognition is not an illegitimate restriction on the freedom of the parties to pursue their own 
interests’.211 At the core of efficient breach is a party’s right to pursue their own interests. The 
interests of other parties are accounted for through the expectation measure of damages. As such, it 
is difficult to see how any good faith requirement would conflict with a breach of a commercial 
contract that is efficient. 
It is interesting to briefly consider how jurisdictions which focus more on good faith would react to 
an efficient breach. Note the suggestion that ‘breach, consideration of the theory of efficient breach 
in the context of the civil law reveals an atmosphere that is not preclusive of the idea of efficient 
breach but which is certainly less friendly than American common law’.212 A useful example is 
French law.213 The French civil code requires that contracts are ‘negotiated, formed and performed 
in good faith’.214 However, it is highlighted that the new French civil code does not define good faith. 
This is problematic because it ‘is perceived by some commercial parties as vague, allowing the court 
too much discretion, and as inimical to contractual certainty’.215 Based on case law inferences, good 
faith includes ethical conduct, loyalty, cooperation and coherence.216 The fact that in French law, 
specific performance is available in principle for breach of contract was discussed previously.217 It is 
important to keep in mind that recent reforms to the code were made in part due to the perception 
that French contract law was commercially unattractive.218 Specific performance is now unavailable 
where there is a disproportionate difference between the cost to the promisor and benefit to the 
promise, or where undue hardship would be caused to the promisor.219 This suggests that where a 
commercial justification can be provided for breach of contract, damages, rather than specific 
performance will be the remedy. Again, where the breach takes place based on a commercial 
justification, and not in bad faith, there is no reason to suggest that it would be illegitimate. 
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6.2.4.2 Conclusion  
 
The duty of good faith in commercial contracting does not inhibit the functionality of efficient breach. 
It focuses on factors such as fairness and honesty. Where there is no evidence of improper conduct, 
issues of good faith will be irrelevant. Efficient breach does not necessitate such conduct. In fact, it 
does the opposite as the expectation measure of damages takes account of the interests of the party 
who suffers the breach. As such, the good faith requirement does not impinge upon the application 
of efficient breach to commercial contracts. 
 
6.2.5 A Contrast with Trust Law 
 
The final point of interest regarding potential clashes with existing legal doctrines is a contrast that 
exists between contract, and trust law. This concerns execution and remedies.220 Trust law gives rise 
to obligations where performance may be enforced. Property law is another example of this.221 This 
is unlike contract law where any interests in performance are generally remedied through damages. 
The intention is to further highlight that a commercial contract is a category of obligation that is 
legitimately treated differently to instruments that emerge elsewhere. 
There is no case to be made for efficient breach of trust. This is based on the underlying principles 
regarding the execution of trusts. The most obvious difference is that a beneficiary has the right ‘to 
have the trust duly administered in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument, if any, and 
the general law’.222 This is a clear right to performance which is evidenced by the remedies which 
are available. In the case of a breach of duty by a trustee:  
[T]he basic purpose of any remedy will be either to put the beneficiary in the same position 
as if the breach had not occurred or to vest in the beneficiary any profit which the trustee 
may have made by reason of the breach (and which ought therefore properly to be held on 
behalf of the beneficiary).223 
Resultantly, the law and economics inspired approach which is adopted with respect to the efficient 
breach of contract cannot be applied to trust law.  
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Should it be required, the execution of a trust will fall under the jurisdiction of the court.224 This is 
unlike contract where the court simply enforces remedies. The court may answer questions regarding 
execution.225 They may also remove and appoint trustees.226 This highlights the importance of the 
performance interest of beneficiaries in trust law. Providing remedies through substitute performance 
is unlike the approach in contract. Of course, a claimant in a contract dispute could (and likely will) 
use that compensation to access substitute performance. However, in trust law that substitute 
performance will be facilitated by the court itself. Further, in more serious situations the court will 
ensure that a trust is performed. This is clear evidence that the execution of trusts is fundamentally 
different to the performance of a contract. 
These contrasts further illustrate the fact that commercial contracts sit apart, not only from other 
forms of contract, but from other legal doctrines. Accordingly, it would be flawed to suggest that 
approaches which would be illegitimate in other areas cannot be applied to commercial contracts. As 
such, applying economic reasoning in the form of efficient breach to commercial contracting should 
not be discounted. 
 
6.2.6 Conclusions Regarding Potential Clashes and Contrasts with Legal Doctrines 
 
The intention here was to outline that the application of efficient breach to English contract law is 
not impinged upon by these potential clashes with existing English legal doctrines. It has been 
outlined that potential clashes between the efficient breach of commercial contracts and existing legal 
doctrines do not negate the theory’s legitimacy. On damages, it was noted that quantification is 
potentially problematic in any area of the law, but that the process is simplified in the case of 
commercial contracts. Further, it would be bold to claim that the entire damage calculation process 
should be discounted based on inherent difficulties in quantification. In addition, no issues are raised 
by the potential of an award of nominal damages on the basis that the practical impact of a breach 
would effectively be accepted. The same can also be said for punitive damages as an efficient breach 
of a commercial contract would not trigger an award. Finally, the claim that an efficient breach will 
impossible because normal methods for quantifying damages will fail to provide full compensation 
is flawed. On a potential likeness with a number of torts, it was pointed out that the legitimacy of an 
efficient breach of a commercial contract would not be negated. In tortious interference there is a 
natural assumption that there will be third party involvement in line with the over-bidder paradigm. 
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This will not necessarily be the case. Also, as a result of a commercial justification, the efficient 
breach of a commercial contract will not be synonymous with the torts of either economic duress or 
intimidation. On clashes with property rights, the suggestion that the theoretical approach utilised in 
efficient breach will be applicable to crimes or torts relating to property is incorrect.227 This is because 
commercial contracting provides a setting where a wealth maximisation, in line with the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion (featuring the actual payment of compensation) may legitimately be applied. In cases 
concerning crime or tort this would be inappropriate. Furthermore, restitutionary remedies or specific 
performance will be available for breach of a contract concerning the sale of unique goods such as 
land.228 Efficient breach is also not inhibited by the existence of the duty of good faith because where 
there is no evidence of improper conduct, issues regarding infringements on good faith will not be a 
concern. An efficient breach does not necessitate that such conduct will be evident. Finally, there are 
clear contrasts between the function of contract, particularly commercial contracting, and trust law 
in terms of execution and remedies. This was discussed in order to highlight that the ideology which 
can give rise to the efficient breach of commercial contracts should not be considered to extend to 
other areas of contract law or to the law more generally. The next step is to move on to discuss other 
categories of criticism which may be directed at the application of efficient breach to commercial 
contracting. 
 
6.3 Clashes with the Application of an Instrumentalist Approach 
 
Instrumentalist theories aim to encourage actions based on a particular objective. In the case of 
efficient breach that objective is economic efficiency.229  However, these approaches have been 
criticised. For example, it has been suggested that ‘a purely instrumental view deprives law of any 
internal moral integrity: law becomes an empty vessel that can be used to do anything, no matter how 
reprehensible’.230 They contrast with approaches which focus on corrective justice.231 It is noteworthy 
that Weinrib set out that expectation damages are a form of compensation for breach of contract 
which is in line with corrective justice. This is on the basis that they represent the value of 
performance.232 Further, that if the law must be coherent a combination of corrective, and distributive 
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justice cannot be utilised.233 The claim is that because ‘private law relationships are characteristically 
bipolar, their coherence is a matter of corrective justice’.234 The issues which will now be considered 
include the suggested moral impermissibility of breach of contract, and the corrosion of other moral 
practices in both a wide and business centric sense. However, it will be concluded that none of these 
issues negate the legitimacy of the efficient breach of a commercial contract. 
 
6.3.1 The Moral Impermissibility of Breach of Contract  
 
The most common basis upon which the theory of efficient breach is refuted is that it is at odds with 
the moral requirements of promising.235 This will now be recapped briefly, before moving on to 
outline why such criticism is not applicable to commercial contracting. The reasons why efficient 
breach will not affect other moral practices will also be set out.  
Chapter 4 outlined that deontological concerns regarding efficient breach are irrelevant within 
commercial contracting by dealing directly with potential moral issues. In English law, promise is 
not, and moreover, should not be considered as the basis of contract as it developed with reciprocity 
in mind. It features tortious roots and is thus detached from promise.236 Whilst both contracts and 
promises concern voluntary obligations, the promises which are being considered here require an 
existing relationship of trust and confidence between promisor and promise. This contributes to any 
moral force impacting whether it will be kept.237 Contracts may invoke reliance without this pre-
existing relationship and intend to protect reliance.238 They provide a method to seek an enforceable 
remedy following breach. Because commercial contracts are geared towards profit generation, it is 
reasonable to assert that their nature is different to those which are non-commercial. This distinction 
is based on the mutual profit generating focus of the parties.239 The institution of commercial 
contracting is different from non-commercial contracting. Because of this, a different standard will 
apply to the parties involved.240 As such, efficient breach in the context of commercial contracting 
cannot be discounted based on issues of morality arising from promise breaking. 
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Shiffrin argues that people enter contracts seeking ‘the specific good or service, not a voucher that 
will allow one to contract to obtain the good or service at a later date (even at a discount)’.241 This 
view makes some assumptions. First, that contract exists to secure performance. However, chapter 4 
set out that it is intended to protect against non-performance by providing a mechanism to claim 
compensatory damages following breach. Second, that contracting parties do not accept that 
compensatory damages should be the default remedy for breach of contract. This appears to cast 
aside years of contract law history and convention based on the mistaken perception that the English 
law of contract grew from promise. Shiffrin’s claim is that performance rather than the payment of 
damages should be the default remedy.242 Also, that ‘self-interest and that roughly consequentialist 
approach to fidelity are incompatible with the morality of promising’.243  
Consequentialist approaches are criticised on the basis that they ‘are incapable of capturing that 
moral content’.244 Further, that because ‘efficient breach is a direct application of consequentialist 
reasoning, efficient breach … contravenes the moral requirements of the contract promise’.245 Rigoni 
suggests that Shavell’s position regarding efficient breach can be characterised as follows: 
One is only morally obligated to perform a promise in circumstances such that a homo 
economicus promisor and a homo economicus promisee would agree to performance in that 
circumstance. Therefore, efficient breach is always morally permitted.246 
Whilst this sounds pejorative, it is technically correct. The homo-economicus (or rational person) 
paradigm involves comparing costs with benefits and choosing an option which best suits the 
economic preferences of the decision maker.247 This paradigm has been analysed from a variety of 
perspectives.248 However, the claim of this thesis is that by mutually entering into a contractual 
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relationship intending to generate profit and by proxy, maximising wealth, and means that the homo-
economicus model may legitimately be applied. All parties must have a profit generation objective.249 
This is unlike a consumer contract, for example, where one party will seek a profit from the 
transaction, but this will not necessarily be the case for the other.  
 
6.3.2 The Corrosion of Moral Practices 
 
Having dealt with the suggested moral impermissibility of breach of contract, the next area of interest 
is the suggestion that accepting efficient breach could have a detrimental effect on moral practices. 
This includes a general distaste for promise breaking and what has been described as “opportunistic” 
breach. Also, claims that moral practice in a wider sense could be corroded, as well as a suggestion 
that it could have a negative impact on business ethics and business culture. This considers the 
potential impact which routine promise breaking may have on conduct. The suggestion is that 
perceived negative conduct displayed by efficient breach will influence decisions because individuals 
will not necessarily be capable of compartmentalising behaviour to specific settings.250 Also, that 
‘the law plays (or is meant to play) a leadership role in shaping social practice’.251 On this point, 
Herman notes that ‘“politics of the right sort” can frame obligations that individuals are able to 
satisfy, and even carry some of the burden of moral responsibility’252 and that this can make 
individuals ‘better moral agents’.253  
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6.3.2.1 A Distaste for Promise Breaking and “Opportunistic” Breach 
 
There is some empirical evidence of distaste for promise breaking.254 Within this study, subjects 
considered that those who caused harm through breach of contract were ‘more immoral and should 
feel more guilt than a person who caused harm via negligence’.255 There was a prevailing view that 
a promisor should at all times perform the contract as expected, ahead of breaching and paying 
damages, even where it would be profitable to do so.256 Further, in cases of intentional breach there 
was a call for punitive damages.257 Lewinsohn-Zamir suggests that generally there is “a clear 
preference for in-kind remedies and entitlements”.258 It is asserted that, generally speaking, people 
will prefer to receive what was promised, rather than its value, no matter how accurate the valuation 
may be.259 The claim is also made that in-kind remedies are preferred by both laypersons and business 
people.260 
There was a perception that a decision to breach should be viewed differently should it take place in 
“fortunate” rather than “unfortunate” circumstances.261 Usual economic analysis treats the two as the 
same and will not ‘distinguish between a case where performance becomes overly difficult for the 
promisor and one in which breach is due to the availability of a more lucrative contract’.262 With this 
in mind, any loss suffered in either case is considered identical.263 Perillo sets out that the classic 
efficient breach is intentional, rather than unfortunate, and that a lack of deterrence for intentional 
breaches should not be read as encouraging them.264 These intentional breaches have been described 
as “opportunistic”. However, it has also been suggested that whilst most breaches are intentional, 
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they are not necessarily predatory or opportunistic.265 Further, Posner suggests that, in fact, most 
breaches are not opportunistic, that many are involuntary based on cost, and that some are voluntary 
and efficient.266 However, this seems problematic because in any potential efficient breach scenario, 
the opportunity for a party to improve their position would be presented. 
There is evidence of negative feeling towards “opportunistic” breaches. This appears to stem from 
the feeling that this type of behaviour will reveal negative character traits which should be 
discouraged.267 For example, even Posner has suggested that breach in order to take advantage of 
another party’s vulnerability would be inappropriate.268 The implication is that opportunism has 
negative connotations.269 It seems then that such a breach would necessarily feature some form of 
unjust or unfair behaviour, which could be seen to mistreat another party, or take advantage of their 
vulnerability. 270 Posner provides an example which concerns the misuse of money provided in 
advance of the delivery of specified goods. The money is subsequently used to build a swimming 
pool for personal use. Here the wrong is clear. With this in mind, it is unclear why a contract law 
remedy should be sought. Granted, it would appear that a breach of contract has taken place, however, 
it seems that other areas of the law would suffice in terms of providing a remedy, based on the facts 
available.  For example, it seems that an action for fraud or theft could be utilised effectively. Further, 
the punitive remedy that Posner suggests (account of profit) would simply not suffice. This is because 
there is no profit to be claimed.  
As was noted above, the evident issue is that all potential efficient breaches necessitate a level of 
opportunism on the part of the breaching party. However, in case of a commercial contract the 
decision to breach is not unfair or unjust by default. This is because while the opportunity exists for 
the breaching party to improve their position, this does not mean that they will be unfairly taking 
advantage of the other party. As has been set out, the use of the expectation measure of damages 
negates this issue as the party who suffers the breach will be effectively compensated using the 
expectation measure. This is on the basis that the overriding intention behind commercial contracting 
is to generate profit and thus, monetary damages will suffice. Because of this, it would be 
inappropriate to judge them based on a same moral standard that could potentially be attributed to 
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promises. In addition, we have seen that it not for the courts to enforce such a standard. Rather, their 
focus is to provide adequate remedies based on the consequences of a breach of contract.  
 
6.3.2.2 Cultivating Habits 
 
The cultivation of behavioural habits has been a subject of interest for philosophers such as Aristotle 
and Kant.271 Cureton sets out that Kant’s view is that people must ‘work to cultivate a good character, 
in part by repeatedly practicing virtuous acts over time; but no matter what we do we can never reach 
moral perfection’.272 Influences on individual behaviour can be considered from a number of 
perspectives. For example, it has previously been set out that behavioural economics scholars accept 
there are idiosyncrasies within the decision making of individuals. This will mean that they will not 
necessarily act in line with the homo-economicus paradigms.273 They may be influenced by factors 
such as bounded rationality, biases, heuristics, willpower and limits on their self-interest.274 
Decisions could be made based on influences such as social preferences,275 or happiness and utility.276 
The claim is that individuals will draw on previous decisions which become part of their reactions 
when faced with moral decisions.277 Cooter’s view is that the law influences the values to which 
people subscribe by impacting on an existing equilibrium. The suggestion is that ‘changing the 
equilibrium can create or destroy a social norm without changing individual values. Creating focal 
points is the first expressive use of law’.278 Also, that the law has the ability to alter the values of 
rational people because the ‘law induces rational people to change their preferences’.279 Further, it is 
suggested that if the need for state coercion is reduced a more liberal approach to government is 
made possible.280 Finally, nudge theory can be considered here.281 Sunstein sets out that a nudge will 
alter a person’s behaviour in a predictable way. However, this will not be achieved ‘without 
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forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives’.282 Importantly it is 
outlined that in order for an intervention to be considered a nudge it ‘must be easy and cheap to avoid. 
Nudges are not mandates’.283 
Shiffrin suggests that morally virtuous behaviour will be guided by the cultivation of good habits and 
that ‘morally good agents do not and cannot consciously redeliberate about all the relevant 
considerations bearing on a decision on every occasion’.284 Because of the perceived similarity 
between contract and promise, and the fact that contracts are entered into as a part of day to day life, 
the claim is that individuals could be tempted to shift ‘back and forth from one set of norms to the 
other’.285 There are two issues to consider here. The first is whether or not breach of contract is a 
negative act. Chapter 4 highlighted that within commercial contracting, breaching in pursuit of 
efficiency gains may be perceived as positive in a consequentialist sense. Commercial contracting is 
geared towards profit generation. As such, it seems reasonable to assert that the parties should be 
held to a different standard.286 Also, viewing breach as wrong based on a perceived synonymy with 
promise breaking is based on an intangible standard of ethics or virtues. While these may seem 
intuitive, they, and the reasoning behind them should be evidenced rather than being based on 
assertions of validity. The conclusion was that efficient breach in the context of commercial 
contracting cannot be discounted based on perceived issues of immorality arising from promise 
breaking. Simply because breach of contract is perceived to be wrong by some, it is not necessarily 
the case in an all-encompassing sense. The second issue is whether contract law should concern itself 
with potential impact within other settings. A consequentialist approach is not appropriate in many 
contexts. This is why claims regarding efficient crime or efficient torts are indefensible. However, 
the reasons why a breach of a specifically commercial contract (which is adequately compensated) 
could lead to other actions which are perceived to be negative, is unclear. It is not the role of contract 
law to regulate this type of activity.  
The point could also be made that a person entering into contracts in a professional capacity may be 
more able to compartmentalise their approach. This could apply to those who act on behalf of 
companies, or individual business people such as sole traders. This approach has faced criticism in 
the form of what Solomon describes as an Aristotelean approach to business ethics. It is outlined 
that:  
[W]hile business life has its specific goals and distinctive practices and people in business 
have their particular concerns, loyalties, roles and responsibilities, there is no ‘business 
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world’ apart from the people who work in business and the integrity of those people 
determines the integrity of the organization as well as vice versa.287  
That being said, there is no conclusive proof that people will or will not be capable of 
compartmentalising their behaviours. With that in mind, it would be inappropriate to disallow an 
efficient breach of a commercial contract on the basis that it may influence behaviour in other sectors. 
 
6.3.2.3 Potential Impact on Business Ethics 
 
Business ethics are said to support contract law ‘by providing additional reasons for performance’288 
and that ultimately business activity is built ‘upon trust in its relationships with suppliers, consumers 
and employees’.289 It is suggested that it ‘is primarily concerned with those issues not covered by the 
law, or where there is no definite consensus on whether somethings is right or wrong’.290 However, 
it has faced criticism based on its limitations.291 For example, there is a suggestion that its aims are 
rarely ambitious.292 Contractual relationships exist between employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers and advisors, but the suggestion is that contract law in isolation will not ensure that 
performance takes place. Factors such as honesty and trust are said to encourage it.293 There is also 
a claim that if management had no faith in the honesty of other parties, contracts would not be formed 
due to commercial risk.294  
There is a view is that because commercial law focuses on intangible legal rights it is difficult to 
reach a consensus on how they should be acquired or exercised. This is due to the different 
circumstances in which they operate.295 Robin notes that ‘asking businesses to go beyond their good 
citizen role in a competitive environment, where there are no natural capitalistic motivations, is 
unrealistic’.296 However, the influence which businesses may on society should not be completely 
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discounted.297 The suggestion is that government should direct business conduct in the way it desires 
through legislation.298 This may concern the environment, future generations, stakeholders and 
unethical business practices for example.299 However, while these issues are legitimate concerns, it 
is clear that they are not, and should not be governed by contract law.  
That business ethics based concerns, such as industry reputation will play into whether a party 
chooses to breach a contract in pursuit of efficiency gains, is not disputed. As will be discussed in 
greater depth later, claims about the legitimacy of an efficient breach does not direct that it should 
take place, only that it could. A breaching party will likely make a decision with this in mind. They 
may perform, attempt to renegotiate, or breach a contract based on multiple factors which may 
influence their preferences. For example, if an individual contracting relationship or a reputation 
within an industry is deemed to be of great importance, the decision to forgo the opportunity to breach 
efficiently may be made. 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion  
 
The intention here was to set out that it is legitimate to adopt an instrumentalist approach (namely 
wealth maximisation) with regard to the application of the theory of efficient breach to commercial 
contracts. This is because their overriding intention is profit generation, and at least on some level, 
wealth maximisation.300 This is also supported by the discussion of appropriate domains in which a 
utilitarian approach may be adopted which was carried out earlier.301 On the moral impermissibility 
of breach of contract, the claim made in chapter 4 that efficient breach in the context of commercial 
contracting cannot be discounted due to issues of morality which arise from promise breaking, was 
reiterated. This is because parties enter into commercial contracts mutually, with the intention to 
generate profit. They will seek to maximise wealth, and thus, the homo-economicus model may 
legitimately be applied. With respect to evidence of a general distaste for promise breaking, or 
“opportunistic” breach, it was outlined that the efficient breach of a commercial contract will not 
feature the type of unjust, or unfair behaviour that would feature in an “opportunistic” breach. On 
the law’s need to cultivate good habits, it was set out that there is no proof that individuals will be 
unable to compartmentalise their behaviours. As a result, it would be inappropriate to discount the 
efficient breach of a commercial contract purely because it may influence behaviour in other sectors. 
Finally, on business ethics it was set out that whilst relevant, it is not the role of contract law to 
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govern conduct based on business ethics. It is notable that concerns based in that realm such as 
industry reputation or accepted conduct, will be likely to influence whether a party chooses to breach 
a contract in pursuit of efficiency gains. Claims about the legitimacy of choosing to breach efficiently 
do not direct that this should take place, but only claim that it could.  
 
6.4 Clashes Based on Commercial Practices 
 
The next area of interest are the ways the theory of efficient breach may potentially clash with current 
practices within the commercial sector. The reality of commercial dealing will be considered first. 
This will be followed by a discussion of the issues raised by relational contracting before concluding 
that the legitimacy of an efficient breach of a commercial contract cannot be discounted based on 
these perceived clashes. 
 
6.4.1 Commercial Reality 
 
It is arguable that commerce is reliant on trust and the performance of promises, and that if parties 
failed to perform, the commercial system could be negatively impacted. It is suggested that within 
commercial relationships ‘norms of trust and co-operation are enforced by the mutual self-interest of 
the parties in maintaining a good relationship, backed up by reputational damage to businesses that 
act in opportunistic ways’.302 Morgan’s position is that a minimalistic contract law would best suit 
parties’ needs. This means that a limited number of rules would be imposed allowing the parties to 
dictate the nature of their agreement. It is suggested that ‘parties that wish for rules enforcing co-
operation, or deterring opportunism, may easily stipulate for this. A limited contract law maximizes 
freedom of contract’.303 Contract law would be facilitative rather than prescriptive. It seems intuitive 
that the norms which Morgan highlights, including trust and cooperation, as well as reputational 
damage would have a non-legal impact on contracting parties. However, the key role of contract law 
seems to be to function after the fact.  
The growth of the commercial system (namely trade) required formal methods to guard against non-
performance.304 A contract provides this, allowing remedies to be pursued post breach. The decision 
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to breach has already been reached. It may have taken into account factors such as reputational 
damages based on the preferences of the breaching party. Breach will not necessarily be the primary 
option, nor should it be perceived to occur regularly. However, where a party deems it efficient, 
believing that it better suits their preferences, it will be justifiable. 
Shiffrin suggests that ‘breach against a business may not sting as harshly as when it is suffered by a 
person’.305 Also, that:  
[T]he more permissive intuition with respect to breach between organizations may not be a 
response to the general rule or practice but rather may encapsulate more particularized ethical 
assessments of singular cases of business-to-business breach within closely competitive 
contexts’.306  
However, it is noted that ‘contract norms that authorize or encourage intentional breach of promise 
for gain among organizational actors should still give us some pause’.307 The suggestion is that 
accepting efficient breach could negatively impact the commercial system because parties will feel 
less able to trust, as well as enter into transactions with others. However, it is contract law that 
provides protection in the event of a breach, allowing parties to operate on the understanding that 
they may pursue a remedy. It is also noted that commercial law, specifically that which relates to 
corporate forms, cannot draw on moral considerations which impact on other areas of the law.308 This 
is because there is no moral consensus regarding the acquisition of intangible legal rights. Further, 
that moral considerations regarding commerce are more complicated than those which concern 
personal conduct.309 
 
6.4.2 Efficient Breach and Relational Contracting  
 
The next issue to consider is relational contracting.310 Relational contracts are longer term in nature, 
where the ‘paper deal’ does not reflect the agreement entirely.311 They rely on the extended 
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functionality of the relationship and thus, may require a level of trust. It is suggested that a number, 
if not all contracts, will be relational in some way when the social context in which they exist is 
properly understood.312 Macneil noted that a relational approach will take account of the relationship 
and its development. This may include contributions from the original agreement, though the extent 
to which they would be relevant will vary.313 Further, that due to increased complexity and an 
extended duration, relational contracts could become problematic should they be too rigid in their 
terms. The potential for flexibility would be essential.314 
 
6.4.2.1 The Features of a Relational Contract  
 
The suggestion is that a relational law of contract would feature two key elements. First, that the 
written part of the contract (or “paper deal”) does not reflect the agreement entirely.315 Second, 
factors such as ‘commercial practices, expectations and implicit dimensions’316 will outline the 
weight which should be attached to the document. Also, such factors should have the potential to 
give rise to legally enforceable obligations.317 Contractual interpretation with commercial concerns 
in mind is well established.318 Andrews highlights that we have seen reference to ‘commercial good 
sense’,319 a ‘reasonable commercial person’,320 ‘business common sense’,321 and ‘commercial 
common sense’.322 Commercial background and the factual matrix have also been acknowledged.323 
As Mitchell sets out, a truly relational approach requires that ‘the object of the interpretation exercise 
should not be the contractual documents, but the entire business relationship’.324  
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There is a claim that placing sole focus on the written document forces the courts to ‘close their eyes 
to real expectations resting in the implicit dimensions of contract and significant reliance on them’.325 
Issues are said to exist around the interpretation of words which do not have a fixed meaning, as well 
as an inability to predict future contingencies leading to gaps in written contracts.326 Campbell noted 
that the key point of relational contract theory is that all contracts are relational, rather than there 
being separate classes of discrete and relational contracts.327 This is on the basis that all contractual 
relationships may feature some relational elements, though this will vary from case to case, and be 
dependent on context. 
 
6.4.2.2 Inherent Problems in Relational Contracting  
 
Campbell and Harris highlight that contract law faces issues regarding longer term agreements as 
parties may not be intending to maximise their utility purely through contractual performance. The 
suggestion is that utility may be maximised through fostering long-term cooperation, based on trust 
rather than contractual obligation.328 Further, contract law does not provide adequate mechanisms to 
deal with longer term contracts.329 Also, there is a claim that long-term cooperation does not square 
with the concept of individual utility maximisation.330 This is potentially problematic for the theory 
of efficient breach because maximising individual utility (in this case wealth) is its foundation. When 
value is placed on long term collaboration, it seems that acting in pursuit of individual self-interest 
could be incompatible. There is a suggestion that the relational model has been devalued due to the 
‘ease and simplicity of the classic economic model’,331 but that some traditional economic 
assumptions have been relaxed. These include views on human behaviour and bounded rationality, 
which now better align with the relational model.332 It has been set out that despite difficulty, values 
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beyond solely wealth maximisation may be utilised.333 Commitment to wealth maximisation may 
lead to the assumption that the opportunity to breach efficiently requires that it takes place. However, 
chapter 7 will outline that such an opportunity will not mean that an efficient breach must take place, 
only that it could. Other options such as performing as specified or renegotiation could be utilised 
but this will be based on the potential breaching party’s individual preferences.  
 
6.4.2.3 The Reality of Relational Contracting  
 
Macaulay claimed that contractual disputes are likely to be settled without needing to refer to the 
contractual document or to litigate.334 Beale and Dugdale noted that contractual remedies will be 
avoided because they are inflexible and held a view that lawyers do not necessarily understand the 
needs of commerce.335 Also, that even where a written document contains terms outlining the process 
which should be adopted, the preference is to avoid referring to it to find a resolution.336 It was later 
noted that where contractual obligations take place over an extended period, cooperation will be 
required because contingencies may arise and circumstances may change. This could mean that the 
language contained within the document could be an inadequate guide. Rather than engaging in 
renegotiation, the suggestion is that adjustments will be made when required.337 This supports the 
suggestion that ‘dispute resolution outside the courts is invariably contextual and relational’.338 It is 
also claimed that where relational issues are not evident, larger corporate parties will not breach 
efficiently. Rather, they will breach the contract and avoid paying compensation which accurately 
reflects the expectation interest, for example by offering ‘an insulting token settlement, and practice 
scorched earth litigation tactics’.339 Whilst this is unfortunate, it does not devalue efficient breach 
from a theoretical standpoint. To breach and delay the payment of damages to the point where the 
other party is adversely affected will detract from the efficiency of the breach. This is because 
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expectation damages are essential. Thus, should such an approach be adopted, it would not be an 
efficient breach.  
 
6.4.2.4 Conclusion  
 
The intention here was to set out that the suggestion that efficient breach would negatively impact 
the commercial system is incorrect. The idea that parties would feel less able to trust others and enter 
into transactions with them is flawed because it is contract law which provides protection by allowing 
parties to operate knowing that they will be able to pursue a remedy in the event of a breach. Also, 
the complex nature of commercial agreements limits the potential for moral considerations to be 
drawn on.340 It is important to note that any decision to breach will be made based on the preferences 
of the breaching party. This may be influenced by factors such as reputational damage. On this point, 
relational contracts do not pose an insurmountable problem for the theory of efficient breach. The 
misconception is that the wealth maximisation approach will require that an efficient breach takes 
place when available. This is not the case because the opportunity does not dictate that an efficient 
breach will take place, only that it could.341  
 
6.4.3 Attitudes to Breach versus Performance 
 
The next issue for discussion is the suggestion that performance is preferred by both lay people, and 
business people. Empirical studies purport to support this claim.342 The 2009 study by Wilkinson-
Ryan and Baron utilised questionnaires which were not completed by business people specifically.343 
This casts doubt over the validity of the claims in terms of their application to the commercial context. 
The study carried out by Lewinsohn-Zamir is arguably more representative on the basis that its 
participants included business people. However, this was again questionnaire based and asked 
participants to choose between in-kind and monetary remedies in a variety of fictitious trading 
scenarios. 344 The issue with this methodology is that it was limited to placing the participant in the 
“buyer” position and purported to show which remedy they would prefer to receive. It is noted that 
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where money provides a perfect substitute for redress, parties ‘should arguably opt for the in-kind 
option because it affords her a strategic advantage in future negotiations’.345 This is on the basis that 
‘the injured party could exact additional payment by selling her right to in-kind redress’.346 The first 
flaw with this claim is that the buyer would be settling for monetary compensation, just that it would 
be inflated and potentially above the value of the commodity in question. Additionally, the approach 
does not place the participant in the position of the seller who may have the opportunity to benefit 
through paying monetary damages, as would be the case in an efficient breach scenario.347 This 
reduces the legitimacy of the study’s results though admittedly this is a natural limitation based on 
the approach which was adopted. 
 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The key point here is that the suggestion that efficient breach would negatively impact the 
commercial system has been discounted on the basis that it is contract law, rather than a relationship 
of trust which facilitates reliance. It allows parties to operate in the knowledge that they will be able 
to pursue a remedy in the event of breach. It was set out that the nature of commercial agreements 
will impose limits on the potential that moral considerations can be drawn upon.348 In addition, the 
existence of relational contracts does not limit the functionality of the theory of efficient breach 
because the view that wealth maximisation requires that an efficient breach must take place when 
available, is flawed. The opportunity does not dictate that an efficient breach will take place, only 
that it could.349 This means that relational factors such as existing relationships or industry reputation 
could be considered. Finally, issues were raised regarding the suggestion that both lay people and 
business people will prefer contractual performance. This is on the basis that the studies were 
questionnaire based, offering participants choices based on a limited number of scenarios. 
Importantly, they did not offer the participant in the position of the seller who may have the 
opportunity to benefit through paying damages as would be the case in an efficient breach.350 This 
reduces the legitimacy of the study’s results. 
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6.5 Issues relating to Practical Application 
 
The final category of criticisms which will be considered concern whether efficient breach is possible 
in a practical sense. A flaw in the current analysis of the theory of efficient breach will be highlighted 
before moving on to discuss issues relating to bounded rationality, transaction costs and pre-breach 
predictions. It will be set out that there is clearly potential that an efficient breach can, and has taken 
place within English Law.  
 
6.5.1 A Flaw in the Current Analysis of Efficient Breach  
 
Much of the literature on efficient breach focuses on providing examples of efficient or inefficient 
breaches.351 These could be perceived to be attempts to either validate, or invalidate the theory.352 
Eisenberg claimed that ‘the theory can only be understood and evaluated in the context of paradigm 
cases to which it might meaningfully be applied’.353 However, using hypothetical examples tells us 
nothing about the potential efficiency of an individual breach, though they are useful for illustrative 
purposes. The over-bidder paradigm concerns ‘a seller who has contracted to sell a commodity to a 
buyer breaches the contract in order to resell the commodity’.354 The loss paradigm concerns ‘a seller 
who has contracted to render a performance to a buyer breaches the contract because she determines 
that her cost of producing the performance would exceed the value that the buyer places on the 
performance’.355 Finally, the mitigation paradigm requires that ‘a buyer who has contracted to 
purchase a commodity that takes time to produce countermands performance by the seller because 
he determines that the value of the performance to him, if completed, will be less than the contract 
price’.356  
Macneil sets out that ‘no conclusion can be deduced that breach is any more (or less) efficient than 
other ways of securing the efficient result of non-performance’.357 It would be impossible to set out 
                                                          
351 See for example Posner (n 266) 131; See also Gregory Klass ‘Efficient Breach’ in Gregory Klass, George 
Letsas and Prince Saprai (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP2014) 364; Eisenberg (n 5). 
352 See for example Peter Linzer, ‘On the Amorality of Contract Remedies - Efficiency, Equity, and the 
Second “Restatement”’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 111, 114-115; See also Ian R Macneil, ‘Efficient 
Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky’ (1982) 68 Virginia Law Review 947, 948 where Linzer’s illustration 
is used; Melvin A Eisenberg, ‘Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and 
the Indifference Principle in Contract Law’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 975, 990-999; Posner (n 266) 
129-131. 
353 Eisenberg (n 5) 997. 
354 ibid, 998. 
355 ibid, 1014. 
356 ibid, 1016. 
357 Ian R Macneil, ‘Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky’ (1982) 68 Virginia Law Review 947, 
950-951; See also Linzer (n 354) 114-115; TT Arvind, Contract Law (OUP 2017) 513-514. 
229 
 
all of the potential scenarios which could lead to an efficient breach. They may fit a description 
provided by one of the paradigm examples noted above, but equally they may not. Chapter 5 
suggested that a simple approach should be adopted to define an efficient breach.358 This would 
involve a contract that is breached after comparing the cost of performance with the cost breach and 
the payment of compensatory damages because it is more cost effective to do so. This can either 
reduce losses or maximise gains.  
 
6.5.2 Bounded Rationality, Transaction Costs and Pre-Breach Predictions 
 
Bounded rationality was briefly discussed earlier.359 It is suggested that if a party’s bounded 
rationality regarding potential transaction costs prevents them ‘from choosing a sophisticated 
contract in light of future events, then they should also prevent parties from anticipating the effect of 
legal rules (which would be applied only in the contingent future) on the simple contract that they 
design’.360 Transaction costs are said to limit the potential for an efficient breach. They may include 
the costs of planning, litigation and acquiring information.361 They could also extend to more 
relational costs such as damage to reputation or loss of future opportunities.362 Criticism of the theory 
of efficient breach based solely on transaction costs is overly simplistic as well as underdeveloped. 
Inefficiency, in this case reduced profits or increased losses, may be influenced by more than simply 
transaction costs. However, one must always be aware of the existence of such costs. They could 
include ‘initial planning in the first contract … costs of planning … after the new opportunity comes 
along, costs of potential or actual litigation … information costs, costs of inertia, costs of uncertainty, 
relational costs, such as damage to reputation and loss of future opportunities to deal’.363 It is 
suggested that any questions about whether a rule requiring specific performance or a payment of 
damages is more efficient will be dependent on transaction costs. Also, that transaction costs may 
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only be deduced based on empirical evidence.364 Therefore, to claim that unknown transaction costs 
impact on efficiency one way or another is clearly incorrect. 
Campbell notes that where ‘each party was fully informed about all the circumstances and could 
accurately predict the future and negotiation was costless, the parties would draw up a completely 
contingent contract’.365 This would include setting out all potential rights and obligations as well as 
outlining the required course of action in any scenario concerning non-performance.366 Parties would 
be better positioned to make decisions regarding their best interests. In reality, this is impossible 
because accessing and incorporating all relevant information into an agreement incurs costs. The 
suggestion is that ‘contracts cannot be the completely contingent products of perfect rationality but 
are the incomplete products of bounded rationality’.367 It is also possible that by drafting agreements 
that are not fully contingent, parties are acquiescing to the default rules of contract. However, it is 
possible to make predictions which influence a decision to breach. Risks relating to cost may be 
calculated. A party considering breach may be advised by lawyers or accountants for example. 
Additionally, pre-existing knowledge of industries or individual contracting relationships could aid 
predictions. Case law evidence supports this assertion because the fact that parties made the decision 
to breach and pay damages outlines that they considered the information they possessed was adequate 
in reaching their decision.368 There is the risk that a decision to breach based on efficiency 
motivations could prove to be inefficient. Whilst this would be unfortunate, it is notable that the 
breaching party would bear that cost.369 Damages in line with the expectation measure would still be 
paid to the party who suffers the breach and, thus, their interests would be protected. 
 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
 
The intention here was to deal with potential issues which could arise out of the practical application 
of the theory of efficient breach to commercial contracts. It was set out that hypothetical scenarios 
customarily used within efficient breach literature should not be considered to prove or disprove the 
functionality of the theory. They are, however, useful in an explanatory sense. The efficiency of a 
damage award will be dictated by transaction costs. Such costs can only be ascertained based on 
empirical evidence.370 Making claims about how unknown transaction costs will impact efficiency is 
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impossible. There is evidence that the opportunity to breach efficiently may arise in practice. By 
virtue of this, it is clear that parties are able to make pre-breach predictions. Parties will sometimes 
view breach to be more cost-effective than performance. This reasoning is demonstrated by the case 
law which has been discussed in Chapter 5. The fact that contracting parties have taken the decision 
to breach outlines that in their view, the information available was sufficient to make predictions 
upon which they could rely.371 
 
6.6 Overall Conclusion 
 
The intention of this chapter was to outline a number of criticisms which have been directed at the 
theory of efficient breach. This was done in order to demonstrate why they are inapplicable with 
respect to the claims which this thesis makes. The original contribution comes in outlining why these 
criticisms do not derail the application of the theory of efficient breach with respect to commercial 
contracting. The approach which has been adopted includes categorising each of the criticisms 
amongst four key themes including potential clashes with existing legal doctrines, criticisms relating 
to the application of what is an instrumentalist approach to the law, issues relating to existing 
commercial practices and issues relating to the theory’s practical application.  
It was first set out that the potential clashes between the efficient breach of commercial contracts and 
existing legal doctrines including issues relating to the calculation of damages, a likeness with torts, 
infringements on property rights and good faith in commercial contracting and a contrast with trust 
law, do not limit the legitimacy of the theory. Second, it was outlined that in the commercial 
contracting context, it is legitimate to utilise the instrumentalist approach of wealth maximisation in 
applying the theory of efficient breach. This is because the parties’ overriding intention is profit 
generation.372 Importantly, these claims regarding the theory’s legitimacy do not require that it should 
take place. The only claim is that it could be pursued legitimately. Third, potential clashes based on 
existing commercial practice were discussed. It was suggested that the efficient breach of commercial 
contracts would cause no negative impact on the functionality of the commercial system due to the 
erosion of trust. This is on the basis that contract, rather than trust supports that system in that it 
allows parties to operate safe in the knowledge that they will be able to pursue a remedy in the event 
of breach. The practical influence of moral considerations on business dealing was also played down 
before setting out that factors relating to relational contracts do not negate the theory’s functionality 
in the context of commercial contracting. The suggestion that contractual performance will be 
preferred by both lay people and business people was then discounted due to the limitations which 
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were evident in the relevant study.373 The fourth category related to the practical application of the 
theory of efficient breach. It was explained that hypothetical scenarios customarily used within 
efficient breach literature do not prove or disprove the theory’s functionality. It is also important to 
be aware that the efficiency of an award of damages will be dictated by transaction costs which can 
only be ascertained based on evidence.374 With this in mind, making any claims regarding how 
unknown transaction costs will impact efficiency is impossible. However, it will be possible for 
parties to make pre-breach predictions based upon pre-existing knowledge and experience as well as 
advice from third parties such as lawyers or accountants. Accordingly, there is evidence that the 
opportunity to breach efficiently may arise in practice. Parties will view breach to be more cost-
effective than performance. On this basis, breach is considered efficient. This reasoning is 
demonstrated by the case law which has been noted. On the basis that parties have taken the decision 
to breach outlines that this is possible.375  
Ultimately, the intention was to set out that the criticisms noted fail to derail the theory of efficient 
breach with respect to commercial contracts. By dealing with each of these criticisms of the theory 
of efficient breach effectively, it will now be possible to discuss how it may function legitimately. 
Chapter 7 will therefore be focused on making the case for efficient breach within the specific context 
of commercial contracting. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Making the Case for Efficient Breach in a Commercial Context 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The intention of this chapter is to make clear that efficient breach is theoretically sound when it is 
considered within the context of commercial contracting. No inferences should be made regarding 
non-commercial contracts. The formulation of efficient breach that will be advanced is an original 
approach based on the specifically commercial contracting context within which it is to be applied. 
The first element of originality that must be noted relates to the foundation upon which this 
formulation of efficient breach is built. The concerns the material covered in the preceding chapters 
of this thesis. Chapter 2 outlined the commercial distinction in contract law, namely that a 
commercial party is identifiable based on business activity which is intended to generate profit and 
that a commercial contract will feature only commercial parties.1 Chapter 3 highlighted that the 
distinction stems from the reasoning behind a party pursuing enforcement of a particular right. When 
done primarily for profit driven reasons, the court’s approach differs from when enforcement is 
pursued for personal reasons. In commercial transactions, the fact that the primary reason for their 
operation is profit generation must be accounted for.2 Chapter 4 clarified that it would be inaccurate 
to suggest that English contract law is built on the promise principle. Also, that contracting should 
be considered in light of its domain of operation and that the normative power of a commercial 
contract will be different to that of a promise.3  Chapter 5 set out that within commercial contracting, 
efficiency may legitimately be judged based on wealth maximisation based on monetary value.4 This 
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will align with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion featuring the caveat that compensation is actually paid.5 
Further, that a simple approach to identifying an efficient breach where the contract breaker’s gain 
exceeds the losses of the party who suffers the breach after the payment of expectation damages was 
outlined. 6 Chapter 6 dealt with criticisms directed at the theory of efficient breach. It was set out that 
these criticisms do not adequately explain why efficient breach is either impermissible or 
impossible.7  
With this grounding in mind, it is possible to outline this approach to the theory of efficient breach. 
First, it will be set out that this formulation of efficient breach differs from the classic Holmes 
inspired iteration. This is in the sense that it is limited to solely commercial contracting, rather than 
all forms of contract. Relevant prerequisites will be outlined before making clear that the opportunity 
to breach and pay damages should not be available within all contracting relationships. The focus is 
solely on commercial contracts.  
Second, the limitations which this formulation has in place will be outlined. These include the 
commercial context and wealth maximisation, the criticism of wealth maximisation by corporate 
lawyers, the contrast between commercial versus non-commercial contracts, the rationality of 
commercial parties, the understanding which commercial parties possess, the legitimacy of monetary 
quantification and the specifics of damage calculation in this context.  
Third, it will be outlined that in the commercial context, an instrumentalist approach to contract law 
is legitimate. The rationale is that because the overriding intention behind commercial contracts is 
profit generation and, by proxy, wealth maximisation, that objective can be achieved by utilising an 
instrumentalist approach. Importantly, nothing is being implied regarding the legitimacy of 
instrumentalist approaches in other settings.  
Fourth, on the decision to breach efficiently it will be set out that the opportunity to breach affords 
contracting parties the flexibility to adapt to unforeseen contingencies cost-effectively. Also, that it 
would be wrong to disallow such behaviour where the parties entered into the contract in question in 
order to generate a profit. Further, that any decision may take into account factors which could lead 
to a decision not to breach, even where it would be economically efficient to do so. This could include 
protecting an existing relationship or reputation within a particular industry for example. As such, 
parties could opt to utilise alternative approaches. These could include performing despite the 
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opportunity to make an efficiency gain. In addition, they could also seek to renegotiate the agreement 
in light of a particular contingency or a change of circumstances. Acknowledging that factors beyond 
purely economic efficiency may play a part is an approach to efficient breach which has not been 
touched on previously. 
Fifth, contrasts with existing defences of efficient breach will be discussed. These include proposals 
based on adapting to unforeseen contingencies which are inevitable based on the incomplete nature 
of contracts raised by Shavell, as well as the altered view of performance noted by Markovits and 
Schwartz. It will be set out that the approach being proposed here differs from each of these 
approaches. This is due to the focus on commercial contracting which allows expectation damages 
to be justified based on the underlying profit generation intent which underpins them.  
Sixth, Epistemic and Normative Justifications will be considered briefly. This will further advance 
the case which is being made for efficient breach. The epistemic element concerns the problematic 
nature of prescriptive approaches. This is on the basis that until individual facts become evident, it 
is impossible to outline whether breaching would be appropriate. Normative elements concern the 
fact that claims that utilitarian principles can be satisfied in advance of the facts of each potential 
efficient breach scenario becoming evident cannot be made. Also, it will be set out that a prescriptive 
approach in this setting would undermine individual autonomy.  
Finally, it will be concluded that when a party is presented with the opportunity to breach efficiently 
this will not mean that breach must take place. However, should a party opt to breach they will be 
justified in doing so. To be clear, this justification applies to the relevant party’s choice to breach 
efficiently, as well as to the law’s approach in terms of limiting the available remedy to expectation 
damages in commercial contract disputes which effectively condones the breach. In addition, it will 
be set out that efficient breach requires that a damage award reflects the expectation interest in order 
to provide adequate compensation. Further, that the costs attached to paying damages should factor 
into any calculations carried out prior to a breach. 
 
7.2 This Formulation of Efficient Breach 
 
The intention here is to set out the facets of this adapted, and original approach to the theory of 
efficient breach. Chapter 5 noted Holmes’ suggestion that ‘the duty to keep a contract at common 
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else’8 is the 
inspiration for the theory of efficient breach. This can be seen to cast aside any contractual 
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requirement other than the need to pay damages following breach.9 This is not accurate however. 
The fact that specific performance,10 or an injunction,11 may be available following breach of contract 
highlights that occasionally the payment of damages may not suffice. Additionally, the version of 
efficient breach that is advanced here differs from the classic Holmes inspired iteration on the basis 
that it is limited to commercial contracts only. Next, in contrast with more prescriptive approaches, 
this iteration of efficient breach does not require that it should be pursued whenever it is available. 
The only claim is that it may justifiably be pursued where the breaching party deems it to be in line 
with their preferences. It is a permissive, rather than a mandatory approach, providing what can be 
described as efficient optionality. In this way, the approach provides what may be described as 
efficient optionality. This allows parties to make decisions based on what suits them best.  Of course, 
this assumes that the party who suffers the breach is compensated in line with the expectation 
measure of damages, which is justifiable in this case. 
 
7.3 The Limitations in Place 
 
Having set out how this version of efficient breach is formulated, it is now important to make clear 
that certain limitations are in place with regard to its application. This includes discussing why it is 
legitimate to apply the theory within the commercial context, as well as outlining why awarding 
damages for an efficient breach is appropriate in this setting.   
 
7.3.1 The Commercial Context and Wealth Maximisation 
 
The fist obvious limitation concerns the fact that efficient breach requires that an economic style of 
reasoning is adopted. This involves accepting that efficiency is a legitimate goal and also, that 
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efficiency concerns maximising wealth.12 There has been debate over whether the pursuit of wealth 
is a legitimate course of action in a broader sense. There is also a suggestion that contract law has a 
role in terms of restraining the maximising impulse. This is in the sense that parameters exist geared 
towards productive exchange.13 However, this thesis is focused only on commercial contracting and 
as such, broader issues regarding the legitimacy of a wealth maximising approach in other settings 
are not problematic because, as was set out previously, parties enter into contracts with the intention 
of generating profit.14 This is not to say that alternative approaches should not be utilised, such as the 
examples provided within literature on corporate governance.15 However, the intention here is to set 
out that wealth maximisation is legitimate in this context, but that it is not a pre-requisite.  
 
7.3.1.1 Criticism of Wealth Maximisation by Corporate Lawyers 
 
Wealth maximisation (or profit maximisation) has been criticised on the basis that it can be seen as 
synonymous with the classic shareholder wealth maximisation which is entrenched within corporate 
law.16 This is something which society, through the legal system allows. However, there is a 
suggestion that there are better ways in which corporate bodies could operate.17 For example, the 
shareholder wealth maximisation approach is criticised on the basis that it ‘encourages the sort of 
short-term obsessions that continually undermine the ability of American and British companies to 
compete in world markets over the long term’.18 However, the Companies Act 2006 offers the 
potential to consider factors beyond wealth maximisation. These may include long term impacts of 
a decision, the interests of employees, relationships with suppliers, customers and others, community 
and environmental impacts, reputation and fairness between company members.19 This allows 
directors to consider the interests of all stakeholders rather than solely shareholders. It is suggested 
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that ‘failure to consider the effect of corporate decisions and policies on a firm’s stakeholders could 
and likely will lead to harm to the firm’.20 With this in mind, the enlightened shareholder value is 
cited as an example of a way to balance shareholder primacy with stakeholder based considerations.21 
Principles based on corporate social responsibility are also noted in this respect.22 The case has been 
made that it is not only morally correct for businesses to take into account how their activities would 
affect their stakeholders, but that it is also strategically in their interests to do so.23 It is suggested 
that section 172 is limited due to an inability of both shareholders and stakeholders to enforce it.24 
However, company directors are required to act in a way which they consider ‘in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’.25 
Their duty is to the company and its members as a whole and, thus, their actions should reflect this. 
Importantly, these factors do not negate the legitimacy of the wealth maximisation approach with 
regard to the efficient breach of commercial contracts. Again, nothing is being said about how 
commercial parties should act. All that is being advanced is that the option to breach efficiently 
should be available should a party deem it to be the most attractive option. It is important to highlight 
that this is also not intended to question the legitimacy of approaches which are not in line with the 
wealth maximisation approach. The key point is that the freedom to choose a course of action which 
a commercial party has a preference for should be available to them. Of course, this is assuming that 
such actions are legally acceptable.  
 
7.3.1.2 Commercial versus Non-Commercial Contracts 
 
How and why commercial contracts are treated differently to non-commercial contracts will now be 
recapped briefly. This is done in order to make clear why efficient breach may legitimately be applied 
to commercial contracts. There is a clear distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
contracts in terms of how they are treated by the courts. This was established earlier.26 In a similar 
vein, Barton acknowledged the difference between market and non-market transactions.27 Farber also 
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noted that ‘market transactions are only one among a group of important economic institutions’.28 
This leads on to the idea that ‘efficiency is the only institutionally feasible and normatively attractive 
goal for a contract law that regulates deals between firms’.29 These firms exist within a market which 
has the function of maximising wealth, subject to certain constraints. This is based on an implicit 
acceptance of the principle that when resources go through market exchanges, they will find their 
way into the hands of those who value them the most.30 Also, it is simpler to place value on wealth 
(using monetary value) rather than welfare due to problems of interpersonal comparability.31 This is 
because welfare could account for individual preferences or satisfactions.32 The claim is that the role 
of commercial contracting should be to facilitate the maximisation of the value which flows from 
them and that this is quantifiable based on monetary value. This is on the basis that commercial 
contract law is focused on efficiency.33 
Next, it is possible to allay moral concerns regarding breach of contract stemming from distaste for 
promise breaking in a commercial setting.34 By focusing on the profit oriented intent which 
commercial parties possess, it is possible to legitimately assess efficiency based on wealth. Wider 
concerns regarding the breach are considered differently than would be the case in the context of 
non-commercial contracting.35 Mitchell notes that ‘contracts and contract law are a natural subject 
for analysis for the economist’.36 Also, that ‘contracting is a method of private ordering that allows 
satisfaction of preferences, and thereby is assured to be a central institution facilitating the transfer 
of goods to their most valued use’.37 This is legitimate as value can be objectively assessed based on 
one party’s willingness to pay, and a preference for a higher value of another.  
Finally, there is a view that ‘contract is primarily the domain of business people, companies and 
corporations … and not something which comprehensively or profoundly shapes the lives of 
members of society qua members of society or which ought to be of particular concern to them’.38 
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However, it is important to keep in mind that contract law’s role extends beyond the commercial 
sector. Examples include consumer contracts, personal contracts, contracts for the sale of goods and 
employment contracts where damages are assessed differently than in commercial cases.39 Whilst it 
is not disputed that a large volume of contractual disputes emanate from the commercial sector, it is 
important not to ignore the existence of non-commercial contracts. However, in this case the focus 
is, of course, solely on commercial contracting. 
 
7.3.1.3 The Rationality of Commercial Parties 
 
The next point of note is how a key principle within economic analysis can be applied to commercial 
contracting with respect to efficient breach. The suggestion is that the economically rational decision 
maker model is in line with the characteristics of commercial parties. This approach to decision 
making has been noted previously.40 Assumptions are made regarding their rationality and 
preferences.41 They focus on their own interests and satisfactions and act to improve their position.42 
It has been set out that ‘the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-
interest’.43 This is said to explain the way in which parties respond to legal rules as they will account 
for the legal consequences of their decisions.44 They are a creation of economics based on a weighted 
average of the behaviour of individuals. However, it is acknowledged that not all individuals act in 
this way.45 The paradigm may be applied to commercial parties because their primary focus is profit 
production. With this in mind, it is noted that contracts are ‘viewed by parties … as instruments 
useful in pursuing antecedent and independent purposes’.46 It is noteworthy that even rationality in 
this sense will be limited (or bounded) to a degree. This is because any decision may only be rational 
to the extent that it can account for information which is known to the decision maker.  
Considerations may go beyond solely rational behaviour in an economic sense. It has been suggested 
that to exclude ‘any consideration other than self-interest seems to impose a wholly arbitrary 
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limitation on the notion of rationality’.47 Further, that when it comes to the rigid pursuit of self-
interest, calling such behaviour ‘rational, or departures from it irrational, does not change the 
relevance of these criticisms, though it does produce an arbitrarily narrow definition of rationality’.48 
With this in mind, there is the potential that a party may have other concerns which influence their 
decision making. In this case, commercial parties will be capable of assessing whether implications 
beyond the financial impact of breach are substantial enough to deter it. For example, preserving 
business relationships or protecting industry reputation could be influential. This is an issue which 
will be discussed in greater depth later. For now, it is sufficient to note that an approach which is 
driven by wealth maximisation may legitimately be applied in the commercial setting. However, is 
important to note that nothing is being said about how parties do, will, or should act. The only claim 
is that acting in an economically rational manner is legitimate in this context. 
 
7.3.1.4 The Understanding which Commercial Parties Possess  
 
Finally, a commercial party is likely to possess a greater understanding of the law’s operation 
following a breach of contract. This is on the basis that where parties are experienced, or where it is 
reasonable to expect that they are experienced, the presumption is that they are familiar with the 
relevant elements of contract law.49 Morgan notes the presumption that despite bounded rationality, 
‘commercial parties presumptively remain better placed to decide on their best interests than the (also 
‘bounded’) courts’.50 Commercial parties will be likely to be more familiar with the default position 
the law adopts in enforcing a payment of damages when they enter into agreements on a routine 
basis.51 This is a likely contrast with non-commercial parties. It has already been set out that 
interpretation of contractual terms differs between commercial and non-commercial contracts. This 
is often in terms of assessing reasonableness.52 Mitchell has noted ‘tacit understandings’53 within 
certain industries with regard to particular customs. For example, the ‘understanding of shipping 
lawyers about the extent of a charterer’s liability for damages for late redelivery’54 was noted. With 
this in mind, it does not seem particularly problematic to suggest that should parties be capable of 
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operating with industry norms and customs in mind, they will have a grasp of how breach of contract 
is dealt with by the courts. It follows that a commercial party expecting enforced performance, rather 
than payment of compensatory damages in the event of a breach of a commercial contract, will be 
unrealistic on the basis that they are a default rule.55 
 
7.3.2 The Legitimacy of Monetary Quantification 
 
Having set out that this version of efficient breach may legitimately be applied to commercial 
contracting, it is now necessary to move on to discuss the legitimacy of monetary quantification in 
terms of damage awards. In commercial settings the focus is profit production. As such, losses can 
legitimately be quantified in monetary terms. This is because transactions will customarily involve 
money, or an equivalent.56 The suggestion is that in this setting, no issues are presented by utilising 
this approach.  
The payment of damages will fulfil the expectations of a party who suffers a breach while avoiding 
the type of moral issues which are said to arise from promise breaking.57 Further, in a commercial 
setting it is possible for parties take cover in the way which Campbell describes.58 This is because 
‘capitalist economies are characterized by the ready availability of goods in competitive supply, 
including a margin of excess capacity’.59 On this point, Eisenberg has criticised the use of market 
value in relation to differentiated commodities. The suggestion is that this would require the use of 
information from roughly comparable transactions, which concern roughly comparable 
commodities, and that this would not accurately reflect a party’s subjective valuation of a 
commodity.60 However, in commercial settings, where replacements are available, subjective 
valuation is irrelevant. 
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7.3.2.1 Damages for Breach of Contract  
 
The key consideration here is the way in which damages for breach of contract will be assessed. This 
is a major factor in terms of justifying the application of the theory of efficient breach because should 
damages be incorrectly assessed, claims regarding the efficiency of a breach would be undermined. 
The discussion to follow will include highlighting the approach adopted in commercial cases, the 
exceptions and limitations placed on damage awards, as well as the reasons why damages are 
preferred to specific performance. That contract law should be geared towards providing efficient 
awards will also be considered.  
It will be set out that damages for breach of commercial contracts are assessed based on market 
value.61 Also, that where there is a market for a replacement, damages will be preferred.  It will be 
noted that law and economics views that awards of damages should be efficient and thus cost-
effective. It will be made clear that should an award be incorrectly calculated, their compensatory 
aim would be undermined. Finally, that intangible loss is inherently difficult to quantify but that this 
is not an issue in commercial contracting. This simplifies the damage calculation process. 
 
7.3.2.2 Calculating an Award of Damages 
 
Where substitute performance is available, damages will be calculated based on the market price of 
a replacement. This is then compared with the original contract price.62 A net loss approach is adopted 
which offsets any gains made by the claimant against their losses.63 Damage awards made by UK 
courts in commercial cases will focus on the market value of the asset in question to calculate a 
claimant’s loss.64 Furthermore, non-pecuniary losses such as loss of amenity or injury to feelings are 
not considered.65  
Damages are subject to exceptions set out in Attorney General v Blake.66 These apply where usual 
remedies would prove inadequate.67 A court may only consider a defendant’s legal obligations. They 
                                                          
61 See The Rozel [1994] CLC 168; The Alecos M [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 120; The Maersk Colombo [2001] 
EWCA Civ 717. 
62 Beale (n 10) 27-005; See also Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2014) 4-002. 
63 Beale (n 10) 26-001; See also British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company  v Underground 
Electric Railways Company of London [1912] AC 673, 691 which set out a need ‘to balance loss and gain’; 
See also Westwood v Secretary of State for Employment [1985] AC 20, 44. 
64 See 3.3 The Commercial Distinction in Contract Law. 
65 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13; [2003] 1 AC 518 [70] (Lord Millet). 
66 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. 
67 See Beale (n 10) 26-046. 
244 
 
will not be concerned by ‘the expectations, however reasonable, of one contractor that the other will 
do something that he has assumed no legal obligation to do’.68 Rules regarding mitigation, as well as 
remoteness places limitations on losses which may be recovered.69 The mitigation rule sets out that 
a claimant may not recover for losses which were reasonably avoidable.70 The remoteness rule 
requires that only losses which arise in the usual course of dealing, or which were contemplatable by 
the parties when the contract was concluded can be remedied.71  
Following the ruling in The Achilleas,72 a claimant will be unable to claim for losses for which the 
defendant could not be assumed to have taken responsibility for. Also, in Co-operative Insurance 
Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd,73 Lord Hoffmann set out the reasons why specific 
performance may be inappropriate.74 It was noted that ‘the purpose of the law of contract is not to 
punish wrongdoing but to satisfy the expectations of the party entitled to performance. A remedy 
which enables him to secure, in money terms, more than the performance due to him is unjust’.75 
Finally, that from a public interest perspective, it cannot be appropriate for a court to require parties 
to carry on a business operation at a loss where there is a suitable alternative available by which the 
other party may be compensated.76  
 
7.3.2.3 Calculating Efficient Awards 
 
At the core of the theory of efficient breach is the requirement that efficient awards of compensatory 
damages are calculated. Posner notes that ‘the objective of giving the promisor an incentive to fulfil 
his promise unless the result would be an inefficient use of resources can usually be achieved by 
giving the promisee his expected profit on the transaction’.77 Cooter characterised the dispute 
regarding efficient breach as ‘a disagreement about whether damages are a sanction for wrongdoing 
or the price of breach’.78 It was noted that justifications for efficient breach are part of an open ended 
list and may include impossibility, changed circumstances, mutual mistake or a situation where 
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performance would impose hardship on the promisor whist producing only a small advantage to the 
promisee. However, it is submitted that opponents of efficient breach would insist that efficiency is 
excluded from this list.79 This is a view which clearly clashes with the approach to efficient breach 
which this thesis advocates. 
Campbell notes that a breach will be efficient where ‘in anticipation of paying full compensation … 
the defendant still decides to break his promise’.80 It is highlighted that the most efficient remedies 
will offer the closest thing to exact compensation because they will deter inefficient breaches whilst 
permitting efficient ones.81 The implication is that in such situations resources will be allocated to a 
more efficient use.82 If damages are adequate, a claimant should be indifferent between payment and 
performance. Theoretically, damages will protect expectation more cheaply because ‘no benefit will 
be conferred by making the defendant protect the claimant's expectation by the more expensive 
method of literal enforcement’.83 It follows that a defendant should be able to opt for the most cost 
effective method. On the issue of maximising profit and minimising loss, a paradox is said to exist 
which stems from a belief that contract law remedies are intended to encourage primary obligations 
through providing a deterrent for breach.84 The response is that breach of contract ‘is a legitimate 
legal institution, governing a rational economic response to the limitations of bounded rationality, 
which it is the function of compensatory damages to allow’.85  
Yorio notes that criticism of incorrectly calculated money damages is legitimate on the basis that it 
undermines contract law’s underlying aim.86 Further, that the defects which exist within the system 
of compensatory damages may be cured through adjusting the rules which govern them. This would 
include balancing moral considerations with efficiency goals. The claim is that this would allow 
contract law to benefit from any efficiency gains which specific performance is said to generate 
whilst avoiding efficiency losses which its application would produce.87 The difficulty with this 
approach is the quantification of what are effectively intangible losses. This is not to dispute that 
they may be a relevant concern in some areas of contracting. However, in commercial contracting 
the courts are unwilling to compensate this type of loss.88 In addition, the underlying intent upon 
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which commercial contracting is built is to generate profit.89 With this in mind, moral considerations 
should not play a part in the quantification of damages following a breach. 
 
7.3.2.4 The Legitimacy of Awards of Damages for an Efficient Breach 
 
Some of the issues regarding the legitimacy of awarding damages for an efficient breach of contract 
were discussed earlier.90 These included whether damages aimed to reflect the expectation interest 
of a party can truly compensate their loss. This would mean that the party would be indifferent 
between performance and damages. It was set out that costs are attached to any form of litigation and 
that it would be flawed to discount the theory of efficient breach simply because of those costs.  
The next issue discussed was whether any loss accrued during the time period between the point of 
breach and a judgment.91 It was suggested that this could be dealt with by awarding interest to reflect 
the rate which would be attached to borrowing funds during that time.92 Also, that performance 
negates the risk of the breaching party going into insolvency during the period between breach and 
the payment of damages.93 This risk was discounted on the basis that there is always that potential 
and whilst this is unfortunate, this does not provide sufficient reason to discount the theory of 
efficient breach.  
The inherent difficulties which are attached to measuring damages were also considered.94 It was 
noted that it would be bold to discount the damage calculation process based on this. The potential 
that difficulties may arise where breaching parties delay payment was noted. It was set out that such 
issues would be allayed were they to act proactively rather than waiting for an action for breach of 
contract to be brought. This would be efficient in terms of time and cost. Further, that the costs 
attached to paying damages should factor into any calculations carried out prior to a decision to 
breach.  
Finally, issues relating to the position of the court were considered. These included concerns over 
hard-to-measure elements such as lost profit or idiosyncratic losses, as well as the limits placed on 
awards such as mitigation and remoteness.95 Again, these issues were discounted on the basis that 
damage awards in commercial cases will not take into account non-pecuniary losses. Market value 
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will be the default measure which is adopted, meaning that subjective valuation of such factors will 
not be an issue.96 Also, that rules relating to mitigation and remoteness are foundational in terms of 
calculating contract damages and that to suggest they are flawed raises issues which are greater than 
simply the functionality of efficient breach.  
  
7.3.2.5 Is Performance Preferred? 
 
It has been suggested that there is a consensus in terms of viewing breach of contract as immoral. 
The result is the suggestion that there is a general preference for performance rather than an award 
of damages following breach. A study by Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron which concerned specifically 
intentional breaches set out that its subjects considered causing harm by breaching a contract ‘more 
immoral and should feel more guilt than a person who caused harm via negligence’.97 The view was 
that a promisor should always perform, even where breaching and paying damages would be 
profitable.98 Also, in cases of intentional breach there was a call for punitive damages.99 Next, 
Lewinsohn-Zamir suggested that there is a preference for in-kind remedies over monetary 
compensation.100 This will mean that people will prefer to receive what was promised rather than its 
value no matter how accurate the valuation.101 There is a perception that a decision to breach should 
be viewed differently should it take place in fortunate rather than unfortunate circumstances.102 This 
conflicts with the economic approach which does not ‘distinguish between a case where performance 
becomes overly difficult for the promisor and one in which breach is due to the availability of a more 
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lucrative contract’.103 There was also a suggestion that alongside maximising wealth, other 
preferences may be influential. It is claimed that: 
People prefer an unqualified entitlement to receive delivery in kind over an entitlement to 
either delivery or monetary damages. The questionnaire emphasized that the monetary award 
would fully compensate the buyer not only for her losses due to the delay in supplying the 
iron, but also for the inconvenience of purchasing substitute iron from another importer and 
the increase in the market price of the iron. However, in real life, some of these losses would 
not be compensated for. To operate smoothly, a factory must be assured that all the inputs it 
needs for production will be delivered on time. Therefore, a higher priced contract 
guaranteeing a right to performance in kind on a certain date may enhance the factory’s 
wealth better than a lower-priced contract sufficing with a monetary substitute. In addition, 
the higher-priced specific-performance contract gives promisees (managers) the bargaining 
power to share in the profits from future renegotiations.104 
There are two obvious problems with this claim. First, that if some losses would not be compensated, 
the breach is by proxy inefficient. Second, that should a party wish to attempt to ensure performance 
will take place in specie, a high value liquidated damages clause could be included within the 
contract. Whilst this would not necessarily enforce performance, it could make non-performance so 
expensive that parties would be unlikely to breach. Liquidated damages clauses will be enforceable 
assuming they are not considered to be penalty clauses.105 It is set out that where a clause is held to 
be a liquidated damages clause rather than a penalty clause, it ‘will be valid and it will fix the liability 
of the party in breach, in the sense that the sum stipulated in the clause will be the sum that must be 
paid, irrespective of the loss that is actually suffered on the facts of the case’.106 
There is a suggestion that the preference for in-kind remedies extends to business transactions.107 
This is due to concerns regarding reputational preservation.108 The claim is that assumptions of 
extreme greediness are not necessarily correct, and that parties will seek to cooperate with one 
another rather than exercising practices such as holdout power.109 Also, that decisions regarding 
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breach may not be informed solely by the potential for a monetary incentive, meaning that other 
factors may influence behaviour.110 In 1963, Macaulay set out that the reputation of a commercial 
party will have an impact on whether other parties will be willing to rely on their assurances.111 
Morgan has also highlighted concerns, suggesting that the ‘gleefully amoral attitude arguably fits 
that of business contractors, for whom contract’s supposed “sanctity” is irrelevant’.112 Further, that 
even in a commercial context, breach is condemned by business people who prefer performance to 
monetary damages.113 Factors such as cooperation and trust are said to be key and that ‘the 
importance of ongoing cooperative relationships in business can hardly be doubted’.114 For example, 
there is a claim that ‘contracting parties routinely disregard the incentives set forth by the legal system 
and adhere to the dictates of the applicable social norm’.115  
Ultimately, these issues do not diminish the legitimacy of the claims which this thesis makes 
regarding the decision making of parties with the opportunity to breach a commercial contract 
efficiently. They may opt to attach value to factors other than financial gain. These may include 
reputation and the protection of existing contracting relationships. Nothing is being said about what 
a party should do when the opportunity to breach efficiently presents itself. The only claim is that 
should breaching efficiently be the preferred option, it would be legitimate to pursue it.  
 
7.3.3 Conclusion 
 
The first limitation concerned the commercial contracting context, and the fact that wealth 
maximisation is legitimate within this setting. It is the case that within commercial contracting the 
intention is generally to maximise the wealth which flows from individual transactions. This is 
despite criticism which has been levelled at the approach by some corporate lawyers. The clear 
contrast with non-commercial contracts in terms of a profit oriented focus was also reiterated. On 
this basis, the rational decision maker paradigm is applicable to commercial parties. Finally, 
commercial parties are likely to possess, or may reasonably be expected to possess, a more developed 
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understanding of contract law’s function following breach.116 This concerns the default position of 
enforcing a payment of damages over specific performance.  
The next key point is that in a commercial setting damage awards may legitimately be quantified in 
monetary terms. This is because transactions will generally involve money or its equivalent. Also, 
whenever damage awards are quantified there is potential difficulty. This applies in any area of the 
law. However, an approach based on market value to assessing damages is adopted within 
commercial contract cases.117 This simplifies the process as intangible losses which are inherently 
difficult to quantify are not considered. There are potential problems when non-market transactions 
concerning differentiated commodities are considered. However, where a replacement may be 
acquired within the market, an award of damages will adequately compensate a claimant. It would 
also be bold to claim that the process by which damages are calculated should be discounted based 
on the difficulties which are inherent in terms of quantification. 
The view within law and economics that awards of damages should be efficient on the basis that they 
would be cost-effective within market transactions was supported. It was also pointed out that should 
an award be calculated incorrectly, their compensatory aim would be undermined. Finally, that a 
commercial party is best placed to make decisions in their own interests. It follows that they are 
capable of assessing whether the ramifications beyond the breach in isolation are substantial enough 
to deter it. Where a party views breaching and paying damages as the most attractive option, it will 
be appropriate. Equally, a want to preserve ongoing cooperative business relationships could feed 
into their decision making process.  
 
7.4 The Legitimacy of an Instrumentalist Approach  
 
Having set out the specifics of the formulation of efficient breach that is being advanced, as well as 
highlighting the limitations upon which its application is contingent, it is now necessary to justify 
the method which is to be applied. The approach which is being suggested is instrumentalist in nature. 
These approaches aim to encourage actions based on a particular objective, in this case the pursuit 
of economic efficiency.118   
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These approaches have been criticised.119 A prominent criticism is that instrumentalist approaches 
conflict with the requirements of corrective justice. As Weinrib set out, ‘corrective justice is the idea 
that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on another’.120 It is said to feature: 
[T]he maintenance and restoration of the notional equality with which the parties enter the 
transaction. This equality consists in persons’ having what lawfully belongs to them. 
Injustice occurs when, relative to this baseline, one party realizes a gain and the other a 
corresponding loss. The law corrects this injustice when it re-establishes the initial equality 
by depriving one party of the gain and restoring it to the other party.121 
This has frequently been discussed with regard to tort law.122 Within tort, the intention is to attempt 
to compensate injuries to a person or their property caused by another. Nothing should be inferred 
with regard to whether this approach is legitimate or not within tort law. It is simply being noted as 
an illustrative example with regard to the application of corrective justice. The difference between 
tort and contract with respect to the suitability of compensation was noted earlier.123 The conclusion 
was that utilitarian approaches which consider only increases in total utility, welfare or wealth should 
be applied in limited circumstances only.124  
There is evidence of attempts to extend the approach to all elements of private law, including 
contract.125 Weinrib sets out that: 
[T]he concepts and many of the principal doctrines of the common law—for example, offer 
and acceptance, consideration, unconscionability, and expectation damages in contract law, 
and causation, fault, and compensatory damages in tort law — reflect the bipolarity of private 
law relationships. Inasmuch as such relationships are coherent, the justificatory 
considerations that underlie them have the structure of corrective justice. And if courts are 
to maintain this coherence, their reasoning about these relationships will also have to adhere 
to the contours of corrective justice.126 
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Also, on contract specifically, it is suggested that ‘the central doctrines the law of contract (offer and 
acceptance, consideration, unconscionability, and expectation damages) allow the parties, through 
the mutuality their conduct, to create in the plaintiff a right to the defendant’s performance of the 
promised act’.127 It is this suggestion which is problematic when we attempt to apply it to modern 
contract law. This is on the basis that damages for breach of contract are based on interests owing to 
a loss, rather than interests owing to performance. This is embodied in the limited availability of 
remedies such as restitution and specific performance within contract. On this point, there have been 
attempts to carry the corrective justice approach further with respect to its application to contract. 
For example, on punitive damages Lee suggested that the ‘infusion of punishment into contract law 
may not appear as offensive as tradition has made it out to be’.128 This was based on the view that 
need not be restricted to the ‘compensate, not punish’ approach.129 In addition, Botterell’s approach 
concerned the suggestion that ‘even if a contract gives the promisee a right to only the promisor’s 
performance of the contract, such a right can sometimes entail the acquisition by the promisee of 
certain rights of ownership’.130 As a result it is claimed that ‘where such rights are acquired, a 
disappointed promisee is entitled to any gains realized by the … by reason of the fact that such gains 
are something to which the promisee has an antecedent normative entitlement’.131 However, in 
Weinrib’s view, expectation damages fulfil the requirements of corrective justice because they 
‘represent the value of the promisor's performance’.132 It is suggested that: 
From the standpoint of corrective justice, private law is a distinct form of practical reason, 
in which justification reflects the correlative situation of the parties as doer and sufferer of 
the same injustice. One-sided considerations, no matter how appealing, such as that the party 
in breach should disgorge profits made from its wrong or should be punished for its 
malevolent conduct, do not conform to this correlativity. Such considerations can be 
incorporated only if private law is willing to countenance unfairness as between the parties 
and the disturbance of the law's internal coherence. Perhaps sensing this, the common law 
traditionally did not use damage awards to punish the breaching party or to force 
disgorgement of the gains from breach.133 
In this way, Weinrib is critical of instrumental approaches, rather than the use compensatory 
damages. However, as was set out earlier, the efficient breach of commercial contracts would utilise 
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the wealth maximisation, in line with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion where compensation is paid.134 This 
is legitimate because only detriment that can be compensated has been caused. This is because an 
award of damages in line with the expectation measure can adequately protect interests stemming 
from commercial contracts. In tort, as well as in non-commercial contracting, this would not 
necessarily be true. In this case, an instrumentalist approach to commercial contracting is legitimate. 
This is on the basis that the overriding intention of their existence is profit generation and, by proxy, 
wealth maximisation. This objective can be achieved by utilising such an approach. This is in line 
with the claims regarding appropriate domains made earlier.135 It is important to note, however, that 
this claim is confined only to this context. Nothing is to be inferred with regard to the legitimacy of 
instrumentalist approaches in other settings.  
 
7.5 The Decision to Breach Efficiently 
 
Having set out the parameters which are to be applied to this approach to efficient breach, it is now 
possible to move on to discuss it in more detail. It is important to clarify that this is not a defence for 
all intentional breaches, only those which are inspired by the pursuit of efficiency. There is, of course, 
the potential that parties may wish to breach for reasons which do not pertain to efficiency. However, 
nothing should be inferred with regard to intentional breaches generally. The focus here is solely on 
the efficient breach of commercial contracts. 
A key consideration is the decision which the breaching party will make regarding a potential breach. 
In this way, an efficient breach is effectively a one party decision. It will be based on risk predictions 
as well as individual preferences.136 It is also notable that the eventual efficiency of the breach is 
relatively inconsequential with regard to its justification. This may seem counterintuitive on the basis 
that the classic justification for efficient breach is that it will lead to an increase in total wealth. 
However, on the basis that the breaching party will bear the cost should it transpire that the breach 
was ultimately inefficient, this is not overly problematic.137 Their risk would not have paid off, and 
they would be responsible for the costs. Of course, this is only legitimised where the breaching party 
pays the required damages.  
It is important to again make clear that this thesis does not make any claims about what a party should 
do when faced with the opportunity to breach efficiently. Framing an efficient breach in this way is 
a novel approach top take to the theory’s application which contrasts with more prescriptive methods. 
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A potential flaw in the way that literature on efficient breach could be interpreted is the idea that it 
outlines how decisions should be made. This approach would be based in positive economics. The 
claims advanced here are more in line with normative economics. The intention is to outline that in 
a particular setting, a course of action will be economically justified. There is also a claim that the 
model suggests relationships between contracting parties will not impact their behaviour. It is 
suggested that this displays a bias in favour of uncooperative, inefficient behaviour and that this type 
of bias is inevitable within the neo-classical economics model.138 Macneil suggested that Posner’s 
approach is one which advocates breaching first and talking afterwards, despite the suggestion that 
talking post breach ‘may be one of the more expensive forms of conversation to be found, involving, 
as it so often does, engaging high-priced lawyers, and gambits like starting litigation, engaging in 
discovery, and even trying and appealing cases’.139 However, the potential for breach can, in fact, be 
seen to provide the necessary leverage to trigger renegotiation on the basis that it may encourage a 
party who may be unwilling to negotiate to reconsider.140 If this proved to be unrealistic, a breach on 
efficiency grounds may take place as a final option. 
The decision to breach may also account for other factors which could lead to a decision not to breach 
where it would be economically efficient to do so. These may include the protection of an existing 
relationship, or reputation within a particular industry. A party could opt to perform despite the 
opportunity to make an efficiency gain, or attempt to renegotiate the agreement in light of an 
unforeseen contingency or change of circumstances.141  
As Campbell and Harris suggest, the only question should be whether that party will perform or 
choose to pay compensatory damages, and that this decision will be based in part on cost.142 
Additionally, criticism has been directed at the perceived narrow view which is focused on wealth. 
The claim is that individuals may not be focused solely on improving their own position, meaning 
that they may account for other factors such as social norms or their relationships with other 
parties.143  
A party may legitimately decide based on their own preferences that a relationship is worth 
protecting. They could opt to perform and effectively write-off any efficiency gains which they could 
have made. They could also attempt to renegotiate in light of an unforeseen contingency or change 
of circumstances. On renegotiation, it is suggested that scholars who (based on non-economic 
reasoning) prefer remedies which punish breach of contract will ‘assert that their remedies are not 
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inconsistent with economic efficiency because the parties can always renegotiate to permit an 
efficient breach’.144 Key is that ‘if renegotiation costs are low, all remedies are equally efficient’.145 
However, this claim assumes that renegotiation is both a possibility, as well as potentially fruitful. 
This may or may not be the case. Also, it is possible that the threat of breach will provide the 
necessary leverage which will trigger renegotiation. This is on the basis that it could encourage a 
party who was initially unwilling renegotiate, to reconsider their position.146 Finally, a party could 
opt to breach and pay compensatory damages which are in line with the expectation measure.  
The opportunity to breach will afford contracting parties the flexibility to adapt to an unforeseen 
contingency in a cost-effective manner. It would be wrong to disallow such behaviour where the 
parties to an agreement entered into it to generate a profit. Enforcing performance where total wealth 
would not be maximised or, worse, where it would be reduced would be counterproductive. 
Additionally, there is a view that it is not appropriate to require a party to carry on a business activity 
which results in a loss should an alternative route which provides compensation is available.147 It is 
also  notable that the intention of contract law is satisfying legitimate expectations rather than 
punishing wrongdoing.148 
 
7.6 Contrasts with Existing Defences of Efficient Breach  
 
The main justification which is raised for the theory of efficient breach is that pursuing economic 
efficiency is legitimate.149 This involves maximising wealth by moving resources into the possession 
of the party who values it most.150 Clearly this requires that maximising wealth is considered to be a 
legitimate goal. However, this cannot be said to be the case in all contractual settings. As has been 
noted throughout, this approach to efficient breach is limited in the sense that the claims which this 
thesis makes are based on wealth maximisation’s legitimacy within commercial contracting only. 
This is due to the intention to generate a profit which underpins them.  
There are some relatively recent examples of defences for efficient breach which have been raised. 
These include Shavell’s defence based on unforeseen contingencies which may flow naturally from 
the incomplete nature of contracts, as well as an alternative attitude to contractual performance 
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known as the dual performance hypothesis raised by Markovits and Schwartz.151 Whilst these 
approaches are interesting, they are somewhat underdeveloped. As such, the formulation of efficient 
breach that this thesis advances provides a more functional approach that applies specifically within 
the commercial contracting context.  
 
7.6.1 A Defence based on the Incomplete Nature of Contracts  
 
Shavell suggests that a breach of contract may be permissible in light of an unforeseen contingency. 
Further, that when damages are fully compensatory, breach will be moral on the basis that it would 
have been allowed had the parties been aware at the initial negotiation stage.152 Also, that any belief 
that a moral reason ensures that contracts are performed stems from an oversimplification of moral 
requirements, as well as a misunderstanding of the incomplete nature of contracts.153 More recently, 
Shavell outlined that his argument is based on the incomplete nature of contracts. This is due to the 
time and cost of attempting to account for any possible contingency.154 It is suggested that where a 
contingency is not provided for ‘then the moral duty to perform … is governed by what a completely 
detailed contract addressing the contingency would have stipulated’.155 Also, that where a particular 
contingency has been provided for there will be a moral duty to perform based on the contract’s 
terms.156  
Shavell’s position is that opting to breach and pay damages which reflect the expectation interest is 
not immoral ‘when performance would not have been specified in a complete contract’.157 It is set 
out that most individuals (citing Shiffrin as an example) hold a view that breach of contract features 
a moral element. The reasoning is that ‘they regard contracts as simple promises and ignore the 
incompleteness of contracts - individuals tend to confuse the violation of a contract with the breaking 
of an explicit promise’.158 The focus placed on unforeseen contingencies highlights that the 
incomplete nature of contracts is an inherent problem.  
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Where a better opportunity presents itself, it is legitimate to pursue it, pay damages and enjoy any 
benefits. The opportunity to breach efficiently would afford parties the flexibility to adapt should 
contracts which they have entered into become economically inefficient.159 This is on the basis that 
the contract would not have been agreed had the opportunity in question had it been predicted, and 
had all the relevant information been available. This squares with the attitude that contract law should 
facilitate efficient exchanges by providing optimal incentives to maximise surplus from 
transactions.160 It follows that a rational commercial party would prefer to have this option available 
to them.161 Furthermore, despite the best efforts of those drafting contracts, coupled with the expertise 
of commercial parties who operate within a particular industry, it is impossible to prepare for all 
potential eventualities.  
The claims which this thesis makes represent a development of Shavell’s approach. This involves 
restraining the ability to adapt to unforeseen contingencies through breach by limiting it only to 
commercial contracts. Restricting this analysis has an impact on damage calculation by focusing on 
market value,162 as well as on claims regarding any moral force which is believed to be embodied 
within contracts.163 
 
7.6.2 A Defence based on an Alternative Approach to Contractual Performance   
 
Markovits and Schwartz claim that protecting expectation through an award of damages is justified 
because there is a ‘difference between a promisor who refuses to trade but voluntarily transfers … 
and a promisor who declines both to trade and to transfer’.164 They suggest that dual performance 
will provide one of two things which have been contracted for because performance is said to include 
both trade, and transfer.165 This ‘commits a promisor to performance just as surely as a promise of 
the form Shiffrin prefers; it just changes what counts as performance’.166 While this approach is 
original, it risks attempting to justify efficient breach based on the terminology which is used, rather 
than outlining that the theory is itself functional. The use of “trade or transfer”, rather than “perform 
or pay” falls into this trap. It is more appropriate to adopt an approach which seeks to deal directly 
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with the concerns which have been raised in respect of efficient breach. Simply altering the 
terminology used does little to legitimise the theory generally. 
Criticism has stemmed from the use of specific market conditions by Markovits and Schwartz. Rigoni 
outlines that the payment of damages is justified based on these assumptions.167 They are as follows: 
(i) [T]he buyer has bargaining power ex post [i.e., he can extract a bribe]; (ii) the seller can 
charge a price that at least equals her expected cost; and (iii) the seller’s ability to price ex 
ante is constrained by the existence of other potential suppliers. The first two of these factors 
hold everywhere and the last holds unless a seller has strong monopoly power.168 
It is suggested that in Markovits and Schwartz’s model the ‘secondary sale of the contracted good or 
service to a third party, essential to fortunate circumstance efficient breach, cannot happen in a 
competitive market’.169 Finally, Rigoni is critical of the use of expectation damages as a default 
remedy for breach of contract. 
Markovits and Schwartz acknowledge that the setting in which efficient breach may legitimately 
function is a competitive market. It is suggested that ‘business firms … commonly attempt to 
maximize expected profits, and it is widely assumed that many of them are capable of doing so’.170 
This attitude is in line with the position that individual parties will be best placed to make decisions 
which impact on their own position. However, they stop short of outlining that the theory is 
applicable only to contracting parties who are operating in a commercial manner. This is a clear 
contrast with the model which this thesis proposes.  
Arguably the dual performance hypothesis better facilitates the profit increasing, or loss limiting 
approach. This is because it is based on taking an efficient course of action in terms of a contractual 
agreement. This is based on either an opportunity for increasing profit, or decreasing loss. However, 
it is important to ensure that the proposed remedy will effectively compensate the party that suffers 
a breach. As has been noted throughout, the commercial contracting context provides a setting where 
contracting parties can be compensated legitimately using damage awards assessed in line with the 
expectation interest.  
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7.6.3 Conclusion 
 
The defences of efficient breach provided by Shavell, as well as by Markovits and Schwartz are 
deserving of credit based on their originality. Both feature elements that contribute in terms of 
seeking to provide a justification for efficient breach. However, these elements require development 
in order to be functional. The approach that this thesis advances achieves this by focusing specifically 
on commercial contracting. This allows the use of expectation damages to be justified based on the 
underlying profit generation intent that underpins commercial contracts.  
 
7.7 Epistemic and Normative Justifications  
 
The final point to note is that this approach to efficient breach can be justified in both an epistemic, 
and a normative way. Through discussing both of these approaches, the case that is being made for 
efficient breach within the context of commercial contracting will be advanced further.  
 
7.7.1 The Epistemic Justification 
 
From the epistemic perspective, approaches that seek to prescribe a course of action with respect to 
efficient breach are not functional. This is on the basis that any blanket requirement to breach, or not 
to breach, would be problematic. Until the facts of each individual case become evident, it is 
impossible to know whether or not to breach would be appropriate. It is clear that the efficiency of a 
breach cannot be predicted without the relevant information and evidence.171 Also, it is impossible 
to say that the potential for efficient breaches does not exist due to factors such as transaction costs.172 
The only conclusion which can be made is that there exists the potential that the opportunity to breach 
efficiently may arise.173 This means that any formulations or criticisms of efficient breach which 
purport to prescribe a course of action, cannot be applied.  
In each case where the potential opportunity to breach efficiently arises, it will fall to the individual 
party to assess whether or not they will choose to pursue it.174 They will be best placed to make that 
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decision as they will be capable of assessing the costs versus the benefits, informed by their own 
position and preferences.175 With this in mind, they should be allowed to make this decision, rather 
than having their hand forced by overly prescriptive requirements regarding contractual performance.   
 
7.7.2 The Normative Justification 
 
From the normative perspective there are two key points to note. First, in relation to a need for 
empirical evidence regarding the circumstances of a potential breach, it is impossible to claim that 
utilitarian principles can be satisfied in advance of the individual circumstances of each potential 
efficient breach scenario becoming evident.176 This has a societal link in the sense that whether or 
not overall wealth can be improved based on individual efficient breach, opportunities must be 
assessed on the individual facts and on a case by case basis. Second, a prescriptive approach to 
efficient breach would clash with requirements regarding individual autonomy.177 This is in relation 
to the right to make decisions based on individual positions and preferences noted earlier.178 
Prescribing contract rules in this regard could be perceived as insulting the autonomy of the contract 
breaker.179 These normative elements add weight to the legitimacy of efficient breach in the 
commercial context.  
 
7.7.3 Efficient Optionality  
 
This approach to the efficient breach of commercial contracts is not a prescriptive one. It offers 
efficient optionality to commercial contracting parties. This builds upon the point regarding the 
difficulty in assessing whether a breach should take place without understanding the entirety of the 
facts and the context, as well as the point regarding individual autonomy. The law facilitates the case 
by case nature of efficient breach through providing this form of optionality giving parties the scope 
to act in their own best interests, adapting to the circumstances in which they find themselves. 
This approach is efficient in the sense that compensation in line with the expectation measure will 
ensure that the interests of the party who suffers the breach are protected.180 This is not to say that 
the system by which damages are calculated is perfect. However, it is functional for the purposes for 
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which it is required. This is particularly evident in the commercial setting where market value can be 
utilised as an effective measuring tool.181 The contract is binding, though it binds parties in a way 
which facilitates an appropriate level of flexibility with respect to efficient breach. The nature of a 
commercial contract is key in this respect. This is because they exist to protect the interests of the 
parties in entering into a transaction with the underlying intention of generating a profit. They do not 
exist to enforce performance, only to provide adequate compensation where performance does not 
take place. 
 
7.7.4 Conclusion 
 
By considering additional epistemic and normative justifications, the case which is being made for 
efficient breach within the context of commercial contracting has been advanced. The epistemic 
element concerns the fact that a prescriptive approach which directs whether or not a breach should 
take place, would be problematic. This is because until individual facts become evident, it is 
impossible to outline whether breaching would be the best option. The normative element relates to 
the fact that claiming that utilitarian principles can be satisfied in advance of the individual 
circumstances of each potential efficient breach scenario becoming evident, is impossible. Also, a 
prescriptive approach in this setting risks undermining individual autonomy. 
 
7.8 Overall Conclusion 
 
This original formulation of efficient breach differs from the classic Holmes inspired iteration. This 
is because it specifies the circumstances and setting in which it may occur, namely commercial 
contracting. By focusing on this context, it is possible to demonstrate how efficient breach may 
function legitimately. This is because its intention is profit production meaning that maximising the 
level of wealth that flows from those contracts is the parties’ focus.  
Focusing on the commercial context allows the rational decision maker paradigm to be applied, as 
the primary focus of commercial parties is producing profit. These parties are also best placed to 
make decisions in their own interests. It is asserted that they will be able to assess whether any 
ramifications extending beyond the breach in isolation are impactful enough to deter it. Also, the 
suggestion is that commercial parties (in comparison to non-commercial parties) are likely to possess, 
or may reasonably be expected to possess a more developed understanding of contract law’s default 
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rules regarding breach of contract, which involves enforcing a payment of damages over specific 
performance.  
It was set out that in this setting, awards of damage may legitimately be quantified in monetary terms. 
This is because transactions will generally take place in a market where replacements may be 
acquired. As such, value can be objectively assessed based on market value. These transactions will 
also tend to involve money or an equivalent. It is because of the existence of a market for a 
replacement, that damages will be preferred to specific performance. Furthermore, intangible losses 
which are inherently difficult to quantify will not be considered. This is standard practice within 
commercial contracting which simplifies the damage calculation process.  
Additionally, in contrast with more prescriptive approaches, this iteration of efficient breach does 
not require that it should be pursued where it is available. Importantly, it does not suggest that the 
opportunity to breach and pay damages should be available in all contracting relationships. Its 
prerequisites include that a damage award must reflect the expectation interest as it is essential that 
the party who suffers a breach is compensated effectively. The breaching party should account for 
this cost. Next, a decision to breach the terms of a contract should be inspired only by efficiency. An 
efficient breach may be pursued where the breaching party deems it to suit their preferences. Finally, 
this approach is permissive, rather than mandatory, providing efficient optionality.   
It was outlined that in the commercial context, an instrumentalist approach may be applied with 
regard to an efficient breach. This is on the basis that the overriding intention behind commercial 
contracts is profit generation and, by proxy, wealth maximisation. As such, that objective can be 
achieved by utilising an instrumentalist approach. Most importantly, nothing is to be inferred 
regarding the legitimacy of instrumentalist approaches in other legal settings.  
It was suggested that the opportunity to make a decision to breach efficiently offers flexibility. This 
is in the sense that parties can adapt to unforeseen contingencies cost-effectively. Further, that it 
would be wrong to disallow such behaviour on the basis that the parties entered into the contract 
seeking to generate a profit. Importantly, the availability of efficiency gains will not necessarily mean 
that breach must take place. This decision may account for factors such as protecting existing 
relationships or a reputation within a particular industry. With this in mind, the decision to perform 
or to attempt to renegotiate the agreement could be made. However, should a party opt to breach, 
they will be justified in doing so. This justification applies both to the relevant party’s choice to 
breach efficiently, and also, to the law’s approach in limiting the available remedy to expectation 
damages. The use of this remedy in commercial contract disputes effectively condones the breach.  
Existing defences of efficient breach were then discussed. This was examined in order to outline how 
this version of efficient breach differs from those which preceded it. They included Shavell’s defence 
based on adapting to unforeseen contingencies which are inevitable based on the incomplete nature 
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of contracts, as well as the altered view of contractual performance noted by Markovits and Schwartz. 
It was made clear that this approach is original based on the focus on commercial contracting which 
allows expectation damages to be justified based on the underlying profit generation intent 
underpinning them. 
Finally, epistemic and normative justifications add weight to the case for efficient breach within the 
context of commercial contracting which has been made. The epistemic element relates to the fact 
that a prescriptive approach, which directs whether or not a breach should take place, is problematic. 
Until individual facts become evident, it is impossible to outline whether breaching would be the 
best option in a particular case. The normative issues are twofold. First, claims that suggest that 
utilitarian principles can be satisfied in advance of the individual circumstances of each potential 
efficient breach scenario becoming evident cannot be made. Secondly, a generally prescriptive 
approach runs the risk of undermining individual autonomy. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion: The Functionality of Efficient Breach in the Commercial Context  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The intention of this thesis was to outline the functionality of the theory of efficient breach within 
the context of commercial contracting. To achieve this, six questions were considered. These 
concerned outlining the characteristics of a commercial contract, why commercial contracts are 
treated differently to non-commercial contracts, whether English contract law is based on promising, 
what is an efficient breach, whether the criticisms directed at the theory of efficient breach derail it, 
and finally, when and where may efficient breach function. The methodology that was adopted 
consisted of looking at efficient breach through a commercial lens. However, in order to answer each 
of the questions at hand, a number of varying approaches were utilised, though they were broadly 
doctrinal. 
Broadly, this thesis made two primary original contributions. The first concerned the commercial 
context within which efficient breach was analysed. This approach has not been applied previously. 
Based on this it was set out that the efficient breach of commercial contracts is legitimate based on 
the underlying profit generation intent that is exhibited by parties to commercial contracts. As a 
result, commercial contracting is the natural environment in which efficient breach may be applied. 
The second concerned the fact that this is the first major discussion of efficient breach which applies 
the theory to the English law of contract as a large quantity of the relevant literature has emerged 
from the American schools of law and economics. It was set out that English contract law is an 
appropriate realm for this discussion to take place within. This is on the basis that the UK is a major 
centre for the hearing of commercial disputes, and that a large volume of English contract law 
emanates from the commercial sector. 
 
8.2 Chapter 2: The Commercial Distinction in English Contact Law  
 
Chapter 2 established a definition of “commercial” within contract law. This definition was not 
intended to be all-encompassing and was not meant to be applicable in all settings. The focus was on 
identifying the characteristics embodied by an archetypal commercial contract in order to ground the 
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analysis of efficient breach that followed. It was set out that a commercial distinction exists within 
contract law despite it being unsatisfactorily defined. This distinction was highlighted by reference 
to the construction and interpretation of commercial contracts, as well as by analysing relevant case 
law. The next task was outlining what ‘commercial’ is perceived to mean. Areas of interest included 
the Commercial Court, as well as legal history, namely the development of what has been described 
as commercial law. It was evident that commercial parties have historically been treated as distinct 
from the general public. However, it was clear that the evident characteristics of such a party, namely 
being a member of the merchant class, were outdated. This is because of the wider range of 
commercial parties that exist today. 
A modern definition of commercial was reverse engineered by identifying common themes relating 
to a commercial distinction shared by tax law, the law of partnership, company law and patent law. 
Non-commercial contracts were then discounted. As regards consumer contracts, it was set out that 
a consumer will be clearly distinct from commercial parties. This is based on the definitions offered 
in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012. The other forms of contract that were discounted were of a personal nature. These included 
contracts of employment and non-commercial contracts for the sale of goods. There was also a note 
on government bodies, which are able to enter into contracts of both a commercial and non-
commercial nature. Mutuals, Co-operatives, Social Enterprises and Community Interest Companies 
were also be discussed. This was because they provided examples where the boundary between 
commercial and non-commercial is less clear. This discussion was carried out to acknowledge that 
this blurred line exists in some cases. However, this was not problematic, as the definition of 
commercial that was advanced was not intended to be an all-encompassing one that could be applied 
in all settings.  
It was established that the key elements when defining a commercial party are that an organised 
business activity is carried out with the overriding intention of generating a profit. This business 
activity will usually take place as part of a party’s trade, profession or vocation. It will often be done 
through business forms including sole traders, partnerships or companies. It was also asserted that a 
commercial contract will feature only commercial parties who are acting with an overarching 
business activity in mind. This will apply both in a general sense, as well as with respect to the 
activity (in this case a contract) in question.  
 
8.3 Chapter 3: The Rationale behind the Commercial Distinction in English Contract Law  
 
Chapter 3 outlined why commercial contracts are treated differently to non-commercial contracts. 
To achieve this, literature on the process of judicial decision-making as well as the work of the 
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American Legal Realists, was considered. It was highlighted there exists the potential that non-legal 
norms could factor into judicial decision making in commercial cases. It was noted that within the 
English common law system the importance of existing precedent cannot be discounted. This is 
because judges are bound to follow the rulings of previous courts, as well as to adhere to the 
reasoning provided.  
It is the case that the fundamental structure of English contract law will remain the same whether a 
dispute concerns a commercial contract or otherwise. However, there is a difference in approach 
where a right is being pursued for commercial reasons. This is necessary in order to ensure that 
certainty and predictability in commercial dealing can be guaranteed. Predictability is based on 
commercial norms and practices that are influenced by context. When rights are being protected or 
enforced for commercial purposes, intended to generate profit, the courts will account for factors 
including commercial reasonableness, as well as industry customs and practices. In contrast, the 
courts treat the pursuit of rights that are of an individual or personal nature differently. These may 
include those that are intended to create pleasure or facilitate enjoyment. Ultimately, an interest-
based approach is adopted where courts will consider personal preferences ahead of what would 
generally be considered to make commercial sense. Such factors will not be considered in 
commercial cases.1  
This approach can also be seen in equity in the case of proprietary estoppel, as well as in the 
application of fiduciary duties. There is a distinction in the way a court will treat disputes arising 
from commercial and non-commercial relationships. Again, this concerns rights of a personal nature, 
in contrast with attempts to make a commercial gain. The clearest example of this can be seen in the 
decisions of Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd2 and Thorner v Major.3 In Cobbe v Yeoman’s 
Row Management Ltd, it was set out that in a commercial case, the court will seek to avoid the 
uncertainty which promissory estoppel may introduce.4 In Thorner v Major promissory estoppel was 
allowed based on the familial nature of the dispute. In addition, fiduciary duties will only be applied 
by the courts in commercial relationships which require them. This could include trusts, agency 
relationships, partnerships and joint ventures for example.5 These feature varying rights, interests 
and expectations which require varying levels of protection and enforcement.6  
                                                          
1 See 3.7 Overall Conclusion. 
2 [2008] 1 WLR 1752. 
3 [2009] UKHL 18. 
4 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752 [81] (Walker LJ); See also Motivate 
Publishing FZ LLC v Hello Ltd [2015] EWHC 1554 (Ch) [74]. 
5 See Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46; Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74; Aluminium Industrie 
Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium [1976] 1 WLR 676; See also A Mason ‘The place of equity and equitable 
remedies in the contemporary common law world’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238, 245; See also 
Steven White ‘Commercial Relationships and the Burgeoning Fiduciary Principle’ (2000) 9 Griffith Law 
Review 98, 99. 
6 See 3.6 A similar approach in Equity. 
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8.4 Chapter 4: An Argument against Promise as the Basis of English Contract Law: Allaying 
Concerns Regarding Efficient Breach in the Commercial Contracting Context 
 
Chapter 4 offered a number of contributions regarding issues which relate to a perceived likeness 
between breaking a promise, and a breach of contract. The moral issues that are raised regarding 
efficient breach were dealt with. These issues may lead to the belief that breach of contract is 
fundamentally wrong because it is perceived to be synonymous with breaking a promise. However, 
it is the case that promising requires an existing relationship of trust and confidence between 
promisor and promisee. The existence of such a relationship contributes to any moral force which 
influences whether or not a promise will be kept. Unlike promises, contracts invoke reliance without 
the necessity for a pre-existing relationship of trust and confidence between those involved. Their 
primary function is to provide a method for one party to seek an enforceable remedy following a 
breach, a feature which promises lack. As such, promise is not, and moreover, should not be 
considered to form the basis of contracting within English law. In addition, the domain in which 
contracting operates differs from that of promising. This is reflected by the state’s role in enforcing 
contracts. They are not enforcing a standard morality between individuals. They are protecting 
reciprocal exchanges using the court system. This is particularly resonant within the commercial 
contracting context. 
It is the case that English contract law has developed with reciprocity in mind. It is practically 
detached from promising, based on its tortious roots. This is unlike the contract law of other 
jurisdictions which appear to feature promise as a foundational principle. The result is that it is 
naturally consequentialist in a positive sense. This is particularly apparent with regard to the approach 
to assessing damages for breach of contract. Damages intend to provide compensation for any 
damage, loss, or injury suffered because of a breach. They seek to place a party, as far as is possible, 
in the position that they would have been in, had the contract been performed. Clearly, this method 
is based on consequentialism as it provides compensation based on the actual loss suffered. Also, in 
any contract it is the consequences of entering into it which provides the reason for doing so. 
Specifically, commercial contracts are entered into primarily to generate a profit. Resultantly, an act 
consequentialist approach is legitimate as it allows scope to maximise levels of profit, or equally 
minimise loss. Further, it is clear that the theory of efficient breach requires that a consequentialist 
approach is adopted.  
Finally, the negative view of promise breaking and to breach of contract in a general sense appears 
to be as a result of some intangible standard of ethics or virtues regarding the type of behaviour that 
is right or wrong. However, this standard is intuitive, rather than evidenced. Commercial contracting 
is geared towards profit generation. As such, it is reasonable to assert that a different standard should 
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be applied to assessing any moral requirements which parties are held to. It follows that an efficient 
breach in the context of commercial contracting cannot be discounted based on issues of morality 
arising from promise breaking.  
Ultimately, the suggestion is that by focusing on commercial contracting which is geared towards 
profit generation, it is reasonable to assert that a different approach should be applied to assessing 
any moral standard to which parties should be held. This will mean that efficient breach in the context 
of commercial contracting cannot be discounted based purely on issues of morality which are linked 
to promise breaking.7  
 
8.5 Chapter 5: The Economic Analysis of Law and the Theory of Efficient Breach 
 
Chapter 5 outlined the economic analysis of law before briefly setting out some of its criticisms. It 
was made clear that these are not problematic. This is on the basis that the claims which are made 
relate only to the breach of commercial contracts. The theory of efficient breach was introduced in 
order to ensure that it was fully understood. This was followed by a discussion of efficiency which 
was carried out in order to highlight the different approaches to efficiency which are adopted in 
various settings. Furthermore, it was important to justify which approach, or approaches should be 
utilised in this context. This included discussing the role which efficiency may play within decision-
making. Issues which may potentially stem from the law’s pursuit of efficiency were also 
highlighted. This included the idea that the value of the legal process may extend beyond it.  
It was set out that the pursuit of efficiency may be implemented in appropriate settings. Also, that 
the efficient breach of commercial contracts is such a setting. Within the context of commercial 
contracting, efficiency may be judged legitimately based on the principle of wealth maximisation 
where monetary value is the appropriate measure, as well as by utilising the Kaldor-hicks criterion 
featuring the caveat that actual compensation is provided for losses suffered. It was important to 
make clear that this claim is limited to commercial contracts only. It was also set out that a simplistic 
approach to defining an efficient breach would be adopted. This involves the breach of a contract’s 
terms where it is more cost effective to do so. It will take into account the total cost of performance 
versus the costs of breach and the payment of compensatory damages. This may be done either to 
reduce losses, or to maximise gains.8  
                                                          
7 See 4.9 Overall Conclusion. 
8 See 5.9 Overall Conclusion; See also Melvin A Eisenberg, ‘Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law’ (2005) 93 California Law 
Review 975, 997: ‘The theory of efficient breach holds that breach of contract is efficient, and therefore 
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8.6 Chapter 6: Criticisms of the Theory of Efficient Breach 
 
Chapter 6 outlined criticisms which have been directed at the theory of efficient breach. This was 
done in order to demonstrate why they are inapplicable with respect to the claims which this thesis 
makes regarding the efficient breach of commercial contracts. A thematic approach which involved 
categorising each of the criticisms between four key themes. These included potential clashes with 
existing legal doctrines, criticisms relating to the application of what is an instrumentalist approach 
to the law, issues relating to existing commercial practices and issues relating to the theory’s practical 
application.  
First, it was set out that the potential clashes between the efficient breach of commercial contracts 
and existing legal doctrines, including issues relating to the calculation of damages, a likeness with 
torts, infringements on property rights and good faith in commercial contracting and a contrast with 
trust law, do not negate the legitimacy of the theory.9 Second, it was outlined that it is legitimate to 
utilise the instrumentalist approach of wealth maximisation. This involves applying the theory of 
efficient breach within the commercial contracting context. This is legitimate as a result of the 
parties’ overriding profit generating intent. A key point was that this does not require that it should 
take place, only that it legitimately could.10 Third, discussion centred on potential clashes based on 
existing commercial practices. The suggestion was that the efficient breach of commercial contracts 
would cause no negative impact on the functionality of the commercial system in terms of eroding 
trust. This is on the basis that it is contract, rather than a relationship of trust and confidence that 
supports the commercial system. This is because it allows parties to operate in the knowledge that 
they will be able to pursue a remedy following a breach. The suggestion that contractual performance 
will be preferred by both lay people and business people was also discounted.11 The final category 
concerned the practical application of the theory of efficient breach. It was set out that hypothetical 
scenarios customarily used within efficient breach literature do not prove or disprove the theory’s 
functionality. It was also made clear that the efficiency of an award of damages will be dictated by 
transaction costs attached. Importantly, these costs can only be ascertained based on evidence. As a 
result, any claims regarding how unknown transaction costs will impact efficiency cannot be proved. 
However, it is the case that contracting parties will be able to make pre-breach predictions. These 
will be based upon pre-existing knowledge and experience, as well as advice from parties such as 
lawyers or accountants. Importantly, there is clear evidence that the opportunity to breach efficiently 
                                                          
desirable, if the promisor's gain from breach, after payment of expectation damages, will exceed the 
promisee's loss from breach’. 
9 See 6.2.6 Conclusions Regarding Potential Clashes and Contrasts with Legal Doctrines. 
10 See 6.3.3 Conclusion. 
11 See 6.4.4 Conclusion. 
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may arise. Parties will sometimes view breach to be more cost-effective than performance and, on 
this basis, breach is efficient. This reasoning is demonstrated by the relevant case law.12 
Ultimately, the original contribution made by chapter 6 came in setting out, in a thematic, as well as 
systematic fashion, why these criticisms of the theory of efficient breach are inapplicable with respect 
to commercial contracts. This allowed the case for the theory’s application to be made in chapter 7. 
 
8.7 Chapter 7: Making the Case for Efficient Breach in a Commercial Context 
 
Chapter 7 set out that this iteration of efficient breach differs from the version which is inspired by 
Holmes.13 This is in the sense that it specifies the circumstances and setting where an efficient breach 
may take place, namely commercial contracting. The focus on the commercial context meant that it 
was possible to demonstrate how efficient breach may function legitimately. This was based on the 
fact that commercial contracts exist in order to facilitate profit production. The result is that the 
intention of the parties is to maximise the wealth which flows from them. This allows the rational 
decision maker paradigm to be applied. Furthermore, the suggestion was that individual commercial 
parties are best placed to make decisions based on their own interests and that in comparison to non-
commercial parties, they are likely to possess, or may reasonably be expected to possess, a deeper 
understanding of contract law’s default rules which concern compensatory damages following a 
breach of contract. Here it is legitimate to quantify awards of damages in monetary terms. This is 
because the transactions in question tend to occur in a market, meaning that replacements are likely 
to be available. This will mean that value may be objectively assessed based on market value. In 
addition, the transactions in question tend to involve money or an equivalent. This means that 
damages will be preferred to specific performance. In addition, intangible losses are not considered 
within commercial cases.  
This iteration of efficient breach contrasts with more prescriptive approaches. It does not require that 
it should always be pursued. What it provides is efficient optionality. The claim is simply that it may 
legitimately be utilised where the breaching party deems it to be the most attractive option. It is also 
important to note that there is no suggestion that the opportunity to breach and pay damages should 
be available in all contracting relationships. The commercial focus allows that an instrumentalist 
approach may be applied regarding efficient breach. Again, this is due to the fact that the overriding 
intention behind commercial contracting is profit generation. This means that a wealth maximisation 
based approach may be utilised here. Again, nothing is to be inferred regarding the legitimacy of 
                                                          
12 See 6.5.3 Conclusion. 
13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 462. Reprinted  
in (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991, 995. 
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instrumentalist approaches in other legal settings. The ability to breach efficiently offers flexibility 
in the sense that parties can adapt to unforeseen contingencies. In addition, it would be inappropriate 
to disallow such behaviour as the parties entered into the contract with the intention of generating 
profit. However, the fact that efficiency gains may be available does not necessitate that a breach 
takes place. Other factors such as protecting existing relationships or a reputation within a particular 
industry may influence the decision. This could mean that performance or renegotiation could also 
occur. Next, existing defences of efficient breach were discussed in order to highlight the originality 
of this approach. Again, this is based on the focus on commercial contracting. Finally, it was set out 
that there are additional epistemic and normative justifications which support the case which is being 
made for efficient breach within the context of commercial contracting. The epistemic element 
concerns the fact that a prescriptive approach is problematic because until individual facts become 
evident, a case for, or against breach, cannot be made. The normative issues concern the fact that 
claims suggesting that utilitarian principles can be satisfied in advance of the individual 
circumstances of each potential efficient breach scenario becoming evident cannot be made. Also, 
that the application of prescriptive approaches in this contracting context runs the risk of undermining 
individual autonomy requirements. 
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Appendix 
 
List of Statutes 
UK Statutes 
 
Charities Act 2011. 
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004. 
Companies Act 2006. 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014. 
Corporation Tax Act 2009. 
Corporation Tax Act 2010. 
Employment Rights Act 1996. 
Finance Act 2010. 
Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005. 
Income Tax Act 2007. 
Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998. 
Partnership Act 1890. 
Patents Act 1977. 
Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
State Immunity Act 1978. 
Statute of Monopolies 1623. 
Theft Act 1968. 
Trade Disputes Act 1906. 
Trustee Act 1924. 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
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Other Statutes, Codes, etc. 
 
Communication from the Commission, ‘Social Business Initiative Creating a Favourable Climate 
for Social Enterprises, Key Stakeholders in the Social Economy and Innovation’, COM (2011). 
Community Patent Convention 76/76/EEC of 18 May 1976 for the European patent for the 
common market [1976] OJ L129/30, Article 31. 
Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC [2005] OJ L 149/22. Article 2(a). 
Council Directive 2011/7/EC of 16 February 2011 On combating late payment in commercial 
transactions (3). 
European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, 74- European Treaty Series No. 74, 
Article 7(1). 
The French Code Civil – Articles 1104, 1184, 1217, and 1221. 
The German Civil Code – Section 241. 
Patent Act 1981 (Germany) Section 11. 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, Article 31 s 1(c). 
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